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Introduction
The recent crisis has shown that ﬁnancial risk management not only lies at the
core of our economy, but at the heart of our modern society. Increasingly strong
links between international markets and various sectors in our economy make the
quantiﬁcation and monitoring of ﬁnancial risks essential for the health of our ﬁ-
nancial system and thus for the functioning of the entire society. Financial risk
aﬀects all the things which are most precious to all of us: our health care system,
our retirement date and income, the overall quality of education and even the per-
formance of our favorite football club. As a consequence, measuring, monitoring
and managing risk have become increasingly important and the ﬁeld of ﬁnance is
the axis in many decision making processes.
The previous examples illustrate the importance of ﬁnancial risk management,
but they also show how broad the ﬁeld is. Addressing all types of ﬁnancial risk is
not only beyond the scope of this thesis, but probably even a mission impossible.
We therefore only address certain types of risk and try to narrow down the focus
of this thesis per chapter. We start on a macroeconomic level, by determining
the components of global ﬁnancial risk and more speciﬁcally international bubbles
in equity prices. We proceed by focusing on the risk of individual stocks in the
US. We measure the risk in terms of CAPM betas and show the eﬀects of beta
estimates on asset pricing tests and portfolio choice. Thereafter, we narrow our
universe further down by looking at domestic equity investment by US pension
funds. The risk-adjusted performance of domestic equity portfolios is measured
and we give insights in the benchmarks for performance evaluation and cost levels
of the pension industry. Eventually, we focus on the individual pension plan
participant, by measuring the annuity risk that he faces at the retirement date.
We develop and price an option that protects participants against this risk, taking
into account possible regret in the decision making process.
1
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1.1 Global ﬁnancial risk and bubbles
Bubbles in equity prices have attracted enormous scholarly interest ever since the
infamous Dutch tulip mania in 1637. Over the last centuries many eﬀorts were
initiated in trying to understand the dynamics of the bubbles. The literature on
the topic may be best described by the most extreme views on these extraordinary
events; irrational exuberance1 on the one hand and fully rational expectations2 on
the other. Despite the disagreement on the rationality of the bubble, there seems
to be consensus on the importance of innovation in many bubbles. Examples of
the link between bubbles and innovation are the IT innovations in the nineties and
the corresponding NASDAQ bubble and the emergence of railroad transportation
with the accompanying railroad mania halfway the nineteenth century. Based on
this last example a framework was developed for explaining the bubbles in share
prices during innovations.3
The ﬁrst global ﬁnancial bubble in stock prices occurred in 1720 in Paris, Lon-
don and the Netherlands and was never considered to be caused by innovations.
Explanations for these linked bubbles primarily focus on the irrationality of in-
vestor speculation and the corresponding stock price behavior of two large ﬁrms:
the South Sea Company in Great Britain and the Mississippi Company in France.
In chapter 2 we examine a broad cross-section of largely new security price data to
evaluate the causes of the bubbles. Using the collected stock prices for British and
Dutch ﬁrms in 1720, we ﬁnd evidence against indiscriminate irrational exuberance
and evidence in favor of speculation about two factors: the Atlantic trade and the
incorporation of insurance companies.
The war of the Spanish Succession and the war of the Quadruple Alliance had
severely weakened the Spanish position in the Americas and deprived them of
the Asiento, the right to trade slaves with the West. Expectations about future
proﬁts of the Atlantic trade led to price run ups in the ﬁrms trading with the
West. Beside the developments overseas, a ﬁnancial innovation in the insurance
business took place. From pooling private capital for the insurance of ships by
rich business men, insurance gradually transformed into a new corporate form.
Limited liability companies were set up, gathering large pools of capital via the
issuance of shares. Through many discussions of politicians and business men, we
are able to determine that the expectations about the future proﬁts of the new
corporate form were high. Consequently, the share prices of insurance companies
bubbled much stronger than those of any other industry. Our ﬁndings are therefore
consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁnancial bubbles require a plausible story to
justify investor optimism.
1 Cf.Dale, Johnson, and Tang (2005) and Vissering (1863)
2 Cf. Garber (1990)
3 Cf. Pastor and Veronesi (2009)
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1.2 Measuring risk of individual stocks
Ever since the Capital Asset Pricing Model was introduced by among others Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965), it has been a cornerstone in the asset pricing literature.
During the last decades many extensions and improvements on the CAPM were
proposed. One of the most important generalizations concerns the time variation
in betas. Although many empirical studies provide evidence of the time varia-
tion in betas, there is no agreement on the best speciﬁcation. The literature is
sharply divided in parametric and non-parametric speciﬁcations for beta dynam-
ics. In the parametric speciﬁcation4 betas are a function of conditioning variables,
whereas non-parametric speciﬁcations use rolling windows regressions, short win-
dow regressions or Kalman-ﬁlters to model the time variation. Another debate in
the asset pricing literature concerns the estimation methods. A majority of stud-
ies groups stocks into portfolios when estimating asset pricing models5, whereas
others6 argue that individual stocks should be used for asset pricing purposes.
In chapter 3, we improve both the speciﬁcation and estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
betas. Time variation in betas is modeled by combining a parametric speciﬁcation
based on economic theory with a non-parametric approach based on data-driven
ﬁlters. The non-parametric speciﬁcation is improved by mixing data at diﬀerent
frequencies using the MIDAS-approach, and by specifying a ﬂexible weighting
function that gives larger weights to more recent observations. We allow the
optimal combination of parametric and non-parametric betas to vary per stock and
over time. We also increase the precision of individual beta estimates by setting
up a hierarchical Bayesian panel data model that imposes a common structure on
the parameters. The model shrinks the ﬁrm-speciﬁc beta estimates towards the
cross-sectional mean for stocks with few time series observations. The hierarchical
structure also enables us to include a large number of factors in our model, while
eﬃciently estimating the parameters of the hierarchical distribution.
We show that the dynamics of large, value stocks are better described by a non-
parametric speciﬁcation, whereas for small growth stocks the parametric approach
is preferred. Furthermore, the optimal speciﬁcation loads more heavily on the
stable, non-parametric beta during periods of distress. We also document that our
accurate beta estimates lead to a large increase in the cross-sectional explanatory
power of the conditional CAPM. Our new speciﬁcation results in sharply reduced
and insigniﬁcant pricing errors, loads signiﬁcantly on the beta estimates from the
panel model in cross-sectional regressions and gives risk premium estimates very
close to the sample mean. We are also able to conﬁrm the ﬁnding by Ang, Liu,
and Schwarz (2008), that the formation of traditional asset pricing portfolios leads
to a reduction in cross-sectional variation in betas, which results in large standard
errors of the constant and relatively small loadings on betas in cross-sectional
regressions. In addition, we provide evidence that there is considerable variation
in alphas and betas within traditional asset pricing portfolios. Finally, chapter 3
4 Cf. Shanken (1990) and Ferson and Harvey (1999)
5 Cf. Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992)
6 Cf. Avramov and Chordia (2006a) and Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008)
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shows that using the betas to forecast the covariance matrix of returns results in
a signiﬁcant improvement in the out-of-sample performance of minimum variance
portfolios.
1.3 Risk-adjusted Equity Performance of
Pension Funds
The risk measurement and management of pension funds is one of the most chal-
lenging tasks in current day ﬁnance. Asset allocation, asset-liability management,
longevity risk and intergenerational risk sharing are just a taste of the many de-
cisions and risks at stake for pension fund managers. Strangely enough, when
compared to the mutual fund industry, pension fund managers enjoy about half
of the support from the academic world.7 The low number of academic studies
on pension funds can be attributed to a general lack of comprehensive data on
pension funds. Where mutual funds have an obligation to report their returns,
investment styles and fees to the SEC on a regular basis, pension funds have no
such requirement. As a result, we have a large database with mutual fund data
(CRSP) and hardly any data on pension funds. It is therefore not surprising that
there is general consensus on mutual fund underperformance8, while there is a
large debate on the performance of pension funds9.
The diﬀerent conclusions on pension fund performance may simply be at-
tributed to the various characteristics of the data sets employed in earlier work.
Some studies focus their attention on deﬁned beneﬁt funds (which are generally
larger), whereas others merely look at deﬁned contribution plans. Variation in per-
formance ﬁgures may also be explained by diﬀerences between corporate, public
or other10 funds. Data sets typically contain a speciﬁc type of fund, e.g. corporate
deﬁned beneﬁt funds, which make generalizations of results disputable. A more
fundamental problem of pension fund data concerns the data provider. A large
majority of studies is performed on manager-level data, i.e. data provided by as-
set management companies, investing on behalf of pension funds. Although this
may give insight in the overall performance, scholars are not able to distinguish
between funds since one manager may work for more than one fund, and funds
employ more than one manager. Finally, all pension data provided by either funds
or asset management companies may suﬀer from biases since there is no obligation
to report.
CEM Benchmarking Inc. (CEM) was one of the ﬁrst to recognize the diﬃcul-
ties with pension fund data and started to send out questionnaires to funds from
1990 on, requesting performance, benchmark and cost ﬁgures. CEM oﬀered pen-
7 A search on scholar.google.com for “mutual fund” results in 708,000 hits, whereas “pension
fund” leads to only 359,000 hits. Similarly, a search on sciencedirect.com for “mutual fund”
results in 24,665 articles and “pension fund” in 12,041 articles.
8 Cf. Malkiel (1995) and Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004)
9 Cf.Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2009) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)
10 e.g. churches and universities
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sion funds the opportunity to compare their ﬁgures to peers worldwide, thereby
providing feedback on their asset management decisions and performance ﬁgures.
In chapter 4, we employ the CEM database and provide a comprehensive picture
on the performance of domestic equity mandates of all types of US pension plans
(deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution and corporate, public and other), give
insight in the benchmarks used by pension funds to evaluate their asset managers
and provide a complete overview of the cost levels and cost drivers of pension
funds.
In our evaluation, we are able to distinguish between several types of mandates
(actively vs. passively managed, large cap vs. small cap stocks and internally vs.
externally managed11). By matching CEM data to the Compustat SFAS 158
database, we can also test for the presence of biases resulting from the voluntary
reporting, and ﬁnd that our results do not suﬀer from these biases.
Our results show that pension funds perform very close to their benchmarks,
before and after risk-adjustments, contrasting the strong underperformance of mu-
tual funds. We also document strong diﬀerences, both between funds and over
time, in the benchmarks used to evaluate asset managers of large and small cap
mandates. Chapter 4 also shows that average cost levels of pension funds amount
to 50 basis points, whereas mutual fund fees add up to 150 basis points on an
annual basis12, partially explaining the performance gap between pension and
mutual funds. By regressing costs cross-sectionally on fund size, we also provide
evidence of the scale advantages in costs of domestic equity investments, both in
internally and externally managed portfolios. The scale advantages in externally
managed portfolios indicate that pension funds have bargaining power with exter-
nal parties in their domestic equity mandates. The monitoring power of pension
funds is illustrated by comparing internally and externally managed mandates and
by including size as control variable in risk-adjusted performance regressions. We
argue that a combination of scale advantages, bargaining power and monitoring
abilities, reduces the scale and probability of underperformance of pension funds.
1.4 Pricing Retirement Risk Protection and
Behavioral Biases
Narrowing our center of attention further down to the individual, we focus on
the deﬁned contribution pension plan participant shortly before his retirement
date. In the years before retirement, deﬁned contribution plan participants face
considerable risks. Investment risk can be reduced by gradually moving towards a
riskless strategy as the retirement date approaches. Mortality risk can be covered
by standard insurance products. However, annuity risk is virtually impossible
to hedge and yet can aﬀect the after-retirement income drastically. As a result,
deﬁned contribution plan participants aﬀront a diﬃcult decision shortly before
their retirement date: if and when should they convert their retirement capital
11 This last distinction is only possible for deﬁned beneﬁt funds due to data restrictions.
12 Cf. Swensen (2005)
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into a life annuity? The high duration of the life annuity induces a substantial
price sensitivity with respect to long-term interest rates. Retiring a month earlier
or later can therefore easily amount to 10% diﬀerence in after-retirement income.
Consequently, the option to time the retirement date is extremely valuable.13
In addition to the risks and uncertainties of the retirement investment decision,
numerous experiments have shown14 that regret aversion plays an important role
in human decision making, complicating the process even further. Imagine that
your co-worker, who retired half a year earlier than you, has a 10% higher income,
while converting the same amount of capital at retirement.
In order to protect deﬁned contribution plan participants against annuity risk
at their retirement date and possible regret of bad timing, we develop and price
a lookback option on a life annuity contract in chapter 5. The lookback life an-
nuity option guarantees that participants have made the optimal timing decision
and provides the ultimate protection against annuity risk at retirement. We ﬁrst
determine a closed-form option value under the restriction that the option holder
invests risklessly during the time to maturity of the option and without the guar-
antee that the exact amount of retirement capital is converted into a life annuity
at retirement. Thereafter, the investment restriction is relaxed, the guarantee of
exact conversion is imposed and the option is priced via Monte Carlo simulations
in an economic environment with a stochastic discount factor. We proceed by
determining the sensitivities of the option price with respect to its characteristics,
i.e. the type of option, initial interest rate, time to maturity and asset allocation.
We ﬁnd that the price of a lookback option, with a maturity of three years,
amounts to 8-9% of the capital at the option issuance date. The option price is
most sensitive to the exercise price of the option, i.e. pricing alternative options
(e.g. Asian) substantially lowers the price. Time to maturity and interest rate
volatility are other important option price drivers. Asset allocation decisions and
initial interest rates hardly aﬀect the option price.
Finally, some further remarks on the structure of the thesis. In some cases, we
refer for more information to the appendix of the chapter. Further explanations
are always provided in the appendix of the chapter for which the information
is relevant. Typically, we refer to appendices for proofs, posterior distributions,
derivations and additional material. The notation used throughout this thesis,
although fairly similar, may diﬀer for each chapter, but within each chapter the
notation is consistent. Relevant notation is therefore deﬁned within the chapters.
13 Cf. Milevsky and Young (2006)
14 Cf. Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
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New Evidence on the First
Financial Bubble
The ﬁrst global ﬁnancial bubble in stock prices occurred in 1720 in Paris, London
and the Netherlands. Explanations for these linked bubbles primarily focus on the
irrationality of investor speculation and the corresponding stock price behavior
of two large ﬁrms: the South Sea Company in Great Britain and the Mississippi
Company in France. In this chapter we examine a broad cross-section of security
price data to evaluate the causes of the bubbles. Using newly collected stock
prices for British and Dutch ﬁrms in 1720, we ﬁnd evidence against indiscriminate
irrational exuberance and evidence in favor of speculation about two factors: the
Atlantic trade and the incorporation of insurance companies. The fundamentals
of both sectors may have led to high expectations of future growth. Our ﬁndings
are consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁnancial bubbles require a plausible story
to justify investor optimism.1
2.1 Introduction
Asset bubbles are important puzzles in ﬁnancial economics - important because of
their extraordinarily potential for disruption; puzzles because they defy standard
notions of rationality. Recent research in the wake of the NASDAQ bubble and
the global housing bubble has highlighted the role of uncertainty and technolog-
ical innovation in the development of asset bubbles. In particular, Pastor and
Veronesi (2009) and Pastor and Veronesi (2006) argue that technological innova-
tion and investor uncertainty can explain high security valuations and the rapid
rise and fall of stocks related to potentially transformative technological innova-
tions. Their papers make cross-sectional empirical predictions about securities
during periods of technological change. They show that imputed growth rates in
1 This chapter is based on the paper Frehen, Goetzmann, and Rouwenhorst (2009).
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innovative industries can appear irrationally high ex post and that industries in
which bubbles occur will be characterized by high return volatility, high uncer-
tainty and rapid adoption of the new technology. They test these predictions on
19th century railroad securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
In this chapter we revisit one of the most famous events in ﬁnancial history:
the South Sea Bubble of 1720. Along with the earlier Dutch Tulipmania, of the
17th century, the South Sea Bubble is often regarded as an example par excellence
of investor irrationality. However, unlike Tulipmania, which was conﬁned to the
futures market in tulip bulbs, the South Sea Bubble involved many stocks traded
in three diﬀerent countries. Although 1720 is not generally viewed as a period
of technological novelty, we argue in this chapter that there were at least three
critical innovations that took place in a very short span of time; two of which were
ﬁnancial innovations, the other was a major potential shift in the conﬁguration
of global trade. The ﬁrst innovation was ﬁnancial engineering at a national scale.
The Mississippi Company and the South Sea Company issued equity shares in
exchange for government debt; in eﬀect converting the national debt into corporate
stock. This novelty appeared to be a new model for government ﬁnance: a heavily
politically-inﬂuenced corporation that also had exclusive rights and patents to
pursue other ventures. The second innovation was an incipient shift in global
trade. Both of the companies were set up to exploit trade in the Americas. The
Mississippi Company owned the Louisiana territory and the South Sea Company
owned the exclusive right to export African slaves to Spanish America. Spanish
domination of the Atlantic trade was weakened as a result of the War of the
Spanish Succession [1701-1714], and the War of the Quadruple Alliance [1718-
1720], opening the door to increased competition from Britain, France and the
Netherlands. These geopolitical conditions oﬀered great possibilities, but also
great uncertainty.
The third innovation was also ﬁnancial. The ﬁrst publicly traded insurance cor-
porations were chartered in Great Britain 1720, as a result of the famous Bubble
Act. As such, they represented a new model of capital formation and risk-sharing
for maritime insurance ﬁrms - in a nation built on maritime trade. This innova-
tion was rapidly imitated in the Netherlands, despite past Dutch dominance of
maritime insurance. The innovation in insurance form also stirred great debate
and uncertainty about its eﬀects.
Ex post, two of these three innovations had a transformative eﬀect on the global
economy. Although government debt for equity swaps did not survive the ﬁnancial
crisis when the South Sea bubble burst, the Atlantic trade did. The triangle trade
between Europe, Africa and the Caribbean eventually became the dominant inter-
national trade system of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Finally, the emergence
of publicly ﬁnanced, limited liability insurance companies ultimately transformed
risk sharing. The traditional insurance industry, consisting of underwriters which
pooled capital collected via brokers, encountered ﬁerce competition from the new
corporations. The publicly traded insurance companies founded in 1720 survived
and ﬂourished and became models for the insurance trade in both the old and the
new worlds. The public insurance corporation is now the dominant institutional
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form. In this chapter we examine the extent to which the bubble of 1720 might be
explained by current models of technological innovation and share price dynam-
ics. To do so, we collect cross-sectional security price information for a number
of stocks traded in London and the Netherlands. Some of the security price data
is brand new to scholarship. We use these new data to measure cross-sectional
diﬀerences in the timing, steepness and magnitude of share price increases in 1720.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that the dynamics of the South Sea Bubble diﬀered
by industry. We next document the extent to which these industry eﬀects ex-
tended across national boundaries. Our results suggest that speculation about
the Atlantic trade with the Americas was an important factor in investor expec-
tations. We also ﬁnd evidence that market prices and new issues in Britain and
the Netherlands were driven in part by investor expectations about the ﬁnancial
innovations in the insurance trade. On the other hand, we ﬁnd little evidence that
the debt-conversion function of the Mississippi and South Sea companies was an
important factor. Finally, we ﬁnd some qualiﬁed support for the hypothesis that
investors were simply enthusiastic about stocks in general. Most shares rose in
the British and Dutch bubbles, but the growth in those not associated with the
Atlantic trade or with the insurance trade was signiﬁcantly less.
2.2 Background
Most early writers treat the bubbles of 1720 as evidence of investor irrationality.2
Dale, Johnson, and Tang (2005) explicitly test this theory using violations of
the law of one price.3 Others have argued that the bubbles were not necessarily
evidence of irrational expectations on the part of investors, but rather the result of
plausible expectations of future returns4, or a reasonable response to such ﬁnancial
innovations as the liquidity of shares and the potential of companies to exploit new
capital markets and investment opportunities.5 Garber (1990) shows how the high
price for the South Sea Company might have been justiﬁed by plausible expected
returns on invested capital. On the other hand, Velde (2009) comes to opposite
conclusions for the Mississippi Company, arguing that in the short-term it was
ﬁnancially over-extended.
An important challenge for ﬁnancial historians is to understand how investor
expectations at the time could have driven stock prices up by many multiples in
the space of a few months. What could have made investors suddenly willing to
pay so much for shares in these companies? In this chapter we do not seek to test
the rationality of investors but rather to provide more information about what
factors may have inﬂuenced their beliefs. For example, if the bubbles in the South
Sea Company and the Mississippi Company were driven by expectations about
the future proﬁtability of Atlantic trade - in which both ﬁrms held patents - then
2 Cf. Mackay (1852), Vissering (1863), Van Rijn (1899) and Kindleberger (1978).
3 In response, Shea (2007) argues that the Dale, Johnson, and Tang (2005) test of the law of
one price using share subscriptions is infeasible.
4 Garber (1990).
5 Cf. Scott (1910) and Neal (1990).
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other ﬁrms engaged in Atlantic trade should also have experienced high price run-
ups in 1720, and conversely, prices of ﬁrms not engaged in the trade should not
have grown as much. If the speculation was about the debt-conversion operations
of the companies then other ﬁnancial ﬁrms should have experienced comparable
price run-ups. Thus, the cross-sectional variation in stock returns of the 1720s may
reveal the factor-speciﬁc basis for investor aspirations that created the bubble -
whether rational or not. The contrary hypothesis is that irrational exuberance in
1720 might simply have been indiscriminate, aﬀecting all stocks. In this case we
would not expect to ﬁnd systematic diﬀerences across industries.
The barrier to examining the 1720 bubble in cross-section has always been one
of data. Up to this point, the prices for some very important companies such as
the Dutch East Indies and Dutch West Indies companies have not been available
to researchers. Scholars have also not had access to prices for the considerable
number of initial public oﬀerings from the London and Dutch markets that were
ﬂoated in 1720. While excellent British price data for several companies has been
collected and studied6 no one has yet made a comparative study of the prices for
British insurance companies for that period, despite the fact that they were the
focus of the main Parliamentary legislation regulating ﬁnancial markets in 1720,
commonly known as the Bubble Act.
In this chapter we collect share prices for Dutch and English companies from
a Dutch newspaper published in 1720, the Leydse Courant. We also collect price
data for Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance from the leading
London ﬁnancial periodical of the time, The Course of the Exchange. Together
with the British data from Neal (1990) we are able to track the course of 26 Dutch
company stocks through the entirety 1720, including the Dutch East and West
Indies Companies and a broad sample of British ﬁrms over the same interval. We
also use Dutch company archives to provide institutional details about mechanisms
of share speculation.
We ﬁnd evidence against indiscriminate irrational exuberance and evidence in
favor of speculation about two factors: the Atlantic trade and the incorporation
of insurance companies. The fundamentals of both sectors may have led to high
expectations of future growth. The Atlantic trade was the focus of considerable
political and economic activity around 1720 and the insurance business was under-
going a transition towards the corporate form. Other sectors, such as the ﬁnancial
industry and ﬁrms engaged in the Asian trade evidently did not inspire the same
scale or investor enthusiasm. The South Sea and Mississippi bubbles were clearly
not limited to major ﬁrms operating to refund government debt.
The main contribution of this chapter is the introduction of a cross-sectional
analysis of share prices in 1720 in order to test competing theories about investor
expectations in the ﬁrst great crash of the world’s stock markets. It also introduces
a hitherto unstudied source of Dutch company prices that documents the scale and
timing of the crash in the Netherlands. This data set allows us to study an early
and important example of the international propagation of a ﬁnancial crisis.
6 Cf. Parsons (1974), Neal (1990), Temin and Voth (2004), Shea (2007), Dale, Johnson, and
Tang (2005), Carlos, Maguire, and Neal (2006).
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2.3 Data
We collected prices reported for Dutch and British companies from the Leydse
Courant (preserved in the National Library of the Netherlands in the Hague) over
the period November 1719 to December 1720.7 These include London transactions
of British companies, as well as occasional prices for the same ﬁrms on exchanges
in the Netherlands. We added these prices to those collected by Larry Neal and
used in Neal (1990) to study capital market integration in the 18th century.8 We
augmented the Neal data with daily quotation series’ from the The Course of the
Exchange for the two major British insurance companies.
Evidently no previous scholarship had looked at a complete sequence of the
Leydse Courant, and no study so far has used regular Dutch price information
for the period 1720 to 1723, although scholars had been able to gather occasional
references to prices.9 British stock prices are available for the late 17th and early
18th century in Castaing’s The Course of the Exchange and two other sources,
but Dutch data in general has been lacking for this turbulent period. The British
insurance company prices in 1720 have been used to construct market indices10,
but not studied separately.
Leydse Courant prices were not quoted in currency but as percentages of par
value net of paid-in capital. Share issues at the time were oﬀered as subscrip-
tions that required an initial payment that secured the subscription rights. In
eﬀect, issuing companies ﬁnanced the purchase of their shares with a loan, using
the shares as collateral.11 The initial payment was typically a small fraction (1%
to 10%) of the par value of the share and came with obligations to make future
payments to the company over a period of time - sometimes on a monthly basis,
but other times at irregular intervals. This convention made comparisons across
companies straightforward, since it had the eﬀect of normalizing the prices. We
were able to verify this reporting convention by matching share loan transactions
in the books of one of the Dutch ﬁrms founded in 1720, Maatschappij van Assur-
antie, Discontering en Belening der Stad Rotterdam [hereafter Stad Rotterdam, its
modern name], with share quotes in the Leydse Courant. Appendix 2.C discusses
7 Our database, including exchange rates as well as equity quotes is available online at:
http://icf.som.yale.edu/DutchData/index.shtml. More data including price quotes in dif-
ferent cities is available upon request.
8 http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/01008.xml
or http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/NEAL/neal.html
9 See Gelderblom and Jonker (2009). In a subsequent revision (2009), concurrent with the ﬁrst
draft of own work, they report Dutch prices for the second half of 1720. Neal (1988) mentions
the Leydse Courant, but notes that only a few issues are extant for the period. In fact, he
implores scholars to search Dutch libraries for a complete run of them.
10 Cf. Parsons (1974)
11 Dale, Johnson, and Tang (2005) and Shea (2007) disagree on the question of whether South
Sea Company investors were obligated to continue loan payments when shares dropped in
value.
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this interpretation in some detail.12
By similar means we were also able to verify the assertion by Shea (2007) that,
at least in Holland, subscribers in shares were not obligated to pay the ﬁrm if they
chose to forego the shares. Shareholder subscription obligations were closed out
when shares were returned to the company in lieu of payment.
Prices in the Leydse Courant were often quoted as a daily range. In these cases,
we took the average of the range as the daily price. Prices for companies were also
quoted in more than one city. In these cases we used the prices for the market
with the most liquidity, deﬁned as the market with the largest number of quotes
during the period of study.13 Prices for the major British companies: The Bank of
England, the South Sea Company, the East India Company, the Royal Exchange
Assurance Company, the London Assurance Company, the York Building Society
and a few others were also quoted, suggesting that Dutch investors followed - and
likely traded in - British shares. This is consistent with the hypothesis in Neal
(1990) that Dutch investment capital ﬂowed into Great Britain in 1720, pursuing
equity investment opportunities. News of the ﬁnances of France was also regularly
reported in the paper, and prices for the shares and related ﬁnancial claims on the
Compagnie des Indes were quoted frequently. This suggests that Dutch investors
were interested in the daily ﬂuctuations of the French ﬁrm and may have been
actively investing, at least in the year 1720. We are lacking the price information
before November 1719, so it is not possible to trace earlier Dutch investor interest
through this periodical.
The Leydse Courant also contains extensive interest rate and exchange rate
information on the same frequency. It quoted the agio (discount rate between
currency and money of account) for the Bank of Amsterdam, and exchange rates
between Amsterdam and a number of other cities, including London, Paris, Lisbon
and Hamburg. These are useful for future research as well.
2.4 Cross-sectional Diﬀerences in the South Sea
Bubble
Figure 2.1 shows the stock price growth of the eight major London companies
regularly quoted in The Course of the Exchange and the other major price list,
Freke’s Price of Stocks etc. over the period from November, 1719 through De-
cember, 1720. The scale is logged to represent percentage changes and indexed to
1 at the beginning of the available quotations for each series.14 There are three
12 Although the convention is useful for interpretation of the economic scale of the events of 1720
in the Netherlands, it does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimates of the bubble in share prices,
since these are calculated as percentages normalized either to previous prices or previous
quotes.
13 Our database preserves the range and prices for multiple markets, allowing future research
analysis of such things as intra-day volatility and information diﬀusion and investor bias
among cities, however these topics are not the focus of the current study.
14 Quotes for two companies, Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance begin January
1st, 1720 under diﬀerent names.
12
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf2.4 Cross-sectional Differences in the South Sea Bubble
striking features of the graph. First, during the year 1720 all ﬁrms experienced,
at a minimum, a doubling of their share price. However, for three companies the
prices at the end of the year were at or below their beginning of year levels.15 For
these ﬁrms the increase in share price during the ﬁrst part of 1720 was a purely
temporary phenomenon, while for the others the run-up had a permanent compo-
nent. Secondly, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the degree of price
run-up. Although the events of 1720 are associated with the South Sea Company,
a few ﬁrms ”bubbled” more dramatically than the South Sea Company, when
measured by price growth. In particular, the two marine insurance companies,
Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance rose to much higher multiples
of their original price during 1720. The Royal African Company (which, like the
South Sea Company, was engaged in the Atlantic slave trade) rose as high as the
South Sea Company in percentage terms as well. By contrast, the two banks,
Bank of England and Million Bank, as well as the East India Company (engaged
in the South Asia trade) rose much less than the other four. Our limited price
data for the York Building Company, a scheme that involved the development of
waterworks in London, the purchase of conﬁscated estates in Scotland and the sale
of life insurance and annuities, we cannot measure the increase over the ﬁrst part
of the year, although we know from other evidence that the extent of its rise from
its initial oﬀering price was similar to that of the marine insurance companies.
A ﬁnal feature of interest in Figure 2.1 is the timing diﬀerences in the bubbles.
The two marine insurance companies and the York Building Company reached
their peak simultaneously in mid-August of 1720 and then dropped sharply at
least two weeks before the crash spread to other major British ﬁrms.
The diﬀerences in scale and timing suggest multiple inﬂuences on investor
enthusiasm during 1720. Clearly not all company shares beneﬁtted equally from
speculative demand. While it is diﬃcult to draw precise conclusions from a small
sample of ﬁrms, it is natural to attribute the diﬀerence between the high growth
of the South Sea Company and Royal African on the one hand, and the modest
growth of the East India Company on the other, to the expectations about the
Atlantic trade as opposed to the South Asian trade. The new Dutch price data
give us an opportunity to test this. If there were diﬀerent causes of the price
run-ups in Figure 2.1, reﬂecting diﬀerential expectations of investors about the
relative fortunes of companies trading with the East versus the West, then these
diﬀerences are likely to show up in the Dutch market as well. On the other hand, if
the price run-ups of share prices in London were largely idiosyncratic, it is unlikely
to ﬁnd a similar pattern overseas.
Figure 2.2 shows the rise and fall of investment in the Dutch East Indies Com-
pany and the West Indies Company over the period of November, 1719 through
December, 1720. The data are reported three times per week, so unlike the daily
London prices, they are discontinuous, and represented by markers in the ﬁgure
rather than by lines. The similarities between the Dutch and London markets are
striking. First, the run-up in the Dutch market was much larger for the West In-
15 Since quotations for the York Building Society only begin in June, we do not know whether
it ﬁnished up or down for the year.
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Figure 2.1: Magnitude of the London Bubble
This ﬁgure displays the magnitude of the 1720 bubble for the Bank of England, South Sea
Company, London Assurance, Royal African Company, Million Bank, York Building Company,
Old East India Company and Royal Exchange Assurance. Share prices are normalized by their
initial value and plotted on a logarithmic axis for the period August, 1719 to December, 1720.
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Figure 2.2: Dutch East and West Indies Company
This ﬁgure displays the share price development of the Dutch East and West
Indies Company from November, 1719 to December, 1720. Prices are de-
noted in percentages and normalized by dividing by the ﬁrst observation,
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dies Company than the East Indies Company. Second, the relative top-to-bottom
variance of prices is strikingly similar in both markets. The Dutch West Indies
Company clearly bubbled on the same scale as the South Sea Company and the
Royal African Company, rising by a factor of 7 over a very short interval. By
comparison, the price of the Dutch East Indies Company did not double and, like
its British counterpart it fell below its beginning of year value by the end of 1720.
The four major ﬁrms in Northern Europe engaged in Atlantic trade; the Mis-
sissippi Company, the Royal African Company, the South Sea Company and the
Dutch West Indies Company all rose by factors of 7 to 10 in the global bubble.
The two major ﬁrms engaged in Asian trade, the Dutch and British East India
companies, rose by much less. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
investor sentiment diﬀered with respect to Atlantic vs. Asian trading companies,
supporting the theory that the South Sea Bubble may have been partly a function
of expectations about future Atlantic trade. There is some supporting historical
evidence for this hypothesis. The triangle trade that brought manufactured goods
to Africa, Africans as slaves to the New World and plantation-produced commodi-
ties to Europe was one of the most important international economic institutions
in the early modern era. It was just getting underway in 1720 and thus future
proﬁts were a long way oﬀ at the time of the bubble. Nevertheless, like the modern
tech bubble, perhaps this future promise sparked current investor enthusiasm.
Other international events at the time might have directed investor attention
to the Atlantic trade and encouraged broader commercial aspirations in the New
World. The short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance [1718-1720] pitted Spain
against Britain, France, Austria and the Netherlands over control of Italy. The
New World territories from Texas to Florida were an important secondary theater
of the conﬂict. France fought to extend control over Spanish lands in Texas and
New Mexico from her settlement at the mouth of the Mississippi; the British in
Carolina threatened Spanish Florida. While a treaty in February, 1720 concluded
the hostilities in favor of the alliance, there was no major realignment of control
in the Americas.16 Never-the-less, Spanish dominance in the New World was
explicitly challenged, potentially raising interests and expectations among French,
British and Dutch investors about future New World inroads.17
The commonality in the patterns of price run-ups in Amsterdam and London
suggest a high degree of ﬁnancial integration between these markets.18 However,
as noted above the West Indies Company rose later than the South Sea Company
or the Royal African Company. Part of the diﬀerence can simply be attributed to
time keeping: there was an eleven-day diﬀerence between the older Julian calendar
used in London and the newer Gregorian calendar used on the continent. But
16 In fact the concluded peace likely heightened the prospects for South Sea Company and
Royal African Company proﬁtability, as the South Sea company expected to have the Spanish
Asiento reinstated following the war - the document granting rights to supply African slaves
to Spanish America. The South Sea Company had previously sourced slaves from the Royal
African Company.
17 See Weber (1992) p.165 ad ﬀ.
18 See also Neal (1990). for a discussion between the integration of Dutch and British Stock
Markets in the 18th century
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even accounting for this time lag, there remains at least a month diﬀerence in the
beginning of a bubble trend. This suggests that any spill-over of irrational (or
rational) exuberance ran from Britain to the Continent, not vice-versa.
2.5 International Stock Market Crash
As we have seen, share prices in several companies rose dramatically in 1720, but
the timing of their take-oﬀ diﬀered. In this section we examine the timing of the
crash. Figure 2.3 shows the Dutch West Indies Company, Stad Rotterdam, the
South Sea Company and the two British insurance companies. The trading dates
for the British companies have been adjusted to the Gregorian calendar. Hereafter
a G will indicate a Gregorian date, and J a Julian date.
The prices are indexed to one at the start of each series, and the vertical
axis is logarithmic to allow comparison of the scale of the price changes on a
percentage basis. The two British insurance companies reached their peak on the
same day - August 26th [G], and began their drop on the 27th [G]. They both
fell signiﬁcantly over the following four trading sessions. The Dutch West Indies
Company reached its peak on August 28th [G] and began its drop on the following
trading day, August 31st. It, too, continued to fall signiﬁcantly over the following
several trading sessions. Together, these three ﬁrms - aside from the Mississippi
Company in France - were the ﬁrst major companies to crash in price in 1720. The
crash in Royal African Company shares began three weeks later on September 14th
[G] and the crash in South Sea Company shares began on September 19[G]. Since
late August seems to have been the important turning part in the London and
Dutch stock markets, a natural question to ask is what happened around August
27th [G], or August 16th [J]?
The Leydse Courant reported news about both the British insurance companies
in its edition of August 28th [G] noting that, on the 23rd of August [G] the Royal
Assurance Company was planning a new issue of shares for the following week,
presumably to raise the 50,000 pounds payment to the Exchequer promised by
September 11 [G]. This payment was a condition of their charter granted as a
result of the Bubble Act.19 The London Assurance Company was also required
to deliver the same sum on that date. The news also noted cryptically that the
London Assurance Company ”kept silent and sought to learn the secrets of the
other ﬁrm” presumably alluding to some scandal.20 This suggested that there was
some asymmetric information of potential importance to investors.
Not reported in the Courant, but known from the London Gazette of August
23rd [J] is that the Attorney General issued a writ of scire facias on August 29th
[G] against four ﬁrms (including the York Building Company) seeking to expand
their business beyond their charter. This writ represented a serious risk to ﬁrms
seeking broad latitude. Although they were not named in the writ, it likely fed
negative speculation about the potential constraints to the aspirations two marine
19 Supple (1970), p. 37.
20 Leydse Courant, vol. 121, p. 2, July 28th, 1720.
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Figure 2.3: Timing of the Crash
This ﬁgure displays the share price development of the Dutch West Indies Com-
pany, Rotterdam Company, South Company, Royal Exchange Assurance and Lon-
don Assurance from August, 1719 to December, 1720. Prices are normalized
to 1 by the ﬁrst observation of the series and displayed on a logarithmic axis.
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insurance ﬁrms to expand into ﬁre and life insurance. Although the writ was
ultimately annulled, the reprieve came after the market crash.
Non-legal factors may also have come into play around this time. The Leydse
Courant of September 2 [G] reported news from London dated August 30th [G]
that a ﬂeet of twelve ships from Jamaica had been lost and they were insured by
the London Assurance Company for 72,000 pounds.21 It noted the burglary of the
home of one of the directors of the company.22 The insurance claim from the ﬂeet
and possibly the burglary would have raised concerns about the capability of the
ﬁrm to meet its September payment deadline.
Thus, over the course of four days in late August, 1720, adverse news about the
York Building Company and the two major insurance companies hit the market
and quite likely triggered their rapid decline in price. Over the course of a week,
all three British ﬁrms declined roughly 30%. This decline is large enough to have
caused ﬁnancial distress to speculators on margin. In this way it may have led
to a broader ﬁnancial crisis sparked by borrowers liquidating securities to cover
obligations.
Because they are reported in the Leydse Courant, we can track the dates
on which these same news items reached the Netherlands. The lag of three to
four days between the crash in London insurance companies and the Dutch West
Indies Company is not surprising. Koudijs (2009) calculates that the average 18th
century travel time of packet boats between London and Amsterdam was about
three or four days. Likewise, the lag of three to four days is conﬁrmed by evidence
from the Leydse Courant’s dated bylines vs. publishing dates for London news.
We might expect, however, that some reports reached the Dutch capital markets
through other channels.
Thus, through public information sources, Dutch investors in the British bubble
companies as well as the Dutch West Indies Company would have known by August
29th about the ﬁnancial plans and troubles of the British insurance ﬁrms. Also
they may also have known through private information sources that the Jamaica
ﬂeet was wrecked.23
It is not clear whether these reports were good news or bad for Dutch investors.
The West Indies Company was not engaged in the insurance trade, and the only
value-relevant news about the new world (apart from the shipwrecks) might have
been the August 30 [G] report in London of the discovery of gold in Jamaica,
reported in the September 2 [G] Leydse Courant. The only source of propagation
of the crash is through the channel of ﬁnancial distress. Investors in the West
Indies Company who held British insurance shares on margin might have had
to raise cash by selling their Dutch assets. The Leydse Courant reported the
prices of Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance intermittently
for the trading days July 6 [G] to August 24th [G], and for the York Building
21 The date of this event is incorrectly reported in Postlethwayt (1766) as occurring in October.
22 Leydse Courant, vol. 125, p. 1, September 2nd, 1720.
23 The Amsterdam insurance market would have had the same capabilities of learning about
Caribbean shipwrecks in a timely manner as the London market, since these aﬀected under-
writing decisions regardless of who insured the ships.
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Company from July 19th [G] to August 17th [G]. It seems reasonable to interpret
this demand for news about these ﬁrms as evidence of speculative interest in these
securities among Dutch investors. Interestingly enough, shares in Stad Rotterdam
jumped by 15% from August 28th to August 31st. Since the ﬁrm was created to
compete with the British insurance companies, the problems of a rival might have
been viewed as an opportunity. Stad Rotterdam did not crash until the end of
September.
The coincidence of the price peaks for three British ﬁrms and the West Indies
Company seems best explained by the onset of a liquidity crisis in the international
stock markets - a crisis that overwhelmed the capital markets in the following two
months. The coincidence of the scire facias writ limiting British companies to
their charters seems to be the leading culprit in the events that sparked the crash,
although negative news about one of the British insurance ﬁrms also likely played
a role.
Beyond the micro-question about what sparked the global ﬁnancial crash, the
one thing we can determine from the time-series of various stock prices is that,
while British and Dutch ﬁrms rose at diﬀerent times over the course of the ﬁrst
eight months of 1720, September and October were terrible months for all stocks.
The crash overwhelmed all stocks regardless of whether investor expectations were
based on prospects of Atlantic trade, maritime insurance or real estate deals.
One thing the rise in Dutch share prices reveals is that government re-funding
could not have been the sole basis for the British bubble. No Dutch ﬁrm was
launched to imitate the ﬁnancial operations of the Mississippi Company or the
South Sea Company. The fact that other types of ﬁrms bubbled - including the
West Indies Company - suggests that the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles were
not primarily due to speculation about the debt-equity swap as a ﬁnancial inno-
vation.
2.6 Cross-sectional Evidence from New
Company Issues
The price bubbles in 1720 were accompanied in Britain and the Netherlands by
a wave of new company issues. The Leydse Courant provides price information
for many of the new ﬁrms launched in the Netherlands, however regular price
quotations for the new companies in London have not survived. There is, however,
some information to allow us to further examine the cross-sectional diﬀerences in
the degree of exposure to investor enthusiasm. A satirical British print made in
1721, shortly following the crash, The Bubbler’s Mirror, lists a number of the well-
known London issues along with the par value of the shares and the maximum
percentage over par achieved during the bubble.24 This information is suﬃcient
for us to further quantify the cross-sectional diﬀerences noted for the larger ﬁrms
and to determine the extent to which diﬀerences observed across industries - i.e.
24 Reported in Scott (1910) vol. 1 p.410.
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Atlantic trade, insurance and banking carry through more generally. The data
from The Bubbler’s Mirror is reported in Appendix 2.A.
Table 2.1 shows the average growth by industry. The ﬁrst column includes the
large ﬁrms previously studied. In the second column, we removed the Bank of
England, the Million Bank, the South Sea Company, the Royal African Company,
the Royal Exchange Assurance Company and the London Assurance Company
from the calculations. The one exception is the inclusion in both columns of the
East India Company as a basis for comparison.
Table 2.1: Maximum Percentage Price Increase of British Firms over par
by Industry, 1720
This table reports the average growth in share price per industry. The ﬁrst column includes all
ﬁrms. In the second column, we removed the Bank of England, the Million Bank, the South
Sea Company, the Royal African Company, the Royal Exchange Assurance Company and the
London Assurance Company from the calculations. The ﬁnal column reports the number of ﬁrms
in each industry.
Industry Total Total (less large ﬁrms) Number
Insurance 2013% 1717% 8
Real estate 1625% 1625% 2
Commodity 1208% 1208% 12
Manufacture 1166% 1166% 6
Atlantic 895% 948% 4
Marine 875% 875% 6
Service/Utility 567% 567% 3
Paciﬁc 349% 349% 1
Bank/Finance 335% 500% 3
Total 1172% 995% 45
In order to test the hypothesis that the British ﬁrms associated with the At-
lantic trade reached higher premia over par values, we performed a t-test on the
log growth rates of the Atlantic trade ﬁrms and tested the null that the growth
rate for the East India Company was drawn from the same distribution. Despite
the few degrees of freedom, we were able to reject the null with greater than 85%
conﬁdence for both speciﬁcations.25 When the South Sea and Royal African Com-
panies were removed, the t-test returned a probability value of 10.6%. This is not
surprising since the test in this speciﬁcation has the minimum feasible degrees of
freedom.
The Table shows that insurance industry was the highest growth industry,
although it also had the highest cross sectional variation in rates: Four of the top
25 The test was performed for two speciﬁcations: simple growth rates and logged growth rates.
In growth rates, the t-value was 4.25 on 3 df. For log growth the t-value was 6.15 on 3 df. Both
are signiﬁcant at traditional conﬁdence levels. The important caveat is that the small sample
and its unknown distributional properties potentially limits the interpretation of parametric
tests.
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seven ﬁrms ranked by growth were insurance companies, and two of the last seven
were insurance companies. Column two shows that excluding the two top marine
insurance companies, Royal Exchange and London Assurance reduced the scale
of the bubble in insurance ﬁrms, but did not change its top rank. This is due to
the fact that two ﬁrms (General Insurance and British Insurance) bubbled on a
comparable scale to their more widely traded cousins. A t-test of the diﬀerence in
mean growth rates between insurance companies and all other ﬁrms in the sample
yielded mixed results.26
The evidence strongly suggests that the exuberance of London investors was
driven by certain industries. While the Atlantic trade is the obvious candidate
given the fame of the South Sea Company, the data suggest that there was a major
bubble - perhaps even a larger bubble - in insurance. The prominent position of
the insurance companies in the bubble was noted by contemporary observers;
most famously, John Aislabie, Chancellor of the Exchequer who took a bribe of
20,000 pounds of South Sea stock in return for his political support of the ﬁrm.
In his unsuccessful defense before the House of Lords, Aislabie exclaimed of the
two insurance ﬁrms: ”these two projects were founded in greater iniquity and
contributed more to the publick calamity than anything else.”27
An interesting feature of the Bubble Act of June 9, 1720 which asserted gov-
ernmental control over chartering companies for limited purposes is that it did
not directly concern the South Sea Company. Rather, it chartered the London
Assurance and the Royal Exchange Assurance companies and explicitly limited
the chartering of competitors. It thus makes sense to look at the bubble in 1720
through the lens of ﬁnancial innovation in the insurance sector as much as from
the perspective of an event driven by massive government debt conversion, or
indiscriminant speculation in company shares.28
2.7 The IPO Wave in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, a number of new ﬁrms were capitalized in 1720, beginning in
July with the creation of Stad Rotterdam and extending through October of that
year. We collected data from the Leydse Courant for many of these new ﬁrms.
Figure 2.4 shows the major Dutch price series’ as well as a number of the
additional issues over the last six months of 1720. As noted previously, the East
India Company [OIC] rose only a little through the year and then dropped below its
June level by the end of 1720. The West Indies Company rose quite dramatically
and raised additional capital in two subscriptions in 1720 as its stock price rose.
The most striking feature of the ﬁgure is that, with the exception of Middelburg,
which ﬂoated both an insurance company and a commercial company, all the Dutch
26 A t-test assuming diﬀerences in unknown variance between the samples yielded a probability
value of 22% for logged growth rates and 0.3% for raw growth rates.
27 Mr. Aislabie’s second speech on his defense in the House of Lords, London (1721) p. 14
quoted in Scott (1910) p. 405.
28 For a view of the eﬀect of the Bubble Act on business organization, see Harris (1994) and
Harris (2000).
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Figure 2.4: Dutch IPO Wave
This ﬁgure displays the share price development of Dutch shares issued in 1720 and quoted
in the Leydse Courant. Prices are extracted from the Leydse Courant, denoted in nominal
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projects were singularly associated with its own city. Gelderblom and Jonker
(2009) point out that this reﬂects the history of Dutch corporate development. The
East India Company resulted from a consolidation of trading companies in diﬀerent
cities. Gelderblom and Jonker hypothesize that Dutch cities may have anticipated
a similar consolidation of the insurance trade, and thus the ﬁrst move of Rotterdam
might have stimulated a rush to create similar projects that would result in a share
of the consolidated ﬁrm. If this were so, it would suggest that the Dutch viewed
the publicly traded corporate insurance company as an important and potentially
transformative ﬁnancial innovation that had the power to become a dominant
organization. No city wished to be left out of the potential future gains to the
consolidation of the Rotterdam company into a huge national enterprise. This is
consistent with our hypothesis that speculation about the new insurance company
form was a major driver of the international bubble in share prices in 1720. If the
expectation of consolidation motivated the ﬂurry of Dutch public oﬀerings, such
a consolidation never materialized. The shares of Stad Rotterdam began trading
in mid-July, after the peak of the South Sea Company, but a month before the
peak of the London and Royal Exchange Assurance companies. The ﬁrm made a
secondary oﬀering a month later, and by that time many other companies had been
launched. Gouda, Delft and Schiedam were next, and they all followed a trajectory
in August and September. After a drop following their initial oﬀerings their shares
rose sharply - increasing from the pre-September lows by as much as 100% to
300%. These brief spikes may not have been comparable in scale and duration to
the bubble in West India Company shares, but they were evidently perceived by
some market participants as such. The Dutch bubble was memorialized in late
1720 by a famous satirical book of prints, plays and ﬁnancial ephemera entitled
Het Groote Tafereel der Dwaasheid - The Great Mirror of Folly. Following the
entry of Gouda, Delft and Schiedam came a ﬂood of new issues at the end of
September and the beginning of October; just as the global crisis hit London and
the Netherlands. Note the density of initial public oﬀerings and transactions in
the Netherlands in September in this brief interval. The Dutch new issues market
lasted a brief two months. All shares traded down in November and towards the
close of the month trading dried up. Share quotations are virtually lacking in
December. The Leydse Courant stopped quoting share prices in January, 1721.
The ﬁnancial bubble in Holland began later than the bubbles in France or
Britain, and it came to a conclusion with the crash in Britain with nearly precise
correlation to the fall in British insurance company shares. Except for the dramatic
run up in West Indies Company shares, the scale of the Dutch bubble was also
somewhat smaller. Appendix 2.B reports the maximum trough to peak percentage
gain for the full sample of Dutch ﬁrms. The average was 127%; much lower than
the average maximum percentage gain in the London bubble. This is consistent
with the claim of Gelderblom and Jonker (2009) that the Dutch bubble was smaller
in scale than the British and French bubbles.
Assessing the economic signiﬁcance of the bubble in the Netherlands based
upon the peak to trough range of prices may be misleading, however. The new
Dutch data support the relative importance of speculation about insurance. In
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Appendix 2.B we report the stated intent of the new Dutch ﬁrms launched in
1720, gathered from their founding documents. Unlike the new British ﬁrms,
which varied considerably in their industrial classiﬁcations, most of the Dutch
companies were established to conduct commerce and trade. However, a majority
of the companies included insurance as one of their proposed lines of business. It is
telling that the charter of Stad Rotterdam mentions the competitive challenge of
the new British insurance companies in motivating the need to launch the ﬁrm.29
The crash in the equity markets was a signiﬁcant setback to this new ﬁnancial
technology. The success of the public insurance corporation depended on the
external demand for shares and the availability of public investment capital. These
dried up with the global contraction of securities markets following the crash in
Great Britain. Had the global crash not occurred, public investment in marine
insurance underwriting might have continued. After 1720, many of the new Dutch
ﬁrms closed and returned shareholder capital (or issued ﬁnancial substitutes such
as life annuities). A few ﬁrms survived and prospered. The Middelburg commerce
company became a major player in the Atlantic economy - including the slave
trade - in the late 18th century. Stad Rotterdam also fulﬁlled the promise of the
potential of a publicly capitalized insurance corporation. It survived and prospered
to become one of the largest insurance companies in continental Europe, recently
merging with the ﬁnancial giant Fortis.
The survival of Stad Rotterdam, London Assurance and Royal Exchange Assur-
ance into the modern era proved the long-term viability of incorporated insurance
companies. Given that the average peak to trough price increase for most of the
Dutch companies was comparatively modest, it is diﬃcult to view investors of the
time as wild speculators. The underlying rationale for investing at the time - i.e.
an innovation in the ﬁnancing of marine insurance underwriting, does not appear
to have been unreasonable.
2.8 Conclusion
The cross-sectional evidence from British and Dutch ﬁrms in 1720 does not directly
allow a test of whether investment in shares at the time was economically rational.
Instead, it provides more information about the nature and timing of investor
expectations.
The data for major British companies suggests that expectations (rational or
not) about the Atlantic trade may have been an important factor. The diﬀerential
between the South Sea Company and the East India Company in the British
market is matched by the diﬀerential between the Dutch East and West Indies
Companies. This hypothesis is supported by a test of the size of the bubble
using another data set of ”bubbles”. The bubble in other Atlantic-trade ﬁrms,
excluding the Royal African Company and the South Sea Company, also exceeded
the maximum growth in East Indies Company shares in 1720.
29 Anonymous, 1720, Het Groote Tafereel de Dwaasheid, p. 25.
25
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf2 New Evidence on the First Financial Bubble
We have price records for nine major ﬁrms over the year 1720; two from the
Netherlands and seven from Britain. Of these, the share prices for the three ﬁrms
engaged in the Atlantic trade: the South Sea company, the Royal African Company
and the Dutch West Indies Company were higher at the end of 1720 than at the
beginning.30 Although their prices increased by multiples in the middle of the
year and then dropped considerably from their highs in 1720, as a group, they
experienced a permanent price improvement. Firms engaged in other industries
had mixed results. This cross-sectional evidence suggests that the ”bubble” may
have been based upon some fundamental common factor that justiﬁed a value
increase. While investor irrationality may have carried prices to many multiples
of their post-crash value, the bubble speculation may have anticipated some long-
term permanent eﬀect.
The cross-sectional data also show that speculation in insurance companies
was another important factor in the bubble. The chartering and incorporation
of insurance companies in the early 18th century was a ﬁnancial innovation. It
extended the potentially valuable feature of limited liability to ﬁrms that dealt
in risk. Before this transition, insurance was provided by underwriters operating
alone or in syndicates that pooled capital. With the transition to corporations
came broader access to public capital. The new, liquid stock markets gave the
public insurance ﬁrms the capacity to increase their capital base and to diversify
their risks. These may have been perceived as valuable ﬁnancial innovations at
the time. In summary, a view of the stock prices of more than thirty traded
companies, and the price gains in 1720 of another forty additional ﬁrms provides a
useful perspective on the bubbles in South Sea Company and Mississippi Company
shares. While the actions and price dynamics of these two major companies have
dominated the historical study of the period because of their major scale, a cross-
sectional perspective suggests that the basis for speculative enthusiasm at the time
may have been connected to long-term prospects for Atlantic commerce, and the
recent innovation in the organizational form of insurance companies.
30 South Seas = 45% gain, Royal African = 91% gain and West Indies Company 51% gain.
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2.A Appendix I: The British Bubble
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2.B Appendix II: The Dutch Bubble
Table 2.3: Maximum Growth for Dutch Companies
This table reports the increase in share price during the South Sea bubble for the Dutch
companies for which we collected share price information from the Leydse Courant in col-
umn 2. In column 3 we report the primary goal of the company as stated in the company’s
founding documents and in column 4 if the company initiated insurance business.
Company name Price increase Primary Goal Insurance?
WIC 647% Int. trade -
Middelburg Commercie 406% Commerce -
Schiedam 325% Commerce Insurance
Edam 300% Commerce -
Monnikendam 278% Commerce Insurance
Utrecht 275% Commerce Insurance
Delft 1st Subscription 118% Insurance Insurance
Gouda 106% Insurance Insurance
WIC 2nd Subscription 103% Int. trade -
Naarden 100% Manufacture -
Weesp 100% Commerce Insurance
Muiden 100% Commerce Insurance
Medemblik 100% Commerce Insurance
Rotterdam 1st Subscription 76% Insurance Insurance
Dordrecht 64% Commerce Insurance
Den Haag 50% Finance Insurance
Maassluis 50% Commerce Insurance
Rotterdam 2nd Subscription31 42% Insurance Insurance
Vlaardingen 40% Marine Insurance
OIC 39% Int. trade -
Middelburg Assurantie 39% Insurance Insurance
WIC 3rd Subscription 33% Int. trade -
Alkmaar 33% Commerce Insurance
Zwolle 33% Marine Insurance
Hoorn 0% Commerce -
Veere 0% Commerce -
Brielle -7% Commerce -
Enkhuizen -10% Commerce Insurance
Purmerend -17% Commerce Insurance
Mean 127% - -
31 Gelderblom and Jonker (2009) note that the West Indies Company had applied to oﬀer
insurance.
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2.C Appendix III: Price Quote Interpretation
One of the problems in the analysis of the price data from Holland in 1720 is the
question of how the price quotations should be interpreted. Share or subscription
prices were not quoted in currency, but in a percentage in excess of some value.
Scholars to date have disagreed on the interpretation of this value. We address
this basic question through examination of the language used in the price lists in
1720, and by matching share loan transactions in the books of one company to the
documented market quotations. The beneﬁt of matching price quotes to company
transactions in their shares is that the books were kept in units of currency.
Price quotes in the Leydse Courant typically were given in sentences such as:
”Rotterdam: Today the shares of our company were traded for prices ranging from
52 to 56 percent avans”. Intervals like this are not uncommon due to the high
daily volatility; especially in the rise of the bubble the morning prices diﬀered
substantially from evening quotes. A key question posed by these quotes is of
course, what is meant by ”avans”? What amount is the quotation in excess of?
This question is more challenging than it appears. Shares were issued through
subscriptions that required capital calls. Thus, the relevant multiplicand might
be interpreted as the capital paid in to the company up to that date [the paid
in capital] or it might be interpreted as the face value of the share after all the
shareholder installments are paid – something we now often refer to as the par
value or nominal share value.
It is therefore not surprising that previous authors have debated the interpre-
tation of these quotes. For example:
Van Rijn (1899) presumed that the avans referred to the nominal (or fully paid
in) value of the share, and that additional paid-in capital represented a fraction
that incremented the quoted price.32
This is logical because newspaper percentages could not practically be based
on the amounts paid-in. The paid-in capital increased over time and the ex-
act amount paid-in was therefore uncertain until the books were closed and the
paid-in amounts computed. If newspaper percentages were based on the amount
paid-in, the newspaper percentages would have to drop after the payment of an
installment; if the market share price does not change and more capital is paid-in,
the percentage decreases by construction.
Smith (1919) concurs with this interpretation: ”The share price was recorded
in percentages ”avans”, i.e. it indicated the percentages to be paid in excess of par
value, calculated based on the amount which, with respect to the nominal amount
32 ”The furnishment up till 80% of the shares of the ﬁrst subscription is also foolish and absurd,
since the amount furnished in these shares exceeds the market value of the original shares,
i.e. 15% has been paid in on the subscription shares, to demand an additional 65% would
be highly unfair ... The shares of the ﬁrst subscription have already been traded at 38%,
together with the paid-in amount of 15% this makes 53 percent, if an additional 65% were to
be paid in then these shares would be worth 118%, this would be unreasonable. ... If ... on
the old shares 75% had been paid in, these would now be worth 3750 guilders, so a share of
1000 guilders would be worth 750 guilders.”
30
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf2.C Appendix III: Price Quote Interpretation
traded by the company as installment was demanded.” 33 Likewise, Slechte (1982):
”In the ﬁrst two months the prices ﬂuctuated between 100 and 80%, but dropped
in September and October to 60%. The Rotterdam shares were therefore on
average priced at 4000 guilders in this period.”
Despite their general agreement, none of the earlier authors oﬀered empirical
evidence supporting their interpretations. Thus, we sought to reject or verify
their calculations of monetary share prices by matching transactions in the Leydse
Courant with company records.
After the burst of the bubble at the end of September 1720, the directors of Stad
Rotterdam made non-recourse loans to directors using their shares as collateral.
If share prices fell during the maturity of the loan, the company incurred the loss.
This arrangement could be interpreted as beneﬁcial to shareholders because it was
a means to reduce the ”ﬂoat” of shares by keeping directors from dumping into
a falling market. It could also be interpreted as pure self-dealing by directors.
In either case, these transactions allow us to link the market quotes to currency-
valued transactions.
On pages 37 and 142 of the general ledger of Stad Rotterdam, some of these
share loans are recorded in prices that match quotations reported in the Leydse
Courant for the same day.34 Since the ledger accounts are recorded in guilders, we
can ascertain that the newspaper prices are reported in percentages of the nominal
share value (5000 guilders for the Rotterdam company). The losses incurred in
these loan transactions also appear on the proﬁt and loss account of the Rotterdam
company (page 9 of the general ledger account).
A simple example of our interpretation is useful. Suppose that Rotterdam
shares [with 5,000 guilders nominal value] are trading for 2,500 guilders on a certain
date and that up until that date 1% had been paid in. Then the Leydse Courant
would quote of 49% avans which would imply the following: ”Rotterdam is trading
today at 50% = (2,500/5000 * 100%) or 49% of the par value of the share above
the paid-in capital = 49% = ((2,500-1%*5,000)/5,000)*100%”.
This convention was convenient during weeks of installment payments. It al-
lowed investors to distinguish between shares on which the installment has been
paid and shares on which the installment still needed to be paid.
33 Original Dutch text:”De koers werd genoteerd in procenten ”avans”, dus men gaf aan hoeveel
procenten boven pari betaald moest worden, te berekenen over de geldsom, die, met betrekking
tot het verhandelde nominaal bedrag, door de compagnie als storting was ge¨ eischt.”
34 Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, archive no. 199 inventory no. 451, pages 37 and 142.
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Eﬃcient Estimation of
Firm-Speciﬁc Betas and its
Beneﬁts for Asset Pricing
Tests and Portfolio Choice
We improve both the speciﬁcation and estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas. Time
variation in betas is modeled by combining a parametric speciﬁcation based on
economic theory with a non-parametric approach based on data-driven ﬁlters. We
increase the precision of individual beta estimates by setting up a hierarchical
Bayesian panel data model that imposes a common structure on parameters. We
show that these accurate beta estimates lead to a large increase in the cross-
sectional explanatory power of the conditional CAPM. Using the betas to forecast
the covariance matrix of returns also results in a signiﬁcant improvement in the
out-of-sample performance of minimum variance portfolios.1
3.1 Introduction
Precise estimates of ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas are crucial in many applications of modern
ﬁnance theory, including asset pricing, corporate cost-of-capital calculations, and
risk management. For instance, portfolio managers often have to ensure that their
risk exposure stays within predetermined limits and managers need estimates of
their company’s beta to make capital budgeting decisions. Academics and practi-
tioners have taken two approaches to estimating betas. Under the ﬁrst one stocks
are grouped into portfolios to reduce measurement error, assuming that all stocks
within a given portfolio share the same beta (e.g., Fama and MacBeth (1973)). The
1 This chapter is based on the paper Cosemans, Frehen, Schotman, and Bauer (2009)
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second method consists of estimating separate time series regressions for each ﬁrm
to obtain individual betas (e.g, Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998)).
Apart from this lack of consensus in the literature about the best method to
estimate betas, existing studies also fail to provide clear guidance on the best
way to model betas. Although a large body of empirical evidence suggests that
betas vary over time, existing work uses diﬀerent speciﬁcations to model these
changes in betas.2 Many studies use a parametric approach proposed by Shanken
(1990), in which variation in betas is modeled as a linear function of conditioning
variables. An alternative, non-parametric approach to model risk dynamics is
based on purely data-driven ﬁlters, including short-window regressions (Lewellen
and Nagel (2006)) and rolling regressions (Fama and French (1997)).3
In this chapter we improve both the speciﬁcation and estimation of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, time-varying betas. We improve the speciﬁcation of betas by combin-
ing the parametric and non-parametric approaches to modeling time variation in
betas. Because the key strengths of each approach are the most important weak-
nesses of the other, we argue and show that a combination of the two methods
leads to more accurate betas than those obtained from each of the two approaches
separately. We allow the optimal mix of the two methods to vary across stocks,
since individual ﬁrms may beneﬁt more or less from either speciﬁcation, and over
time, because the preferred combination during stable market conditions may be
diﬀerent from that in turbulent time periods.
The parametric speciﬁcation is appealing from a theoretical perspective be-
cause it explicitly links time variation in betas to macroeconomic state variables
and ﬁrm characteristics (e.g., Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003))
However, the main drawback of this approach is that the investor’s set of
conditioning information is unobservable. Ghysels (1998) shows that misspecifying
beta risk may result in serious pricing errors that might even be larger than those
produced by an unconditional asset pricing model. In addition, this method can
produce excessive variation in betas due to sudden spikes in the macroeconomic
variables that are often used as instruments. Finally, many parameters need to be
estimated when a large number of conditioning variables is included, which leads
to noisy estimates when applied to stocks with a limited number of time series
observations. An important advantage of the non-parametric approaches is that
they preclude the need to specify conditioning variables, which makes them more
robust to misspeciﬁcation. However, the time series of betas produced by a data-
driven approach will always lag the true variation in beta, because using a window
of past returns to estimate the beta at a given point in time gives an estimate
of the average beta during this time period. Although reducing the length of the
window results in timelier betas, the estimation precision of these betas will also
2 See, for instance, Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lewellen (1999), Ferson and Harvey (1999),
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Wu (2005), Avramov and
Chordia (2006a), Ang and Chen (2007), and Ang and Kristensen (2009).
3 An alternative approach has been proposed by Christoﬀersen, Jacobs, and Vainberg (2009),
who calculate forward-looking betas using the information embedded in option data. A
drawback of this method is that it requires a cross-section of liquid stock options, which
is not available for many small ﬁrms.
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decrease.
We improve the estimation of individual stock betas by setting up a Bayesian
panel data model that exploits the information in the cross-section of ﬁrms to
obtain more precise estimates. In particular, we specify hierarchical prior distri-
butions that impose a common structure on parameters while still allowing for
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Bayesian methods are especially attractive in set-
tings with individual-level heterogeneity in multiple parameters, because only the
parameters of the hierarchical priors where the parameters are assumed to be
drawn from have to be estimated. In contrast, methods that estimate every pa-
rameter individually without linking it to similar parameters, such as estimating
separate time series regressions for every single ﬁrm, suﬀer from poor estimation
precision, particularly when the number of time series observations is limited. In-
tuitively, the Bayes estimator can be interpreted as a weighted average of the
least squares estimator for a given cross-section unit and the cross-sectional av-
erage coeﬃcient. The Bayes estimator of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters shrinks the
least squares estimator towards the cross-sectional mean. When the number of
observations increases, the weight gradually shifts from the prior to the data.
Our panel data approach uses both daily returns and monthly ﬁrm-level char-
acteristics to capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity and time series dynamics
in monthly betas. Including cross-sectional information increases the accuracy
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas because previous studies document a strong cross-sectional
relationship between beta and ﬁrm characteristics (see, e.g., Fama and French
(1992)). Existing work further shows that the use of high-frequency returns yields
more precise and timelier estimates of beta than using monthly returns (see, e.g.,
Bollerslev and Zhang (2003)). We use daily returns instead of intraday returns
because market microstructure frictions put an upper limit on the frequency that
can be used to estimate betas in practice. We combine the data sampled at diﬀer-
ent frequencies by implementing the mixed data sampling (MIDAS) approach of
Ghysels, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2005), which determines the optimal weights
given to past data.
We estimate the model using a large panel of individual stocks, which oﬀers
several advantages over the alternative of aggregating stocks into portfolios based
on characteristics. First, aggregating stocks into portfolios may conceal important
information contained in individual stock betas. Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008)
show that risk premia can be estimated more precisely using individual stocks in-
stead of portfolios, because creating portfolios reduces the cross-sectional variation
in betas. A second important drawback is that due to the strong factor structure
in the 25 size-B/M sorted portfolios that are often used as test assets in asset
pricing studies, traditional cross-sectional tests are ﬂawed and have low power to
reject a model, as shown by Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2008). Third, when
stocks are grouped into portfolios based on characteristics that have been identi-
ﬁed by previous research as determinants of average returns instead of being based
on economic theory, the evidence against asset pricing models may be overstated
because of data-snooping biases (Lo and MacKinlay (1990)).
Despite the beneﬁts of using individual stocks, most asset pricing studies use
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characteristics sorted portfolios because it is diﬃcult to estimate ﬁrm-level pa-
rameters with a reasonable degree of precision when the number of observations
is limited. Notable exceptions are Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998)
and Avramov and Chordia (2006a), who use a two stage approach to study the
impact of characteristics on risk-adjusted returns. However, both studies estimate
separate time series regressions for every single ﬁrm, which leads to imprecise beta
estimates, particularly for ﬁrms with a short return history.
Fama and French (2008) even conclude that “given the imprecision of beta
estimates for individual stocks, little is lost in omitting them from the cross-section
regressions”.
Our main empirical ﬁndings are as follows. First, we show that modeling
time-varying betas as a function of both conditioning variables and past returns
dominates traditional speciﬁcations in which betas depend on only one of those
components. Combining these speciﬁcations produces superior beta estimates be-
cause they capture diﬀerent aspects of beta dynamics. We also ﬁnd that the
optimal mix of these speciﬁcations varies both over time and across stocks.
Second, we show that our panel data approach produces more accurate esti-
mates of ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas than those obtained from the traditional approach of
estimating a separate time series regression for every ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, for the
average ﬁrm the posterior standard deviation of beta is signiﬁcantly larger in time
series regressions than in the panel model. Third, we document strong cross-
sectional heterogeneity in ﬁrm betas within the 25 size-B/M portfolios that are
commonly used to test asset pricing models. This conﬁrms that aggregating stocks
into portfolios conceals important information contained in individual stocks and
shrinks the cross-sectional variation in betas.
We demonstrate that a more precise estimation and better speciﬁcation of
ﬁrm betas has important beneﬁts for asset pricing tests and portfolio choice. In
particular, we show that the betas generated by our model have signiﬁcant ex-
planatory power for the cross-section of returns. Using stocks as test assets and
estimating betas in a panel model results in more eﬃcient parameter estimates in
cross-sectional asset pricing tests than using portfolios. The estimate of the mar-
ket premium is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, even after controlling for ﬁrm
characteristics. We illustrate the value of our beta speciﬁcation and estimation
method for portfolio choice by using the betas to forecast the covariance matrix of
stock returns. We ﬁnd that the global minimum variance portfolio that is formed
using this covariance matrix outperforms minimum variance portfolios based on
other strategies, including the naive 1/N rule, the sample covariance matrix, and
a static factor model for estimating covariances.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3.2 we introduce our speciﬁcation
for time-varying betas in a panel data framework. Section 3.3 explains the Bayesian
approach to inference and section 3.4 describes the data. We report our empirical
results in section 3.5 and discuss the asset pricing and portfolio choice applications
in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 The Model
In this section we describe our model for individual betas. For simplicity, we
discuss our approach in a conditional CAPM setting but it is straightforward to
extend our work to multifactor models.
Our goal is to show how to improve the speciﬁcation and estimation of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, time-varying betas in any factor model. We start from the following panel
data model for excess returns on individual stocks,
rit = αi + βit−1rMt + ϵit, (3.1)
where rit is the excess return on stock i in month t, αi is the risk-adjusted return,
βit−1 is the conditional market beta, rMt is the excess market return, and ϵit is
a zero-mean, normally distributed idiosyncratic return shock. Following Avramov
and Chordia (2006b), we assume that the covariance matrix of these shocks is
diagonal and that idiosyncratic volatility is constant.
Our speciﬁcation for the conditional beta consists of two components: one part
is the realized beta, bit, and the other part is the fundamental beta, β∗
it,
βit = ϕitbit + (1 − ϕit)β∗
it, (3.2)
where ϕit and (1−ϕit) measure the proportion of the beta of ﬁrm i that is explained
by the realized beta and fundamental beta, respectively. Hereafter we refer to this
mixture of realized and fundamental betas as the mixed beta. We allow the optimal
combination of fundamental and realized betas to vary not only across ﬁrms but
also over time. Time variation in ϕit is modeled as a linear function of market
volatility, because the best mix of fundamental and realized betas in turbulent
market conditions can be very diﬀerent from that in stable periods,
ϕit = ϕ0i + ϕ1VMt, (3.3)
where VMt is the realized market variance, which we calculate by summing the
squared daily market returns over the past year. We take the logarithm of the
market variance to reduce the impact of outliers and then subtract its time series
average and divide by its standard deviation, so that it has mean zero and standard
deviation equal to one.
bit is the realized beta that we estimate using daily data according to the
Mixed Data Sampling (MIDAS) approach introduced by Ghysels, Santa-Clara,
and Valkanov (2005).
We choose to estimate realized betas using daily returns because these provide
a reasonable balance between eﬃciency and robustness to microstructure noise
(see, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)). However, even at a daily frequency
the betas of less liquid stocks might be biased downward. Following Scholes and
Williams (1977), we therefore control for nonsynchronous trading eﬀects by adding
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the covariance of the stock’s return with the one-day lagged market return.4
The MIDAS approach diﬀers from traditional rolling window estimators of be-
tas by selecting the optimal window for estimating betas using a ﬂexible weighting
function. Ghysels, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2005) use the MIDAS approach to
estimate the market’s conditional variance and ﬁnd that it is superior to traditional
GARCH and rolling window methods.






























where t refers to a particular month, τ to a particular trading day, and wt−τ to









Mt−τ, on day t−τ. We set
the maximum window length τmax equal to 250 days, which is approximately one
year of trading days.












τmax,κ1;κ2) is the density of a beta distribution. As pointed out by
Ghysels, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2005), the speciﬁcation based on the beta
function has several advantages.
First, it ensures that the weights are positive and sum to one. Second, it
is parsimonious because only two parameters need to be estimated. Third, it is
ﬂexible as it can take various shapes for diﬀerent values of the two parameters. We
impose a downward sloping pattern on the weights by setting κ1 equal to 1, which
further reduces the number of parameters that need to be estimated. κ1 = κ2 = 1
implies equal weights, which corresponds to a rolling window estimator of beta on
daily data. κ1 = 1 and κ2 > 1 correspond to the case of decaying weights. In
general, the higher κ2, the faster the rate of decay and the quicker beta responds
to new information.
β∗
it is the fundamental beta, parameterized as a function of conditioning vari-
ables,
β∗
it = δ0 + δ′
1[Zit ⊗ BCt], (3.6)
where Zit is a vector that contains L ﬁrm characteristics and BCt is a vector
that contains a constant and M business cycle variables. This speciﬁcation allows
the relation between beta and ﬁrm characteristics to vary over the business cycle.
Modeling beta dynamics as a linear function of a set of predetermined instruments
4 Scholes and Williams (1977) also include a lead term to capture the impact of non-synchronous
trading on the market return. We only include a lag term because otherwise the model cannot
be used to forecast betas.
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goes back to Shanken (1990) and is consistent with the economic motivation for
conditional asset pricing models, in which the stochastic discount factor is a func-
tion of macroeconomic state variables and factor premia.
We include both ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables as instruments for
fundamental betas because of their documented predictive power for returns (Fama
and French (1989) and Lewellen (1999)). Empirical evidence that systematic risk
is related to ﬁrm characteristics and business cycle variables is provided by, among
others, Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Avramov
and Chordia (2006a), and Goetzmann, Watanabe, and Watanabe (2008). The
theoretical motivation for choosing ﬁrm characteristics as instruments is given by
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), who show
that the ability of size and book-to-market to explain the cross-section of returns
is due to their correlation with the true conditional market beta. They decompose
ﬁrm value into the value of assets in place and the value of growth options and
demonstrate that size captures the component of a ﬁrm’s systematic risk related
to its growth options whereas the book-to-market ratio is a measure of the risk of
the ﬁrm’s assets in place. Zhang (2005) extends this work and argues that because
of costly reversibility of capital value ﬁrms have countercyclical betas while betas
of growth stocks are procyclical. Because the price of risk is also countercyclical
his model can explain the value premium within a rational framework. In addition
to size and B/M, we also select ﬁrm-speciﬁc momentum as a conditioning variable
to examine whether the momentum eﬀect is related to beta dynamics. Theoretical
support for including macroeconomic variables is provided by Santos and Veronesi
(2004), who show within a general equilibrium model that market betas vary
substantially with the business cycle.
Our choice of business cycle variables is motivated by previous work (e.g.,
Ferson and Harvey (1999)) and includes the default spread, dividend yield, one-
month T-bill rate, and term spread.
Substituting equations (3.2) and (3.6) into equation (3.1) leads to the following
speciﬁcation:
rit = αi + ϕitbit−1rMt + (1 − ϕit)(δ0 + δ′
1[Zit−1 ⊗ BCt−1])rMt + ϵit. (3.7)
A key objective in this chapter is to determine whether the time series dynamics
and cross-sectional variation in betas is better described by lagged ﬁrm charac-
teristics and macroeconomic state variables, by past realized betas, or by a linear
combination of both. Therefore, we are primarily interested in the parameter ϕit
and compare three diﬀerent speciﬁcations: (1) mixed beta (ϕit unrestricted) (2)
fundamental beta (ϕit = 0) (3) realized beta (ϕit = 1).
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3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Bayesian Methods
We estimate the model parameters using Bayesian methods.5 The main advantage
of Bayesian inference in our setting is that it allows a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation for
describing the dynamics in beta by imposing a common structure on the model
parameters.
Updating beliefs according to Bayes’ theorem implies that the joint posterior
density of the parameters, p(θ|y), is proportional to the likelihood times the prior
density.












, is the set of all parameters
and y is the full set of data.




















ϵi is the idiosyncratic return variance, βit−1 is deﬁned as in equation (3.2),
N is the number of stocks, and Ti is the number of monthly return observations
for ﬁrm i.
3.3.2 Prior Distributions
We specify conditionally conjugate, independent, hierarchical priors that impose
a common structure on the model parameters while still allowing parameters to
vary across ﬁrms. Thus, our setup combines the beneﬁts of a portfolio approach to
estimating betas (e.g., Fama and MacBeth (1973)) and an approach in which sep-
arate regressions are estimated for each ﬁrm (e.g., Avramov and Chordia (2006a)).
Speciﬁcally, our choice of prior distributions is as follows:
5 Bayesian methods have been used in a number of asset pricing studies, including Shanken
(1987), Harvey and Zhou (1990), Kandel, McCulloch, and Stambaugh (1995), and Cremers
(2006). All these studies focus on portfolios and assume that betas are constant. Ang and
Chen (2007) and Jostova and Philipov (2005) use Bayesian techniques to obtain time-varying
portfolio betas, which they model as latent autoregressive processes.
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We use diﬀuse priors to minimize their inﬂuence on the posterior densities.
Following Jostova and Philipov (2005), we specify noninformative prior distribu-




ϕ1 and the idiosyncratic variance
σ2
ϵi, by setting the scale and shape parameters A and B of their inverse gamma
(IG) prior distributions equal to 0.001. We set the degrees of freedom parameter
ψ of the Wishart prior for Ω
−1
δ1 equal to the dimension of this matrix, (L + LM),
because this value gives the lowest possible weight to the prior information (see
Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)). We set the scale matrix of the Wishart
prior equal to [(L+LM)I]−1, so that the prior mean of Ω
−1
δ1 is equal to the identity
matrix. We give equal prior weight to the fundamental beta and the realized beta
by setting the prior mean of ϕ0i, i.e. µϕ0, equal to 0.5 and the prior mean of ϕ1
equal to 0.6
We parameterize the MIDAS weights as a beta function and set κ1 equal to 1.
To rule out cases where more recent returns receive less weight than observations
in the more distant past, i.e., when κ2 < 1, we constrain κ2 to the interval [1,26].
When κ2 = 1 all 250 days receive equal weight in the estimation and when κ2 =
26 the cumulative weight given to the 40 most recent days is 99%. We implement
this restriction by a change of variable, κ2 = 1 + 25κ∗
2.
For κ∗
2 we choose a uniform prior, κ∗
2 ∼ U[0,1].
3.3.3 Bayesian Inference
We employ Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to sample from the
joint posterior distribution of the parameter vector θ. The main idea is to con-
struct a Markov chain such that the chain converges to a unique stationary dis-
tribution that is the posterior density, p(θ|y). We use the Gibbs sampler, which
involves the sequential drawing from the full conditional posterior densities, to
obtain draws from the joint posterior density. In particular, ﬁrst the parameter
vector θ is partitioned into B blocks (θ(1),θ(2),...,θ(B)). At each iteration of the
Gibbs sampler each block is sampled from its posterior distribution conditional
on all other blocks and the data. Because the conditional posterior density of κ2
has a nonstandard form, we cannot directly sample from it. Therefore, we use the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, in which candidate parameter values are drawn
6 We also considered speciﬁcations with µϕ0 set equal to 0 or 1. These results are available
upon request and show that our ﬁndings are robust to the choice of this prior distribution.
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from a proposal density and accepted with a certain probability that is highest in
areas of the parameter space where the posterior density is highest (see Chib and
Greenberg (1995)). Details on the derivation of the joint posterior density and the
conditional posterior distributions are provided in the appendix.
Iterations of the chain converge to draws from the joint posterior. We check
convergence by inspecting the standardized cumsum statistics, as suggested by
Bauwens, Lubrano, and Richard (1999), applying the partial means test based
on numerical standard errors, explained by Geweke (2005), and calculating the
Gelman-Rubin statistic that compares the variation in output between and within
chains, described by Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004). These diagnostics
indicate that the parameter chains have converged after 1,000 iterations. In our
empirical analysis we therefore run 5,000 iterations and discard the ﬁrst 1,000
iterations as burn-in period.
The remaining draws are used to summarize the posterior density and to con-
duct inference.
3.4 Data
The ﬁrm data comes from CRSP and Compustat and consists of the monthly
return, size, and book-to-market value for a sample of NYSE- and AMEX-listed
stocks. To calculate realized betas we further retrieve daily returns from CRSP
for these stocks. The sample covers the period from July 1964 to December 2006.
Following Avramov and Chordia (2006a), we include a stock in the analysis for a
given month t if it satisﬁes the following criteria. First, its return in the current
month t and in the previous 36 months has to be available. Second, data should
be available in month t-1 for size as measured by market capitalization and for
the book-to-market ratio. We calculate the book-to-market ratio using accounting
data from Compustat as of December of the previous year. Finally, in line with
Fama and French (1993), we exclude ﬁrms with negative book-to-market equity.
Imposing these restrictions leaves a total 5,017 stocks over the full sample period
and an average of 1,815 stocks per month.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the data set. Panel A reports the
mean, median, standard deviation and 5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile values
of excess stock returns and ﬁrm characteristics across all data points. The average
monthly excess stock return is 0.69% while the median is -0.16%. The mean (me-
dian) ﬁrm size is $1.59 (0.16) billion. Because the book-to-market ratio contains
some extreme values, we trim all book-to-market outliers to the 0.5th and 99.5th
percentile values of the distribution. After trimming, the average (median) book-
to-market ratio equals 0.96 (0.75). The cumulative return over the twelve months
prior to the current month, which we use as a proxy for momentum, has a mean of
14.65% and a median of 8.60%. Because the distributions of ﬁrm size and book-
to-market display considerable skewness, we use the logarithmic transformations
of these variables in the analysis. Furthermore, we normalize the characteristics
by expressing them as deviations from their cross-sectional means to remove any
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time trend in the average value of the characteristics.
We further retrieve data for the four macroeconomic variables that we use
as instruments for the fundamental beta, i.e., the default spread, dividend yield,
one-month Treasury bill rate, and term spread. We deﬁne the default spread
as the yield diﬀerential between bonds rated BAA by Moody’s and bonds with
a Moody’s rating of AAA. The dividend yield is calculated as the sum of the
dividends paid on the value-weighted CRSP index over the previous 12 months
divided by the current level of the index. The term spread is deﬁned as the
yield diﬀerence between ten-year and one-year Treasury bonds. Panel B shows
descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic variables. The average default spread
is 1.02%, the mean dividend yield equals 3.01%, the average one-month T-bill rate
is 5.69%, and the average term spread is 0.85%.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics and Macroeco-
nomic Variables
This table presents descriptive statistics for stock returns, ﬁrm characteristics, and macroeco-
nomic variables for 510 months from July 1964 through December 2006. Panel A reports the
mean, median, standard deviation and 5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile values of ﬁrm char-
acteristics for a total of 5,017 stocks over the full sample period and an average of 1,815 stocks
per month. We include a stock in the sample for a given month t if it satisﬁes the following
criteria. First, its return in the current month, t, and over the past 36 months has to be available.
Second, data should be available in month t-1 for size as measured by market capitalization and
for the book-to-market ratio. We exclude ﬁrms with negative book-to-market equity. XRET is
the return in excess of the risk-free rate, MV represents the market capitalization in billions of
dollars, and BM is the book-to-market ratio, for which values smaller than the 0.5th percentile
and values greater than the 99.5th percentile are set equal to the 0.5th percentile and 99.5th
percentile values, respectively. MOM is the cumulative return over the twelve months prior to
the current month. Panel B shows the mean, median, standard deviation and 5th, 25th, 75th,
and 95th percentile values of macroeconomic variables. DEF is the default spread, deﬁned as
the yield diﬀerential between bonds rated BAA by Moody’s and bonds with a Moody’s rating
of AAA. DY is the dividend yield on the value-weighted CRSP index. The dividend yield is
calculated as the sum of the dividends paid on the index in the previous year divided by the
current level of the index. TBILL is the one-month Treasury bill rate. TERM is the term spread,
deﬁned as the yield diﬀerence between ten-year and one-year Treasury bonds.
Mean Std. dev. 5th 25th Median 75th 95th
Panel A: Firm characteristics
XRET (%) 0.69 12.31 -17.48 -5.99 -0.16 6.42 21.29
MV ($ billions) 1.59 5.60 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.81 6.67
BM 0.96 0.82 0.18 0.44 0.75 1.22 2.45
MOM (%) 14.65 49.29 -49.12 -14.24 8.60 34.46 96.30
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables
DEF (%) 1.02 0.43 0.55 0.73 0.90 1.21 1.92
DY (%) 3.01 1.10 1.30 2.02 2.96 3.77 4.84
TBILL (%) 5.69 2.70 1.56 4.08 5.16 6.96 10.57
TERM (%) 0.85 1.14 -1.14 0.08 0.78 1.69 2.83
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3.5 Empirical Results
In section 3.5.1 we study whether betas are driven by lagged conditioning variables
or past realized betas. Section 3.5.2 compares the eﬃciency of the beta estimates
produced by the panel model to that of those obtained from time series regressions.
In section 3.5.3 we illustrate the loss of information from aggregating stocks into
portfolios by showing the cross-sectional variation in ﬁrm-level betas within the
25 size-B/M portfolios that are often used to test asset pricing models.
3.5.1 Beta Speciﬁcation
A key objective in this chapter is to improve the speciﬁcation of time-varying
betas. We investigate whether the time series and cross-sectional variation in betas
is best explained by lagged ﬁrm characteristics and macroeconomic variables, by
past realized betas, or by a linear combination of both. We address this question
by estimating the model in equation (3.7) and examining the distribution of ϕit,
which measures the proportion of beta explained by past realized beta. We ﬁrst
calculate ϕit based on equation (3.3) for each draw of the Gibbs sampler. We then
calculate for each ﬁrm the time series average ϕi and its posterior mean.
Figure 3.1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of these posterior means of
ϕi. The cross-sectional average is 0.51, which implies that for the average ﬁrm the
estimate of beta is the average of the fundamental and realized beta estimates.
The spread in the distribution shows that for some ﬁrms past realized betas are
more important determinants of mixed betas while for others lagged fundamental
betas have a stronger impact.
Figure 3.2 plots the evolution of the cross-sectional average of ϕ through time.
Interestingly, ϕ increases during periods of high market volatility, such as reces-
sions and the stock market crash in 1987. This implies that more weight should be
given to past realized betas and less weight to fundamental betas during turbulent
conditions. Because the fundamental beta speciﬁcation is a function of macroeco-
nomic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, it captures long-run movements in beta driven
by structural changes in the economic environment and in ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc
conditions. In contrast, because the realized beta speciﬁcation is based on high-
frequency returns, it picks up short-run ﬂuctuations in beta in periods of high
market volatility.7
Since we ﬁnd that conditioning variables motivated by economic theory are
important determinants of beta, we now consider the posterior distributions of
the parameters underlying the fundamental beta. Table 3.2 presents summary
statistics of the posterior distribution of the δ0 and δ1 parameters in equation (3.6).
The constant term δ0, which can be interpreted as the average fundamental beta
because all conditioning variables are cross-sectionally demeaned, has a posterior
mean of 1.01. The results show that all three ﬁrm characteristics are important
7 Related to this, Engle and Rangel (2008) model low-frequency patterns in market volatility as
a function of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables and Hoberg and Welch (2007) compute
long- and short-run betas based on diﬀerent windows of past returns.
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Figure 3.1: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Phi
This ﬁgure shows the cross-sectional distribution of the time series average of the parameter ϕi,
which measures the proportion of beta explained by past realized beta,
βit = ϕitbit + (1   ϕit)β∗
it,
where bit is the realized beta of ﬁrm i, β∗
it is the fundamental beta, and where ϕit is given by
ϕit = ϕ0i + ϕ1VMt,
where VMt is the realized market variance. We ﬁrst calculate ϕit based on equation (3.3) for
each draw of the Gibbs sampler. We then calculate for each ﬁrm the time series average ϕi and
its posterior mean. This ﬁgure shows the cross-sectional distribution of these posterior means.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of Phi through Time
This ﬁgure plots the evolution through time of the cross-sectional average of ϕit. We ﬁrst
calculate at each iteration of the Gibbs sampler ϕit based on equation (3.3). We then compute
its posterior mean and the cross-sectional average of these posterior means in each month from
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determinants of fundamental betas. Some of the interaction terms between the
ﬁrm characteristics and macroeconomic variables also capture important variation
in market betas, particularly those involving the default spread and one-month
T-Bill rate.
Table 3.2: Posterior Distribution of Fundamental Beta Parameters
This table reports the Bayesian posterior distribution of the determinants of the fundamen-
tal beta, which is parameterized as a linear function of ﬁrm characteristics and business cycle
variables,
β∗
it = δ0 + δ′
1[Zit 
 BCt],
where Zit is a vector that contains L ﬁrm characteristics and BCt is a vector that contains
a constant and M business cycle variables. MV is the log of ﬁrm size, BM is the log of the
book-to-market ratio, and MOM is the cumulative return over the twelve months prior to the
current month. These ﬁrm characteristics are expressed as deviations from their cross-sectional
mean in every period. DEF is the default spread, DY is the dividend yield, TBILL is the one-
month Treasury bill rate, and TERM is the term spread. The table presents the mean, median,
standard deviation and 5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile values of the posterior distribution
of the delta parameters, based on 5,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler and a burn-in period of
1,000 iterations. All δ1 parameters are multiplied by 100.
Mean Std. dev. 5th 25th Median 75th 95th
Constant (δ0) 1.01 0.01 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02
MV -3.62 0.68 -4.77 -4.05 -3.66 -3.20 -2.47
BM -5.30 1.32 -7.38 -6.18 -5.44 -4.34 -3.10
MOM -10.02 2.99 -14.97 -12.05 -9.99 -8.18 -5.28
MV*TBILL 0.65 0.29 0.16 0.45 0.65 0.84 1.14
MV*TERM 1.57 0.28 1.08 1.40 1.58 1.74 2.03
MV*DEF 0.55 0.52 -0.33 0.20 0.53 0.93 1.38
MV*DY -1.41 0.08 -1.55 -1.47 -1.40 -1.35 -1.27
BM*TBILL -3.11 0.58 -3.98 -3.52 -3.09 -2.74 -2.20
BM*TERM 0.35 0.73 -0.84 -0.13 0.39 0.83 1.49
BM*DEF 13.15 0.95 11.62 12.53 13.18 13.74 14.64
BM*DY -0.05 0.14 -0.30 -0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.17
MOM*TBILL 3.05 1.02 1.43 2.29 3.06 3.81 4.67
MOM*TERM -1.11 0.89 -2.55 -1.67 -1.08 -0.54 0.34
MOM*DEF -28.91 1.70 -31.65 -30.02 -29.00 -27.76 -26.02
MOM*DY 8.18 0.23 7.81 8.03 8.18 8.32 8.56
As explained in section 3.2, we use the MIDAS approach of Ghysels, Santa-
Clara, and Valkanov (2005) to estimate realized betas based on daily return data.
This approach incorporates a ﬂexible weighting function that makes it possible
to choose the optimal weights given to past data in the estimation. The optimal
window strikes a balance between giving equal weight to observations to obtain
more precise beta estimates and giving more weight to recent data to obtain betas
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that are timelier and therefore more relevant. As shown in equation (3.5), we use
a beta weighting function whose shape is determined by two parameters. We set
κ1 equal to 1 and estimate κ2. We ﬁnd that in our realized beta speciﬁcation the
posterior mean of κ2 is equal to 1.16. Figure 3.3 compares the optimal weighting
scheme implied by the posterior mean of κ2 to the equal weighting scheme used by
rolling window estimators. The plot shows that in the optimal scheme the most
recent 150 days receive more weight than in the equal weighting scheme because
these are most informative for estimating realized betas.
We now turn to the mixed betas generated by our model. First, we calculate βit
based on equation (3.2) at each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. Subsequently, we
compute for every ﬁrm the time series average of the mixed beta and its posterior
mean. Figure 3.4 shows the cross-sectional distribution of these posterior means
of βi. As expected, the distribution is centered around one and has a standard
deviation of 0.34. A 95% conﬁdence interval for beta ranges from 0.46 to 1.60,
which implies that ﬁrms diﬀer substantially in their sensitivity to broad market
movements.
In Table 3.3 we report summary statistics of the posterior means of all three
beta speciﬁcations. Because for each t the cross-sectional average of ¯ βit is close
to one, the more interesting aspect is the dispersion in betas, both over time and
in the cross-section. The left panel in Table 3.3 reports properties of the cross-
section of betas and the right panel shows time series characteristics of beta. The
diagonal elements in these panels show that on average, realized betas display the
largest spread, both over time and across ﬁrms, while fundamental betas show
the least variation. This is consistent with the notion that realized betas capture
high-frequency movements in beta and fundamental betas pick up long-run beta
ﬂuctuations. Another explanation is that measurement error in the realized beta
estimates leads to spurious dispersion or that in addition to ﬁrm size, book-to-
market, and momentum, other ﬁrm characteristics drive variation in beta. The
time series and cross-sectional behavior of the mixed betas is a combination of the
dynamics of the realized and fundamental betas. Thus, it combines the beneﬁts of
both speciﬁcations, responding fast to changes in market conditions without pro-
ducing excessive variation in beta. The oﬀ-diagonal elements in Table 3.3 are the
correlations between the betas generated by the three speciﬁcations. Fundamental
and realized betas are strongly correlated, both over time and across stocks. Cor-
relation is far from perfect though, as a regression of one on the other has an R2
of only 0.68. This illustrates that realized and fundamental betas exhibit diﬀerent
cross-sectional characteristics and time series dynamics. Hence, a combination of
these two speciﬁcations captures diﬀerent aspects of market beta dynamics.
3.5.2 Beta Estimation
In this section we compare the precision of beta estimates from the hierarchical
Bayesian panel data model to that of estimates from a separate Bayesian time
series regression for every ﬁrm. We study the estimation eﬃciency of the two
methods for the fundamental beta speciﬁcation, where ϕit is ﬁxed at zero. Since
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Figure 3.3: Optimal versus Equal Weighting Scheme for Estimating Re-
alized Beta
This ﬁgure compares the equal weights in the traditional rolling window estimator of realized
betas to the weights implied by the MIDAS weighting function in equation (3.5) for the realized








0 50 100 150 200
W
e i g h t   ( %
)
Days (tau)
Optimal weights Equal weights
49
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf3 Efficient Estimation of Firm-Specific Betas
Figure 3.4: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Firm Betas
This ﬁgure shows the cross-sectional distribution of average ﬁrm betas. We ﬁrst calculate at
each iteration of the Gibbs sampler the beta for ﬁrm i at time t based on the model in equation
(3.7). Subsequently, we compute the time series averages of these conditional betas. We then
calculate for each ﬁrm the posterior mean of its time series average beta. This ﬁgure shows the
cross-sectional distribution of these posterior means.
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Table 3.3: Beta Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics on the dispersion of betas and the correlation between
mixed, fundamental, and realized betas. The left panel reports the properties of the cross-section




















where the indices j and k refer to the model (Mixed, Realized, Fundamental), betas are evaluated
at their posterior means ¯ βit, and where ¯ ¯ βt is the average beta at time t. The right panel considers




















where ¯ ¯ βi is the average beta of ﬁrm i. The diagonal elements in both panels have been trans-
formed into standard deviations. The oﬀ-diagonal elements of both the cross-sectional and time
series covariance matrices have been rescaled to correlations (italics).
Cross-sectional (Scross) Time Series (Stime)
Mixed Realized Fund’l Mixed Realized Fund’l
Mixed beta 0.33 0.24
Realized beta 0.95 0.61 0.94 0.46
Fundamental beta 0.94 0.83 0.10 0.93 0.82 0.09
this speciﬁcation requires the estimation of many parameters when a large number
of conditioning variables is included, the eﬃciency gain from using the panel model
can be substantial. We measure estimation precision by computing the standard
deviation and the 5% and 95% percentile values of the posterior distribution of
beta at each point in time.
Figure 3.5 plots the posterior mean and 5% and 95% percentile values of the
posterior distribution of the fundamental beta of IBM from August 1964 through
December 2006. The upper graph is based on the estimation output of the panel
data model and the lower graph is constructed using the output of a time series
regression. The shaded areas in the plot indicate NBER recession periods. The
plots show that the conﬁdence interval for beta obtained from the panel regression
is much narrower than the interval produced by the time series regression. Noisy
estimates of the δ1 parameters, which measure the inﬂuence of the conditioning
variables on fundamental betas, lead to wide intervals for beta in the time series
model.
The large eﬃciency gain in the panel model is due to two reasons. First, the
δ parameters are pooled across stocks in the panel speciﬁcation. The panel model
therefore exploits the information in the cross-section of stocks to obtain more
precise estimates. Second, because we specify hierarchical priors for the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc parameters in the model, only the parameters of the common distribution
where the parameters are assumed to be drawn from have to be estimated. The
Bayes estimator of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters in the panel model shrinks the
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Figure 3.5: Conﬁdence Interval for IBM Beta: Panel versus Time Series
Regression
This ﬁgure plots the mean and 5% and 95% percentile values of the posterior distribution of
the fundamental beta of IBM in each month from August 1964 through December 2006. The
fundamental beta is modeled as a linear function of ﬁrm characteristics and macroeconomic
state variables. The upper graph is based on the estimation output of the hierarchical panel
data model presented in section 3.2 of the chapter and the lower graph is constructed using the
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least squares estimator towards the cross-sectional mean. In contrast, in the time
series regressions every parameter is estimated individually, which results in poor
estimation precision when many parameters need to be estimated and the number
of time series observations is small.
Because in our panel approach parameters can be estimated more precisely, it
can include more conditioning variables than the traditional approach of estimat-
ing a time series regression for every ﬁrm used by Avramov and Chordia (2006a).
While we include 15 conditioning variables to accurately model beta dynamics,
they note that “attention must be restricted to a small number of such variables
to ensure some precision in the estimation procedure”. To compare the relative
eﬃciency of the panel and time series approaches when a more parsimonious spec-
iﬁcation for fundamental betas is used, we also estimate the panel model and time
series regressions with a set of conditioning variables that is similar to that used by
Avramov and Chordia (2006a). In particular, we choose ﬁrm size, book-to-market,
and two interactions terms between these characteristics and the default spread
as instruments.
The conﬁdence intervals for the fundamental beta of IBM based on this reduced
set of conditioning variables are displayed in ﬁgure 3.6. As expected, the intervals
for beta generated by the panel model and the time series regressions have both
narrowed compared to those based on the complete set of conditioning variables.
However, the plots show that even when less parameters need to be estimated the
panel approach leads to more precise estimates of ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas than the time
series approach.
Because IBM is present in our data set during the entire sample period, many
observations are available for beta estimation (509 months). As explained before,
we expect the eﬃciency gain from the hierarchical Bayesian panel data approach to
be even larger for ﬁrms with a short return history. To summarize the estimation
precision for the betas of all ﬁrms, we compute the cross-sectional average of the
posterior standard deviations of all betas in every month. Figure 3.7 plots these
standard deviations for the panel model and time series regressions. Clearly, the
posterior standard deviation of betas estimated using the time series regressions is
larger than the standard deviation of betas estimated using the panel regression.
3.5.3 Portfolio Heterogeneity
The previous section has shown that ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas are noisy when estimated
using time series regressions. To reduce the measurement error in betas, Fama and
MacBeth (1973) propose to aggregate stocks into portfolios and run a time series
regression for every portfolio to obtain the portfolio’s beta. Fama and French
(1992) follow this suggestion and assign each stock the beta of the portfolio it
belongs to. As pointed out by Ferson and Harvey (1999), such an approach is
often used in studies of initial public oﬀerings (IPOs), when no return data is
available to estimate beta. They note that this approach only works when the
characteristics used for portfolio formation are good proxies for risk, because an
important assumption underlying the portfolio approach is that the stocks in a
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Figure 3.6: Conﬁdence Interval for Reduced Fundamental Beta of IBM
This ﬁgure plots the mean and 5% and 95% percentile values of the posterior distribution of
the fundamental beta of IBM in each month from August 1964 through December 2006. The
fundamental beta is modeled as a linear function of a reduced set of ﬁrm characteristics and
macroeconomic state variables. The upper graph is based on the estimation output of the
hierarchical panel data model presented in section 3.2 of the chapter and the lower graph is
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Figure 3.7: Average Posterior Standard Deviation of Fundamental Betas
This ﬁgure plots the cross-sectional average of the posterior standard deviations of the funda-
mental betas of all ﬁrms in the sample from August 1964 through December 2006. In the upper
graph the fundamental beta is modeled as a linear function of ﬁrm characteristics and macroe-
conomic state variables and in the lower graph fundamental betas depend on a reduced set of
conditioning variables. Posterior standard deviations are based on the estimation output of the
hierarchical panel data model and the output of time series regressions estimated for every ﬁrm.
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particular portfolio share the same risk characteristics. In case of the widely used
25 portfolios sorted on ﬁrm size and book-to-market, it is assumed that ﬁrms are
homogeneous in their exposure to risk after controlling for size and B/M. When the
stocks in a given portfolio have diﬀerent exposures to other determinants of risk,
this method can lead to serious errors. In this section we therefore examine whether
ﬁrms that are grouped together in a portfolio have similar risk characteristics.
We construct the 25 size-B/M portfolios following the procedure of Fama and
French (1993).
Subsequently, we calculate for every portfolio j in every month t the cross-
sectional average and standard deviation of the excess returns and posterior means
of the alphas, betas, and phis of the stocks in that portfolio. The left part of
Table 3.4 reports for each portfolio the time series means of these cross-sectional
averages. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Fama and French (1996)), the small-
growth portfolio has the lowest average return and a large, negative pricing error.
In general, the average portfolio returns display a strong value premium but weak
size eﬀect. Importantly, sorting on ﬁrm size and B/M does not produce a wide
spread in average market betas across portfolios, as most portfolio betas are close
to one.8
The table further shows that the phi parameters of large cap portfolios are
higher than those of small cap portfolios. This implies that realized betas are the
most important determinants of the mixed betas of large ﬁrms while fundamental
betas have a stronger eﬀect on the mixed betas of small ﬁrms.
Table 3.4 also shows the dispersion of the risk and return characteristics across
stocks in each portfolio. For all characteristics we observe strong heterogeneity
within portfolios. In some portfolios the cross-sectional standard deviation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc alphas is more than 1%. Especially ﬁrms that are grouped together
in small cap portfolios have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent pricing errors.
The cross-sectional variation in betas of ﬁrms in each portfolio is around 0.30,
which implies that the assumption that stocks in the same portfolio have similar
risk characteristics is violated. Table 3.4 also reports substantial heterogeneity in
phi within portfolios. This means that for some ﬁrms in a given portfolio mixed
betas are mainly driven by realized betas whereas for others fundamental betas
are more important.
3.6 Applications of Firm-Speciﬁc Betas
This section discusses two important applications of the ﬁrm-level betas generated
by our Bayesian panel data model. In section 3.6.1 we compare the explanatory
power of diﬀerent beta speciﬁcations and estimation methods for the cross-section
of individual stock returns. Section 3.6.2 uses the beta forecasts to estimate the
8 However, unreported results show that value and growth portfolios exhibit very diﬀerent risk
dynamics. Conﬁrming the results of Ang and Chen (2007) and Franzoni (2007), we ﬁnd that
the beta of value ﬁrms shows a declining trend and is lower than the beta of growth stocks
since the 1980s.
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covariance matrix of stock returns, which we then use to construct minimum vari-
ance portfolios.
3.6.1 Cross-Sectional Tests of the Conditional CAPM
The previous section has shown that aggregating individual stocks into portfolios
leads to a substantial loss of information and shrinks the cross-sectional variation
in betas. Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008) demonstrate that this loss of information
can lead to large eﬃciency losses in cross-sectional tests of asset pricing models.
In particular, they show that while creating portfolios reduces estimation error
in betas, standard errors of risk premia estimates are higher due to the smaller
spread in betas. Consequently, using individual stocks instead of portfolios as base
assets allows for more powerful tests of asset pricing models.
Another important reason for using individual stocks in cross-sectional tests of
asset pricing models is given by Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2008). They show
analytically that due to the strong factor structure in the 25 size-B/M sorted port-
folios often used as test assets in asset pricing studies, traditional cross-sectional
tests have low power to reject a model. In particular, when theoretical restrictions
on cross-sectional slopes are ignored, any factor that is only weakly correlated with
the true factors can generate high cross-sectional R2s and small pricing errors.
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) show that the empirical support for several recently
proposed asset pricing models weakens considerably when this issue is taken into
account. Because individual stock returns do not have a strong factor structure,
they are not aﬀected by this problem.
In their analysis, Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008) assume constant stock betas,
which they estimate by running time series regressions. We extend their work in
two directions. First, we improve the speciﬁcation of betas by allowing for time
variation. Second, we use a formal panel data approach to increase the precision of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc beta estimates. We do not claim that the CAPM is the “best” asset
pricing model. Our objective is to show the eﬀect of better beta speciﬁcation and
estimation on the pricing ability of the CAPM.
We ﬁrst estimate betas for all stocks in our sample and for the 25 size-B/M
portfolios. We consider four beta speciﬁcations (mixed, fundamental, realized,
and static) and estimate the models using hierarchical Bayesian panel regressions.
These betas are then used as independent variables in second stage monthly cross-
sectional regressions of excess returns on betas,
rit = λ0t + λ1tβit−1 + λ′
2txit−1 + υit, (3.10)
where λ0t is the intercept, λ1t the risk premium, and where xit−1 is a vector of
control variables. We run the cross-sectional regressions for every draw of the
Gibbs sampler and calculate the time series average of the cross-sectional coeﬃ-
cients. We then calculate the posterior mean and variance of the Fama-MacBeth
estimators. In appendix B we demonstrate that this procedure accounts for mea-
surement error in beta by using the entire posterior distribution of the βit in the
estimation.
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Columns 1-3 in Table 3.5 report the Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcient estimates when
individual stocks are the test assets and no control variables are included in the
regression (xit−1 = 0). We ﬁnd that for the mixed beta speciﬁcation the intercept
is close to zero and insigniﬁcant while the risk premium estimate is signiﬁcantly
positive. The λ1t estimate is 0.56%, which is close to the average monthly excess
market return during the sample period (0.47%). This implies that the condi-
tional CAPM with mixed betas satisﬁes the theoretical restriction emphasized by
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) that the risk premium should equal the expected excess
factor return. For the other three beta speciﬁcations the intercepts are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The risk premium estimates in the realized beta and funda-
mental beta models are positive and signiﬁcant but deviate more from the average
market return than the premium estimated in the mixed beta model. In terms of
explanatory power the mixed beta speciﬁcation also outperforms the competing
approaches to modeling beta. The static CAPM performs worst, because in this
model the cross-sectional variation in market betas does not respond to business
cycle variations.
Columns 4-6 in Table 3.5 show that when portfolios are used as test assets,
all beta speciﬁcations generate economically large intercepts. Nevertheless, the
mixed beta speciﬁcation again has the highest explanatory power and the static
CAPM does worst. We stress that the R2 should only be compared across beta
speciﬁcations and should not be used to compare individual stocks and portfolios
as test assets, because the dependent variables in the cross-sectional regressions
are diﬀerent. Table 3.5 further shows that the standard errors of the parameter
estimates are much larger when portfolios are used as test assets than when in-
dividual stocks are used, which conﬁrms that sorting stocks into portfolios can
lead to large eﬃciency losses because it reduces the dispersion of betas. In fact,
standard errors from using portfolios are more than twice as large as those from
using individual stocks.
The last three columns in Table 3.5 report estimation results for individual
stocks when control variables are added to the cross-sectional regressions. In
particular, the vector xit−1 contains the ﬁrm characteristics size, book-to-market,
and momentum. Fama and French (1992) ﬁnd that the cross-sectional relation
between between market beta and average return is ﬂat when tests control for
size. We ﬁnd that while adding these ﬁrm characteristics leads to an increase in
explanatory power, the risk premium estimate for the mixed beta speciﬁcation
remains signiﬁcantly positive. Thus, when individual stocks are used as test assets
and betas are well-speciﬁed and precisely estimated, the positive relation between
beta and return no longer disappears when controlling for ﬁrm characteristics.
3.6.2 Beta Forecasts and Minimum Variance Portfolios
An important application of betas is to estimate the covariance matrix of returns,
which is used to construct mean-variance eﬃcient portfolios. Traditional imple-
mentations of the portfolio theory developed by Markowitz (1952) use sample
moments. When the number of assets is large, however, it is diﬃcult to precisely
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estimate the expected returns and covariances. As a result, asset weights are often
extreme and portfolios behave poorly out-of-sample. Many strategies have been
proposed to improve the out-of-sample performance of mean-variance portfolios,
including shrinkage estimators, imposing short-selling constraints, using asset pric-
ing models to estimate expected returns, and imposing a factor structure on the
covariance matrix.9
In a recent study, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) compare the out-of-
sample performance of these approaches to the 1/N rule that gives equal weight
to all available assets. They conclude that none of the more sophisticated meth-
ods consistently outperforms the naive 1/N benchmark in terms of Sharpe ratio
or certainty equivalent return. Of the alternative models considered, the min-
imum variance portfolio with short-selling constraints proposed by Jagannathan
and Ma (2003) has the highest Sharpe ratio but is not superior to the 1/N strategy.
The global minimum variance portfolio does well, because it is the only eﬃcient
portfolio that does not require estimates of expected returns, which contain large
estimation errors. Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999) compare the out-of-
sample performance of minimum variance portfolios based on forecasts of future
covariances produced by factor models. They ﬁnd that there is one major fac-
tor, the market, that dominates all other factors. Hence, the one-factor model is
adequate for forming the global minimum variance portfolio.
Motivated by these ﬁndings, we use the mixed beta forecasts produced by
our Bayesian panel data model to forecast the covariance matrix of stock returns
and construct the global minimum variance portfolio. We expect our method to
outperform competing approaches because it delivers more eﬃcient estimates of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas and because it allows for time variation in beta. DeMiguel,
Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) admit that their assumption of constant risk is a
limitation, but argue that models that allow for time-varying moments are likely
to perform poorly out-of-sample because many parameters need to be estimated.
However, one of the key advantages of our method is that it can estimate many
parameters with high precision. We compare the out-of-sample performance of our
approach to that of the traditional sample covariance matrix, the static one-factor
structure considered by Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999), and the 1/N
rule advocated by DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009).10 Engle and Colacito
(2006) stress the importance of isolating the eﬀect of covariance information from
expected returns when the objective is to evaluate diﬀerent covariance estimators.
Because expected returns do not enter the optimization when constructing mini-
mum variance portfolios, diﬀerences in the portfolio weights only reﬂect the eﬀect
of diﬀerent covariance forecasts.
9 See, e.g., Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999), Jagannathan and Ma (2003), and Ledoit
and Wolf (2003)).
10 Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009) propose a new approach to portfolio optimization,
in which portfolio weights are modeled as a function of ﬁrm characteristics to exploit cross-
sectional patterns in stock returns. They show that this parametric portfolio policy performs
well for expected return maximizing portfolios but note that it works less well when the
objective is to construct risk minimizing portfolios.
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(Rt − ¯ R)(Rt − ¯ R), (3.11)
where Rt is the vector of monthly stock returns and ¯ R contains the sample mean
returns. Our second covariance estimator is based on the one-factor model. In
the ﬁrst step, we estimate mixed betas using our panel approach and static betas
using time series regressions. We use these betas to estimate the covariance matrix




t + D, (3.12)
where Bt is the Nt × 1 vector of betas, s2
Mt is the sample variance of the market
premium, and D is a diagonal matrix that contains the variances of the residuals.
Subsequently, we use the various estimates of the covariance matrix to con-
struct the minimum variance portfolio, by choosing the portfolio weights that






wit = 1. (3.14)
The constraint implies that the portfolio is fully invested. Following Chan,
Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999) and Jagannathan and Ma (2003), we also consider
an extension in which we add a short-selling constraint,
wit ≥ 0, i = 1,2,...N. (3.15)
We form the minimum variance portfolio at the end of each month, based on
the forecast of the covariance matrix for the next month.
The ﬁrst portfolio is formed using the ﬁrst half of the sample period to forecast
the covariance matrix of returns according to the methods explained above. Be-
cause the sample covariance matrix cannot be positive deﬁnite unless the number
of return observations per stock is larger than the number of stocks, we only apply
this method to a subset of the investment universe. We record the performance
of the minimum variance portfolio in the next month and rebalance the portfolio
using the new forecast of the covariance matrix. This method produces a time se-
ries of monthly returns for global minimum variance portfolios constructed using
diﬀerent covariance estimators. As a benchmark we also form an equally weighted
portfolio at the end of each month. Since the objective is to minimize the portfolio
variance, we evaluate the performance of the diﬀerent methods by calculating the
realized volatility of the portfolio returns.
Table 3.6 reports annualized risk and return characteristics of the minimum
variance portfolios constructed using various forecasts of the covariance matrix.
Panel A shows the out-of-sample performance when all stocks in the sample are
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used in the optimization and short-selling is allowed. The mixed beta speciﬁca-
tion estimated using the panel data approach outperforms all other methods and
produces a portfolio with an annualized standard deviation of 8.12%. The 1/N
strategy leads to a standard deviation that is almost twice as large (15.40%). The
static beta model ranks second and generates an out-of-sample standard deviation
of 8.50%. Although our objective is to minimize portfolio variance, we ﬁnd that
the mixed beta approach also leads to the best risk-return tradeoﬀ, as it produces
the highest Sharpe ratio of all four approaches, equal to 0.69. Since the minimum
variance portfolio constructed using the mixed beta approach does not involve
taking short positions, it can also be easily implemented in practice. No short
positions are taken because the mixed beta forecasts for all stocks are positive.
In panel B we report the performance for portfolios constructed from a random
sample of 250 stocks, which is the same number of stocks considered by Chan,
Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999). For this subset of stocks the 1/N rule leads
to the highest out-of-sample standard deviation (15.93%), followed by the sample
covariance matrix, which generates a standard deviation of 15.19% and involves
taking large short positions. The mixed beta panel approach again beats all other
methods and produces a portfolio with a standard deviation of 8.41%. Thus,
the performance of this approach when applied to the smaller sample of stocks
is similar to that when all stocks are used in the optimization. An important
reason for the relatively poor performance of the naive 1/N strategy is that we
allocate wealth across individual stocks. In contrast, DeMiguel, Garlappi, and
Uppal (2009) apply this policy to allocate wealth across portfolios of stocks. They
point out that the loss from naive as opposed to optimal diversiﬁcation is much
larger when allocating wealth across individual assets, because individual stocks
have higher idiosyncratic volatility than portfolios.
Jagannathan and Ma (2003) document that the out-of-sample performance
of the sample covariance matrix can be improved by imposing no-short-sale con-
straints, because these reduce sampling error. Panel C reports the risk and return
characteristics of the portfolios generated by the four methods when the nonneg-
ativity constraint is imposed on the weights. The random sample of 250 stocks
used to form the portfolios is the same as that used in panel B. We ﬁnd that the
standard deviation of the minimum variance portfolio constructed using the sam-
ple covariance matrix is indeed lower when no-short-sale restrictions are in place.
In fact, this method yields a lower standard deviation than the equally weighted
(1/N) portfolio or the one-factor model with static betas. We also conﬁrm the
ﬁnding of Jagannathan and Ma (2003) that imposing no-short-sale constraints re-
duces the performance of the static factor model. Because the portfolio produced
by the mixed beta approach in panel B does not take short positions, it is not
aﬀected by the nonnegativity constraint and still has the smallest out-of-sample
standard deviation.
63
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf3 Efficient Estimation of Firm-Specific Betas
Table 3.6: Risk and Return Characteristics of Global Minimum Variance
Portfolios
This table reports the out-of-sample performance of global minimum variance portfolios that are
formed at the end of each month from December 1985 through December 2006 out of a universe
of NYSE-AMEX stocks. The optimization procedure uses forecasts of the covariance matrix of
returns produced by diﬀerent models. Panel A reports the out-of-sample performance of these
minimum variance portfolios when all stocks in the sample are used in the optimization and
without any constraints imposed on the weights. Panel B reports results for this unconstrained
optimization when a random sample of 250 stocks is used to construct the portfolios. Panel C
reports results for this reduced investment universe when a nonnegativity constraint is imposed
on the portfolio weights (no short-selling).
The mean return and standard deviation are those of excess returns. Mean return, standard
deviation, and Sharpe ratio are annualized. Short interest is in percentages.
Model Mean Std. Dev. Sharpe Ratio Short Interest
Panel A: Unconstrained (all stocks)
Equally weighted (1/N) 8.57 15.40 0.56 0.00
Static beta (TS model) 5.24 8.50 0.61 -64.64
Mixed beta (Panel model) 5.60 8.12 0.69 0.00
Panel B: Unconstrained (250 stocks)
Sample covariance matrix 4.30 15.19 0.28 -144.79
Equally weighted (1/N) 9.46 15.93 0.59 0.00
Static beta (TS model) 7.81 13.32 0.59 -60.35
Mixed beta (Panel model) 5.70 8.41 0.68 0.00
Panel C: Nonnegativity Constrained (250 stocks)
Sample covariance matrix 3.02 11.74 0.26 0.00
Equally weighted (1/N) 9.46 15.93 0.59 0.00
Static beta (TS model) 7.55 15.60 0.48 0.00
Mixed beta (Panel model) 5.70 8.41 0.68 0.00
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3.7 Conclusion
Many applications of modern ﬁnance theory require precise beta estimates for
individual stocks.
However, as noted by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), “ﬁrm-speciﬁc
betas are diﬃcult to estimate and may well be unstable over time”. Academics and
practitioners have taken two approaches to estimating ﬁrm-level betas. The ﬁrst
method sorts stocks into portfolios based on characteristics to reduce measure-
ment error and assigns each ﬁrm the beta of the portfolio it belongs to. However,
when stocks in the same portfolio have diﬀerent exposures to other determinants
of risk than the characteristics they are sorted on, this approach can lead to serious
errors. The second method estimates a separate time series regression for every
stock. Although this approach allows each ﬁrm to have a diﬀerent risk exposure,
the resulting beta estimates can be very noisy. The literature also uses diﬀerent
speciﬁcations to model time variation in betas. Many studies use a parametric
approach in which variation in beta is modeled as a linear function of condition-
ing variables. An alternative, non-parametric approach to model risk dynamics is
based on purely data-driven ﬁlters. However, both methods have important draw-
backs and involve a trade-oﬀ between precision and timeliness of beta estimates.
In this chapter we therefore improve both the speciﬁcation and estimation of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-varying betas. We combine the parametric and non-parametric
approaches for modeling changes in betas. The precision of ﬁrm-level beta esti-
mates is increased by setting up a Bayesian panel data model that exploits the
information contained in the cross-section of stocks and imposes a common struc-
ture on parameters while still allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
We ﬁnd that modeling time-varying betas as a function of both conditioning
variables and past return data is preferred over traditional beta speciﬁcations that
are based on only one of these components. Because fundamental and realized
betas exhibit diﬀerent time series dynamics and cross-sectional characteristics, a
combination of these speciﬁcations captures diﬀerent aspects of beta. We show
that the optimal mixture of these two betas varies across ﬁrms and over time.
We further demonstrate that our panel data approach yields more precise es-
timates of ﬁrm-level betas than the traditional approach of estimating betas by
running a time series regression for every ﬁrm. Moreover, we document strong
cross-sectional variation in betas of ﬁrms that are grouped together in portfolios
sorted on size and book-to-market. Consequently, aggregating stocks into portfo-
lios conceals important information contained in individual stock betas and reduces
the cross-sectional variation in betas.
We demonstrate that the mixed betas generated by our panel data model lead
to a sharp increase in the pricing ability of the conditional CAPM. The estimate of
the market risk premium remains signiﬁcantly positive when controlling for ﬁrm
characteristics. The results support the ﬁnding of Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008)
that the use of individual stocks as tests assets instead of portfolios leads to more
eﬃcient estimates in cross-sectional tests of asset pricing models. We extend their
work by showing that a better speciﬁcation and more precise estimation of stock-
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speciﬁc betas increases the explanatory power of the CAPM.
Accurate estimates of ﬁrm-speciﬁc betas are also important for portfolio op-
timization. Based on the mixed beta estimates produced by our panel model
we forecast the covariance matrix of stock returns, which is then used to form
minimum variance portfolios. The portfolio constructed using mixed betas from
the Bayesian panel approach outperforms portfolios of other strategies, such as
the traditional sample covariance matrix and the naive 1/N rule, in terms of
out-of-sample standard deviation. The mixed beta speciﬁcation is also superior
to competing approaches when short-selling constraints on portfolio weights are
imposed.
Since our framework is ﬂexible, it can be readily extended to include multi-
ple risk factors, a diﬀerent set of conditioning variables for fundamental betas,
or another window length for estimating realized betas. In addition, while we
have demonstrated the advantages of our approach for asset pricing and portfo-
lio management, it also has important beneﬁts in corporate ﬁnance applications.
Speciﬁcally, because it quickly captures changes in beta and generates precise beta
estimates even when little return data is available, our method is well suited for
calculating risk-adjusted returns in studies of IPOs and M&As.
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3.A Appendix I: Posterior Distributions
3.A.1 Joint Posterior Distribution
The joint posterior density is proportional to the product of the likelihood function
and the prior distributions of all parameters θ: p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ). Deﬁning βit
as in equation (3.2), stacking the time series observations for every ﬁrm i into
vectors, and substituting the prior densities speciﬁed in section 3.3 produces the































































































































































3.A.2 Conditional Posterior Distributions
In order to implement the Gibbs sampler we need to derive the full conditional
posterior densities for each block of parameters.














where Γ(A) denotes the Gamma function, A is the shape parameter, and B is the scale










where k denotes the dimension of the matrix H, ν is the degrees of freedom parameter, and
R is the scale matrix.
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The conditional densities can be derived from the joint posterior density by
ignoring all terms that do not depend on the parameters of interest and then
treating the parameters considered to be known as constants. We then obtain the
conditional density for the parameters of interest by rearranging the remaining
terms into the kernel of a known distribution.
We partition the parameter vector θ into the following blocks:
θ(1): MIDAS weight parameter: (κ2)
θ(2): Alpha parameters: (αi)
θ(3): Fundamental beta parameters: (δ0,δ1)
θ(4): Firm-speciﬁc mixed beta parameters: (ϕ0i)
θ(5): Pooled mixed beta parameter: (ϕ1)








To generate samples from the conditional posterior of θ(1) we use the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm. The conditional posteriors for all other blocks have convenient
functional forms. Therefore, we use the Gibbs sampler to iteratively draw from
the conditional densities of θ(2), θ(3), θ(4), θ(5), θ(6).
To simplify notation we rewrite the model in matrix form as
ri = αiιTi + ϕ0irMbi + ϕ1rMVMbi + rMWiδ − ϕ0irMWiδ − ϕ1rMVMWiδ + ϵi,
(3.16)
where ri is an T × 1 vector of excess returns, rM an T × T diagonal matrix of
excess market returns, VM an T × T diagonal matrix of lagged market volatility,
bi an T ×1 vector of realized betas, and ϵi an T ×1 vector of idiosyncratic shocks.
Since the δ0 and δ1 parameters in block θ(3) have independent priors, we have
simpliﬁed the notation further by rewriting δ0ιT + ZBCiδ1 as Wiδ,where Wi is
the T ×(1+L+LM) matrix of the constant term and conditioning variables. We




δ1 into the matrix Ω
−1
δ .
3.A.3 Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw κ2
Since we implement a change of variable, κ2 = 1 + 25˜ κ2, we need to draw values
for ˜ κ2. Because the conditional posterior density for ˜ κ2 does not take a standard
form, we cannot use the Gibbs sampler. Instead, we employ the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm, which is a general accept-reject algorithm. In fact, Gelman,
Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) show that the Gibbs sampler is a special case of
Metropolis-Hastings in which proposed parameter values are accepted with prob-
ability one. The M-H algorithm proceeds as follows.
First, a candidate value ˜ κ∗
2 is drawn from a proposal density q(˜ κ2). We apply
the Independence Chain M-H algorithm, in which the proposal density is indepen-
dent across draws. We choose a Beta(1,3) proposal density, which has a mean of
0.25 and standard deviation equal to 0.19. Because the proposal density is not
identical to the posterior density, the M-H algorithm does not accept all proposal
draws. When a proposal is rejected the parameter value is set equal to the current
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value. Draws are accepted according to the following probability
π(˜ κ
(g−1)














This approach ensures that candidate draws with a high posterior density have a
higher probability of being accepted than draws with a low posterior density. Re-
peating this procedure produces the required sequence of draws from the posterior
distribution.
3.A.4 Conditional Posterior αi










where Q∗ = (ri − αi − rMβi)
′ Ω−1





= (Xαi − αiιTi)
′ Ω−1
























and where Xαi = ri − ϕ0irMbi − ϕ1rMVMbi − rMWiδ
+ ϕ0irMWiδ + ϕ1rMVMWiδ.
















, all parameters in Q∗
2 are known, so we can treat Q∗
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3.A.5 Conditional Posterior δ
δ|θ(δ),y ∼ N
(¯ δ, ¯ Ωδ
)
,




((1 − ϕ0i)rMWi − ϕ1rMVMWi)
′ Ω−1
ϵi










ϵi ((1 − ϕ0i)rMWi − ϕ1rMVMWi)
]
,




((1 − ϕ0i)rMWi − ϕ1rMVMWi)
′ Ω−1
ϵi






Xδi = ri − αiιTi − ϕ0irMbi − ϕ1rMVMbi.
3.A.6 Conditional Posterior ϕ0i
ϕ0i|θ(ϕ0i),y ∼ N




with ¯ ϕ0i =
[
(bi − Wiδ)′rMΩ−1
























and where Xϕ0i = ri − αiιTi − rMWiδ − ϕ1rMVM(bi − Wiδ).
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3.A.7 Conditional Posterior ϕ1
ϕ1|θ(ϕ1),y ∼ N





































and where Xϕ1i = ri − αiιTi − ϕ0irM(bi − Wiδ) − rMWiδ.






















δ |θ(1:5),y ∼ Wish
(
[δδ′ + (ψδSδ)]
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3.B Appendix II: Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing
Tests
In this appendix we show how we account for measurement error in betas in the
cross-sectional asset pricing tests. We consider the cross-sectional regression model
described in section 3.6,
rit = λ0t + λ1tβit−1 + λ′
2txit−1 + υit. (3.18)
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Conditional on βit−1 we can estimate the parameters λt, either Bayesian or clas-
sical, using the Fama-MacBeth approach. Let Wit = (1 βit x′
it)′ and let ˆ λt denote














S ≡ V ar
(√







(ˆ λt − ˆ λ)(ˆ λt − ˆ λ)′. (3.20)
The Fama-MacBeth procedure overstates the precision of parameter estimates in
the cross-sectional regressions because it ignores estimation errors in the βit.
As explained in section 3.3, the Gibbs sampler has produced a series of L draws
from the posterior density p(β|y), where β contains the entire collection of all βit
and y is a shorthand for all data used in estimating the betas. Given the β
(ℓ)
it from





t construct the conditional mean ˆ λ(ℓ) and covariance matrix S(ℓ). From


















(ˆ λ(ℓ) − ¯ λ)(ˆ λ(ℓ) − ¯ λ)′. (3.22)
The estimates ¯ λ and ¯ S can be interpreted as the posterior mean and variance of
the average λt if we assume that the prior on λt is uniform and λ does not aﬀect
the posterior density of βit.
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Self-reporting biases and a deﬁciency of comprehensive return and cost data have
severely hindered pension fund studies to date. The bias-free CEM data set re-
solves these issues and provides detailed information on fund-speciﬁc returns, costs
and benchmarks for all types of pension plans and equity mandates. Using this
data set we show that pension fund cost levels are substantially lower than mu-
tual fund fees as a result of scale advantages and bargaining power by pension
funds. We also document that benchmark-adjusted domestic net equity returns of
US pension funds are very close to zero, which sharply contrasts the underperfor-
mance of mutual funds. We argue that the better monitoring capacity of pension
funds enhances performance and also explains part of the performance diﬀerence
with mutual funds.1
4.1 Introduction
Pension funds are among the largest institutional investors in the US and a critical
component of many people’s overall ﬁnancial position. However, remarkably little
is known about their performance and cost structures. By contrast, the mutual
fund sector has been heavily scrutinized as have hedge funds. The lack of pension
fund performance studies can be largely attributed to an absence of suﬃcient data
which is a direct result of reporting guidelines. Mutual funds are required to
report their performance and fees on a regular basis, whereas no such obligation
exists for pension funds. The main contribution of this chapter is to employ the
CEM pension fund database, which provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate
1 This chapter is based on the paper Bauer, Cremers, and Frehen (2009)
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the performance of US pension funds and gives detailed insight in the variety of
benchmarks used to evaluate asset managers and cost compositions of pension
funds. The database covers approximately 40% of the US pension industry in
terms of assets, representing a wide variety of fund sizes, plan types and equity
mandates.
Pension fund return data in previous work was mostly of poor quality and
often narrowed down to speciﬁc fund and plan types. In addition, every pension
fund data set potentially suﬀered from biases as pension funds have no obligation
to communicate their results. More importantly, most pension fund data are
provided on a managed account level, i.e. returns are provided for managers
employed by pension funds (see e.g. Beebower and Bergstrom (1977), Coggin,
Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) and Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2009)). This reporting
structure prohibits documentation of the performance of pension funds as such
since managers are often employed by more than one pension fund and pension
funds typically hire more than one manager. For those databases one typically
does not know which manager is trading for which fund and therefore one cannot
compute fund performance. Furthermore, data on benchmarks used by pension
funds to evaluate their portfolio returns is to the best of our knowledge non-
existent. A ﬁnal drawback of data on pension funds is the lack of comprehensive
cost data. Apart from a small number of surveys (e.g. McKinsey (2006) and
Mercer (2006)), very little is known about the costs of pension funds.
The lack of comprehensive return, benchmark and cost data and possible biases
have induced a broad diversity of conclusions on pension fund performance and
costs. For example, Beebower and Bergstrom (1977) examine the performance of
148 US portfolios in a CAPM framework. In their study, the average portfolio
outperforms the S&P 500 by 144 basis points per year. Coggin, Fabozzi, and
Rahman (1993) document positive selectivity and negative timing skills for a ran-
dom sample of 71 equity managers of US pension plans. Busse, Goyal, and Wahal
(2009) perform the most complete study on pension fund accounts so far. They
study 6,260 portfolios managed by institutional asset managers on behalf of deﬁned
beneﬁt pension funds. Using a conditional multi-factor model, they ﬁnd that the
average fund manager outperforms the market by 124 basis points after expenses.
By contrast, Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) study 91 deﬁned beneﬁt plans
and conclude that the funds underperform the S&P 500 by 110 basis points per
year. Ippolito and Turner (1987) also document underperformance in a sample of
1,526 plans. They conclude that the S&P 500 on average has a return advantage
of 44 basis points. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2006) study mutual funds oﬀered
by deﬁned contribution plans and show that they are beaten by the market by 31
basis points per year. In the most comprehensive study on plan level, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) show that 769 deﬁned beneﬁt plans lag the S&P 500
by 260 basis points yearly. Based on their ﬁgures it seems justiﬁed to question the
future of the pension industry as they do.
The lack of consensus on pension fund performance is in marked contrast to
the abundance of evidence on mutual fund underperformance. A majority of
performance studies concludes that after expenses and trading costs, mutual funds
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perform worse than a comparable passive market proxy. For example, Malkiel
(1995) and Gruber (1996) observe that mutual funds on average underperform
the market by the amount of expenses charged to investors. Chan, Chen, and
Lakonishok (2002) corroborate the underperformance of the mutual fund industry
in a study on mutual fund investment styles. More recently, Elton, Gruber, and
Busse (2004) show that many index funds strongly underperform the S&P 500.
The above mentioned complications of pension fund data and contrasting ﬁnd-
ings of earlier pension fund studies illustrate how diﬃcult it is to create a consistent
and comprehensive picture of the performance of the US pension industry and give
insight in the benchmarks and cost composition of this sector. The CEM data set
enables us to address the aforementioned issues and strongly improve the per-
formance and cost evaluation to date. We cover approximately 40% of the US
pension sector in terms of assets under management and have annual data on
pension plan level, i.e. returns, benchmarks and costs per fund. In particular, we
examine the domestic equity performance of 463 deﬁned beneﬁt and 248 deﬁned
contribution pension plans and provide an overview of the benchmarks used by
pension funds in their large and small cap mandates. Following Kenneth French,
who ﬁrst used the CEM data in his AFA presidential address on the cost of active
investing (French, 2008), we use the data set to complete the picture on cost levels
and their driving forces. By linking our data to other sources we are able to test
for potential biases that result from the voluntary reporting, and ascertain that
our data do not suﬀer from them. For most evaluations we diﬀerentiate between
several mandate types i.e. large versus small capitalization stocks, actively versus
passively managed portfolios and funds that are externally versus internally (only
for deﬁned beneﬁt funds) managed.
We ﬁnd that pension funds generate net domestic equity alphas very close
to zero. Cost levels are substantially lower than in the mutual fund industry and
range between 10 basis points for the largest deﬁned beneﬁt funds to 70 basis points
for the smallest deﬁned contribution funds. Heterogeneity in cost levels between
funds is to a large extent driven by diﬀerences in fund size. Irrespective of fund
size, externally and actively managed mandates are found be more expensive than
their internally and passively managed counterparts.
A considerable majority of pension funds indicates that they benchmark their
small cap equity mandates against the Russell 2000. Although all previous studies
used the S&P 500 as a yardstick for performance, the CEM data show that this
might not even be the right benchmark for the large cap mandates. The Wilshire
5000, Russel 1000 and Russell 3000 indices have conquered an equal market share
in the large cap universe during the last decade.
The small but non-negative net domestic equity alphas of pension funds con-
trast sharply with the large amounts of evidence on mutual fund underperfor-
mance. Particularly, the lower cost levels of pension funds attribute to this gap
in performance. We show that pension plan participants beneﬁt from the size of
their pension plans through lower cost levels in internally managed domestic eq-
uity portfolios. We also ﬁnd that larger funds have lower cost levels in externally
managed mandates, which is a clear proof of pension fund’s bargaining power with
75
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf4 Pension Funds: Performance, Benchmarks and Costs
external parties. Additionally, we provide evidence of the monitoring capacity of
pension funds. More monitoring capacity leads to higher net alphas for large de-
ﬁned beneﬁt funds, and to better performance in internally managed portfolios
compared to externally managed ones. By contrast, Swensen (2005) shows that
no such advantages exist for mutual fund investors. We thus argue that pension
funds are not able to consistently outperform their benchmarks, but scale advan-
tages in internally managed portfolios, bargaining power with external parties and
monitoring abilities limit the magnitude and probability of underperformance. In-
vestors in mutual funds on the other hand do not beneﬁt from these advantages
as a result of the for-proﬁt character of the fund.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces our data set and
measures possible biases. In section 4.3 we introduce the random coeﬃcients panel
model used to evaluate fund performance and the Fama-MacBeth methodology
for measuring scale advantages in costs. In section 4.4 we give an overview of the
most important benchmarks used to evaluate manager performance and study the
impact of selecting diﬀerent benchmarks in the evaluation procedure. In section
4.5 we measure the cost levels of various equity mandates and study the cost
diﬀerences between funds. We evaluate fund performance in section 4.6 and put
forward explanations for the performance diﬀerence between pension and mutual
funds in section 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Data
Deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution pension fund data are provided by CEM
Benchmarking Inc. (CEM), which collects detailed information on pension fund
costs, benchmarks and performance via yearly questionnaires. Table 4.1 illustrates
the diversity and evolution of the equity database by reporting the number of funds
for diﬀerent fund types and the number of funds leaving the database for every
sample year. Pension funds are grouped into corporate, public and other funds.
The overview shows that the number of funds in the database is relatively stable,
as is the relative share of corporate, public and other funds. It is therefore unlikely
that our results will be driven by a single year, a single fund or a particular fund
type. CEM collects data from multiple asset classes and numerous countries. In
this chapter we will focus on domestic equity investments by US pension funds.
Table 4.1 also demonstrates the time frame of the analysis, 1990-2006 for de-
ﬁned beneﬁt funds and 1997-2006 for deﬁned contribution funds. A total of 463
deﬁned beneﬁt and 248 deﬁned contribution funds report to CEM over the sam-
ple period. In any given year, approximately 150 deﬁned beneﬁt and 75 deﬁned
contribution US pension funds report. CEM retains information on funds entering
and leaving the database. Additionally, the number of funds leaving the database
is constant over time, further corroborating the fact that results will not be driven
by individual funds or speciﬁc years and events.
The voluntary reporting to CEM makes the data vulnerable to biases. Table 4.1
gives a ﬁrst insight in possible biases in our database. If funds would stop reporting
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to CEM as a result of bad performance in a certain year, one would expect high
numbers of exiting funds in years with bad market performance, e.g 2001 and
2002. However, Table 4.1 gives no indication of high numbers of exiting funds in
these years. We address the bias issue more formally by linking a secondary CEM
data set to the Compustat SFAS 158 pension database. The Compustat database
contains the yearly returns on pension assets2 (ROA) for all US corporate pension
plans that have an obligation to report to the SEC from 1998 onwards. Hence, the
Compustat data set does not suﬀer from biases related to voluntary reporting.
In addition to the aforementioned, primary data set (containing returns, bench-
marks and costs for anonymous pension funds), CEM provided us with a secondary
database containing fund names and entry and exit years in the primary data set.
However, this secondary database cannot be linked with the primary, anonymous
data source. We only matched the secondary database to the Compustat data, thus
respecting the anonymity of the funds in the primary set containing performance,
benchmark and cost ﬁgures. The matching procedure3 resulted in respectively
67% and 49% matched deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution pension funds in
the CEM database.
We ﬁrst test for biases by categorizing the matched Compustat ROA observa-
tions into two groups. The ﬁrst group contains ROAs of years in which funds have
decided to stop reporting, i.e. the ﬁrst year that they did not report to CEM any-
more. The second group contains all remaining data points. Consequently, funds
that have decided to cease reporting have observations in both groups. Funds that
report the entire period only appear in group 2. By comparing the means of the
groups, we test whether funds decide to stop reporting as a result of bad or good
performance.
Thereafter we repeat this test for the entering years, i.e. we categorize the
matched Compustat data points into two groups. Group 1 contains all ROAs of
years in which funds decide to report to CEM for the ﬁrst time (excluding the ﬁrst
year of the data set). The second group contains all the other data points. Again,
we test if there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean ROA between the two groups.
Panels A and B of Table 4.2 show that there is no evidence of a self-reporting
bias in the exiting or entering years. In Panel A, we report the diﬀerence in the
mean ROA between the above deﬁned groups, i.e. we measure the diﬀerence in
mean ROA of exiting year data points and all remaining data points. In Panel
B, we repeat this procedure for entering years. The diﬀerences in mean ROA are
all insigniﬁcant. Since most funds have observations in both groups and irregu-
larly enter and exit the database (see Table 4.1), it is not necessary to adjust for
autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity in this test.
In a second bias test, we conduct a logit regression of a dummy variable in-
dicating presence in the CEM database on the Compustat ROA performance for
2 This is the total return over all asset classes (contrasting the equity focus in the rest of the
chapter). We argue that funds are likely to stop reporting if their overall performance is bad.
This decision does not merely depend on their equity performance.
3 Funds are matched based on their names. Since some pension funds in the CEM database
have no obligation to report to the SEC (e.g. because they are too small) it is impossible to
match 100% of the funds. Name changes are not considered as entries or exits.
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Table 4.2: Sample Mean Bias Measurement
This table reports the results of two tests that measure possible biases in the
CEM database. Panel A reports the diﬀerence in group means of two groups
of data points and its corresponding p-value. One group contains total returns
on pension assets from the Compustat SFAS 158 pension database in years
that funds decided to stop (’Exit’) reporting to CEM. The other group of
data points consists of total returns on pension assets in all other years. We
perform the mean comparison for both deﬁned beneﬁt (’DB’) and deﬁned
contribution (’DC’) pension funds after matching the Compustat and CEM
database. Mean returns in exiting years are subtracted from the remaining
returns. In the matching procedure 114 of the 171 CEM corporate deﬁned
beneﬁt funds and 93 of the 191 corporate deﬁned contribution funds were
matched with the Compustat database. In Panel B, we employ the same test,
but divide the data points in years in which funds enter the data set (’Entry’)
and all remaining observations. Panel C displays the parameter estimates of a
logit regression (’Logit’) of a dummy variable indicating presence in the CEM
database on Compustat ROA in that year, together with the corresponding
p-values.
Panel A: Exit DB DC
mean 0.80% 2.10%
(p-value) (0.31) (0.09)
Panel B: Entry DB DC
mean 0.10% -0.10%
(p-value) (0.40) (0.40)
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the matched sample. The corresponding p-values in panel C of Table 4.2 again
provide no evidence of biases in the CEM database. The high degree of freedom
ensures suﬃcient power to perform this test.
The unique structure of the CEM database allows for an accurate evaluation
of the cost and performance of domestic equity investments by US pension funds.
It provides the opportunity to evaluate large and small cap, actively and passively
managed and internally and externally managed (only for deﬁned beneﬁt funds)
equity investments separately. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of our pension fund
database by representing all equity classiﬁcations. When starting at the highest
aggregation level, containing all equity investments, subsequent breakdowns create
diﬀerent aggregation levels as indicated in Figure 4.1. Data provided by CEM are
reported on low aggregation levels (e.g. gross returns on internally, passively man-
aged large cap stocks). For this reason, we are able to measure diﬀerences between
investment styles. In order to measure these diﬀerentials, we need to aggregate
the data to higher levels. Higher aggregation-level domestic equity returns are
computed as value-weighted averages of lower level returns with lower level hold-
ings as weights. Holdings are aggregated by addition of lower-level holdings. If,
on a certain level, funds report a positive holding but no return, value-weighted
aggregation is not possible. We exclude these observations. Performance is mea-
sured net of costs (and in some cases also net of fund-speciﬁc benchmarks), and
thus consists of the diﬀerence of variables. If two observations need to be added or
subtracted and one of them is missing, we regard the sum or diﬀerence as missing
as well.
In Table 4.3, we report the portfolio composition after splitting the equity hold-
ings into various investment classiﬁcations. Generally, deﬁned beneﬁt funds have
a major part invested in large cap mandates (90%). Deﬁned beneﬁt funds employ
more active (70%) than passive managers and most mandates are outsourced to
external managers (87%). These ﬁgures are fairly consistent for corporate, public
and other funds in the database. However, when we focus on the 30% largest
and smallest portfolio holdings we detect fundamentally diﬀerent equity portfolio
compositions. Larger sized equity portfolios tend to give more relative weight to
large cap and passively managed mandates. Also the larger portfolios are more
often internally managed. The relatively large weight in large cap mandates might
reﬂect possible diseconomies of scale: as a result of the sheer size of the total equity
holdings it is more complicated to invest large amounts in small cap mandates.
Higher percentages of internal management can easily be explained by economies
of scale; the larger the fund, the lower the relative costs of internal management.
For deﬁned contribution plans, the diﬀerences in equity holdings between large and
small portfolios are less pronounced, since the size diﬀerences are smaller than in
the deﬁned beneﬁt universe. The patterns in deﬁned contribution equity holdings
are comparable to the patterns in small deﬁned beneﬁt plans, which are of similar
fund size.
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Table 4.3: Equity Holdings per Classiﬁcation
In this table we report the percentages invested in large cap versus small cap, actively managed
versus passively managed mandates, and internally versus externally (only for deﬁned beneﬁt
funds) managed domestic US equity mandates. Panel A displays results for deﬁned beneﬁt (’DB’)
plans from 1990 to 2006. Panel B contains percentages of equity holdings for each classiﬁcation
in the deﬁned contribution (’DC’) universe, for the sample period 1997 to 2006. We report results
for all funds in the database (’Tot’), all corporate (’Cor’), public (’Pub’) and other (’Oth’) funds.
Moreover, we provide information for the 30% largest (’L30%’) and 30% smallest (’S30%’) funds
in terms of domestic equity holdings.
Panel A: DB
Total Cor Pub Oth L30% S30%
Large cap 90.49 90.90 89.87 90.26 93.01 88.30
Small cap 9.51 9.10 10.13 9.74 6.99 11.70
Active 69.41 73.66 63.30 68.61 57.24 78.87
Passive 30.59 26.34 36.70 31.39 42.76 21.13
Internal 13.84 9.62 20.15 7.13 27.74 2.86
External 87.10 90.38 79.85 92.87 72.26 97.14
Panel B: DC
Tot Cor Pub Oth L30% S30%
Large cap 83.33 83.56 84.62 78.76 84.72 81.37
Small cap 16.67 16.47 15.38 21.24 15.28 18.63
Active 55.07 54.26 70.37 29.97 52.70 55.11
Passive 44.93 45.74 29.63 70.03 47.30 44.89
82
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf Thesis_Rik V2.pdf4.3 Random Coefficients Panel Model
4.3 Random Coeﬃcients Panel Model
In this section, we introduce the panel data technique used to evaluate pension fund
performance and explain the Fama-MacBeth methodology adopted to study size
eﬀects in costs. Due to the yearly frequency of our data set, standard time-series
regression methods cannot be employed. We therefore rely on a random coeﬃcients
model to test hypotheses on fund performance. Our panel methodology described
in this section diﬀers from pooled panel regressions by allowing the alphas and
betas to vary over the cross-section instead of assuming common parameters for
all funds. Our assumption of a common distribution for alphas and betas is less
restrictive than common parameters across funds. The methodology also diﬀers
from Timmermann, Blake, Tonks, and Wermers (2009), by allowing idiosyncratic
risk to vary cross-sectionally. As a direct consequence of our generalizations we
can estimate our model only for funds with suﬃcient observations. We measure
the cross-sectional explanatory power of fund size for fund-speciﬁc costs using the
well-known Fama-Macbeth methodology, (Fama and MacBeth, 1973).
Standard performance evaluation studies regress fund returns on Fama-French
factors and measure the performance by fund-speciﬁc alphas. However, running
time series regressions with unbalanced annual data from 1990 to 2006 either leads
to extremely noisy estimates or is even impossible as a result of insuﬃcient data
points. Since this chapter focuses on the performance of the pension sector rather
than individual fund performance, there is no need to estimate fund-speciﬁc al-
phas directly and we can rely on a hierarchical panel model for which we estimate
higher order parameters which can be interpreted as pension fund industry alphas
and betas. The random coeﬃcients model assumes that fund-speciﬁc alphas and
betas of the classical Fama-French factors are independently drawn from hierar-
chical distributions with common parameters. The hierarchical parameters can
be estimated with high precision as we beneﬁt from the large cross-section of our
sample. We deﬁne net excess returns (Rit,e) as gross domestic equity returns net
of costs and 3 month US T-Bill rate (Rf) and characterize our model as
Rit,e =αi + β′
iFFt + ηit, (4.1)
where we assume that αi and βi are drawn independently from distributions with
constant means and variances, FFt the time t Fama-French factors (RM − Rf,













where we assume that Ωβ is a diagonal matrix and β is a vector with factor loadings
(βM, βSMB, βHML and βMOM). We also regress net benchmark adjusted returns
(Rit−BMRit) on the same set of factors. This model can equivalently be described
as
Rit−BMRit = αi + β′
iFFt + νit, (4.2)
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with Rit the time t return on domestic equity investments after subtraction of
costs, BMRit the time t benchmark return, νit the zero-mean error term and all
other parameters and factors equivalent to equation (4.1).
We augment the number of factors in equation (4.1) to study the eﬀect of
fund size on the risk-adjusted performance. This extended version of our random
coeﬃcients model is described as
Rit,e =α0i + α1ilog (Sizeit) + β′
iFFt + ξit, (4.3)


















with Ωβ a diagonal matrix. For a more detailed description of our random coeﬃ-
cients model, we refer to Swamy (1970).
In addition to performance measurement, we test cross-sectionally for scale ad-
vantages in fund costs by regressing fund-speciﬁc costs deﬁned as Cit on a constant
and log fund size in million US dollar,
Cit =a0t + a1tlog (Sizeit) + ϵit, (4.4)
with ϵit a normally distributed zero-mean error term. Thereafter we regress the
parameter estimates from the cross-sectional regressions in a time series regression
on a constant, and correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the
Newey-West procedure.
4.4 The Importance of Choosing the Right
Market Factor
In this section we give an overview of the benchmarks used by pension funds to
evaluate performance and show the impact on the performance ﬁgures of choosing
diﬀerent market factors. As summarized in the introduction of this chapter, previ-
ous literature measured pension fund performance against the S&P 500. However
to date no study has given any insights in the benchmarks actually used by pension
funds to evaluate their asset managers. For evaluation purposes it is interesting for
pension funds to know which benchmarks are popular among their peers. Besides,
knowing the right benchmarks is crucial in standard risk-adjustment procedures
for scholars as choosing the wrong market factors may lead to severe biases in fund
alphas and betas.
4.4.1 Which Benchmarks do Pension Funds use?
In their yearly questionnaires, CEM requests pension funds to report the bench-
marks used to evaluate large and small cap mandates. Funds are required to pro-
vide an exact description of the benchmark in combination with the corresponding
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Figure 4.2: Large Cap Benchmarks
This ﬁgure displays the percentage of deﬁned beneﬁt pension funds which uses a speciﬁc bench-
mark in a certain year. We show the percentage of funds which use the S&P 500, Russell 1000,
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Russell 1000
Wilshire 5000
return. Consequently, we can construct market shares for each benchmark, for ev-
ery given year. Figure 4.2 gives an overview of each benchmark’s relative market
share in large cap mandates4. Figure 4.3 displays the evolution of small cap bench-
mark market shares from 1990 to 2006.
Figure 4.2 shows that the S&P 500 has been the most important large cap
benchmark throughout the nineties. However, nowadays many funds also use the
Russell 1000, Russell 3000 and Wilshire 5000 as yardstick for their returns on large
capitalization stocks. Figure 4.3 shows that the Russell 2000 is the dominant small
cap benchmark throughout the entire sample period. Combining these two ﬁndings
we can conclude that it is not only important to diﬀerentiate between large and
small cap mandates when evaluating pension fund performance, the benchmarks
4 There are two reasons why percentages market shares do not sum to 100. First, we omitted
several benchmarks with small market shares for representation purposes. Second, pension
funds sometimes report customized benchmarks which are a linear combination of standard
benchmarks, e.g. 50%*S&P 500 + 50%*Russell 3000. We also omitted the customized bench-
marks from ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Small Cap Benchmarks
This ﬁgure displays the percentage of deﬁned beneﬁt pension funds which uses a speciﬁc bench-
mark in a certain year. We show the percentage of funds which use the Russell 2000, Russell
2500, Russell 3000, Wilshire 4500, Wilshire 5000, S&P 400, S&P 500 or S&P 600 as benchmark
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for asset manager evaluation may also change over time.
4.4.2 Why Choosing the Right Market Factor is Important
Having concluded that there is broad cross-sectional and time-series variation in
benchmarks used by pension funds to evaluate their asset managers, the natural
questions arises: What is the eﬀect of using diﬀerent market factors (or bench-
marks) for performance evaluation by scholars? In this subsection we study the
eﬀect of using diﬀerent market factors in the risk-adjustment procedure described
in section 4.3.
Table 4.4: Benchmark Eﬀects Performance
This table reports the parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression of total
net excess returns of domestic US equity mandates (’Rit,e’) of deﬁned beneﬁt plans, on excess
market return (’Rm’), Size (’SMB’), Book-to-Market (’BTM’) and Momentum (’MOM’), for
the sample period 1990-2006. The random coeﬃcients model can be characterized as
Rit,e = αi + βRm,iRm,t + βSMB,iSMBt + βBTM,iBTMt + βMOM,iMOMt + ηit,
with normally distributed mean-zero errors. We assume that the parameters αi, βRm,i,



























ble reports the parameter estimates from the hierarchical distribution and their corresponding
p-values for diﬀerent market factor variables. In the ﬁrst row we use the Fama-French market
factor, in the second the Russell 3000 and in the last row the S&P 500 factor.
α βRm βSMB βBTM βMOM
FF 0.0103 0.9289 -0.0165 0.0039 -0.0727
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.542) (0.861) (0.001)
Russell 3000 0.0048 0.9456 0.0522 -0.0108 -0.0199
(p-value) (0.084) (0.000) (0.052) (0.617) (0.337)
S&P 500 0.0041 0.9358 0.1259 -0.0098 -0.0274
(p-value) (0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.685) (0.230)
In Table 4.4 we report the parameter estimates of the random coeﬃcients panel
regression of annual net US equity returns on excess market return, Size, Book-
to-Market and Momentum. We investigate the choice of three diﬀerent market
proxies: the excess market return as constructed by Kenneth French5, the Russell
3000 and the S&P500. In the ﬁrst row of Table 4.4, we show that alpha is more than
1% per year and signiﬁcant at a 1% level, when using the FF market factor. The
average fund has a negative loading on the SMB and a positive one on the BTM
factor, indicating a tilt towards large value stocks. However, when we replace the
5 Retrieved from Kenneth French’s website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
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FF market factor by either the Russell 3000 or the S&P 500, alphas decrease (below
1%) and become insigniﬁcant, βRm increases slightly, and the negative loading on
the SMB factor switches to positive while the BTM-beta decreases and becomes
negative. This corroborates the ﬁnding by Cremers and Petajisto (2009) that the
FF market factor puts a disproportionately large weight on small growth stocks.
Table 4.4 also indicates that the net equity returns of US pension funds are better
explained by the S&P 500 index or the Russell 3000 index than by the FF market
factor. We proceed our empirical analysis by using the S&P 500 as market factor
in our risk-adjustment procedure, which results in conservative estimates of fund
alphas (being the lowest in Table 4.4). To determine how robust our results are
with respect to benchmark choices we will also study benchmark-adjusted returns
in our performance evaluation.
4.5 Pension Fund Cost Levels and Drivers
The CEM database contains detailed and comprehensive information on the costs
of US pension funds. In this section, we provide an overview of the general level of
the costs of domestic equity investments, the diﬀerences in costs between various
plan and mandate types and the drivers of these diﬀerences.
Table 4.5 shows that the average cost level for US equity portfolios is roughly
30 basis points for a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan and 50 basis points for a deﬁned
contribution plan. We also document that cost levels of pension funds range be-
tween 10 basis points for the largest deﬁned beneﬁt funds to 70 basis points for the
smallest deﬁned contribution plans. Swensen (2005) shows that average mutual
fund fees amount to 150 basis points for both load and no-load funds. We thus
conclude that average costs of pension plans are substantially lower than mutual
fund fees. Table 4.5 also indicates that larger mandates have lower cost levels.
Many of the diﬀerences (public vs. corporate and deﬁned beneﬁt vs. deﬁned con-
tribution) in Table 4.5 may therefore be explained by size discrepancies. Evidence
of scale advantages in costs is most clear when we compute cost levels for the 30%
largest and 30% smallest funds.
Table 4.6 displays cost levels for various mandate types and clearly indicates
that size is not the only driver of pension fund costs. Outsourced portfolios are
more expensive than internally managed ones. Likewise, actively managed man-
dates have higher cost levels than their passively managed counterparts. Even if
we distinguish between larger and smaller funds these cost diﬀerences remain. We
thus conclude that besides fund size, mandate types also have explanatory power
for cost levels.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 have shown that fund size is an important driver of costs
for domestic equity investments. Both tables provide evidence of substantial scale
advantages in costs. In Table 4.7 we test more formally whether large pension
funds beneﬁt from reduced cost levels. Using the Fama-MacBeth methodology
described in section 4.3, we regress costs for domestic equity investments on log
fund size. For exposition purposes we have multiplied cost levels with 100.
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Table 4.5: Costs and Holdings of Equity Mandates
This table provides information on the costs of domestic equity investments
(’Costs’) and holdings size of domestic equity investments (’Size’) by US pen-
sion funds. Costs levels are displayed in basis points and size in millions of US
dollar. We provide information on deﬁned beneﬁt (’DB’) pension plans for
the sample period 1990-2006 and deﬁned contribution (’DC’) pension plans
for the sample period 1997-2006. We show results for the full sample, and for
corporate, public and other pension funds separately. All costs numbers are
calculated as follows: ﬁrst the equally weighted average per year is calculated.
Then the time-series mean for the corresponding sample period is calculated.
Additionally, we yearly sort all funds on size of the holdings and make a group
of largest 30% and smallest 30% of funds.
Costs Size
DB DC DB DC
Total 28.75 51.09 4,183 1,186
Largest 30% 16.09 42.47 10,759 3,023
Smallest 30% 39.92 61.30 389 192
Corporate 32.63 48.45 2,269 1,190
Largest 30% 24.42 39.16 5,860 2,695
Smallest 30% 40.22 56.90 370 219
Public 21,33 58.68 6,964 1,629
Largest 30% 9.32 55.26 17,313 4,387
Smallest 30% 34.05 73.15 661 234
Other 29.46 - 2,863 -
Largest 30% 14.75 - 6,275 -
Smallest 30% 42.75 - 291 -
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Table 4.6: Costs per Equity Classiﬁcation
In this table we report costs in basis points per mandate type of domestic
equity investments by deﬁned beneﬁt (’DB’) and deﬁned contribution (’DC’)
US pension funds in their respective sample periods, i.e. 1990-2006 for deﬁned
beneﬁt and 1997-2006 for deﬁned contribution plans. We distinguish between
large cap, small cap, actively and passively managed mandates, and we also
diﬀerentiate between costs for internally and externally managed mandates
for deﬁned beneﬁts plans only. All results are displayed for the entire sample
and subsamples of the largest and smallest 30% of the funds.
Investment Type DB DC
Large cap 27.36 46.21
Large cap Largest 30% 16.54 38.29
Large cap Smallest 30% 36.79 54.40
Small cap 42.58 76.88
Small cap Largest 30% 32.63 66.90
Small cap Smallest 30% 60.57 91.49
Active 41.72 76.46
Active Largest 30% 31.22 70.56
Active Smallest 30% 50.69 86.32
Passive 5.24 20.75
Passive Largest 30% 2.92 13.49
Passive Smallest 30% 9.09 28.93
Internal 9.84 -
Internal Largest 30% 7.12 -
Internal Smallest 30% 8.84 -
External 43.61 -
External Largest 30% 33.11 -
External Smallest 30% 52.39 -
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Table 4.7: Size Eﬀects in Costs
This table reports the parameter estimates of Fama-MacBeth regressions of
costs of domestic equity investments by US deﬁned beneﬁt (’DB’) and deﬁned
contribution (’DC’) plans, on a constant and log fund size. In the ﬁrst stage
we cross-sectionally regress fund-speciﬁc costs on a constant and log fund
size in million US dollar for every year in our sample period, i.e. 1990-2006
for DB plans and 1997-2006 for deﬁned contribution plans. Thereafter we
regress the constants and loadings in a time series regression on a constant,
correcting the standard errors via the Newey-West procedure. Total costs
of domestic US equity investments are the dependent variable in the ﬁrst
row. We repeat the procedure for the costs of large cap, small cap, actively
managed, passively managed, internally managed and externally managed
mandates. For exposition purposes we have multiplied cost levels with 100
and therefore represent the ﬁgures in basis points.
DB DC
a0 aSize a0 aSize
Total 112.2244 -9.2404 56.7527 -2.2343
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.4526)
Large cap 93.1465 -7.8851 95.2824 -7.1421
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Small cap 87.8018 -8.4283 152.8869 -3.2033
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.3545)
Active 114.6403 -8.4283 216.7413 -7.9075
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Passive 28.6734 -2.5291 140.6787 -13.8189
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
External 102.6544 -7.6933 - -
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) - -
Internal 23.7273 -1.7792 - -
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) - -
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The negative loading on log fund size for all mandate types implies that larger
pension funds have lower cost levels than smaller ones. Although parameter esti-
mates do not turn up to be signiﬁcant in all classiﬁcations, the pattern of negative
loadings is clear and unambiguous. Pension funds display considerable scale ad-
vantages in their costs of domestic equity investments. If we zoom in on externally
managed mandates the negative loading is even more remarkable since this is not
caused by cost reductions within the fund. The signiﬁcant negative loading indi-
cates that large funds have more bargaining power and can therefore reduce costs
of external portfolio management.
From an economic point of view, one may expect larger pension funds to have
lower cost levels since they can divide their ﬁxed costs over more participants.
Nevertheless Swensen (2005) and Carhart (1997) have shown that as a result of
proﬁt objectives in the mutual fund industry, no scale advantages are documented
in that sector. We thus conclude that pension plan participants beneﬁt from scale
advantages, whereas in the mutual fund sector the fund takes advantage of the
larger size.
4.6 Risk-adjusted Performance
We measure the risk-adjusted domestic equity performance of US pension funds.
First, we specify performance before benchmark-adjustments (net excess returns)
as gross domestic equity returns minus the risk free rate and fund-speciﬁc costs.
Net benchmark-adjusted returns are acquired by subtracting fund-speciﬁc bench-
mark returns and costs from gross domestic equity returns. We regress the benchmark-
adjusted returns on a constant using our standard random coeﬃcients model.
Thereafter, we add risk factors (Size, BTM and Momentum) as explanatory vari-
ables, to pick up outperformance due to excessive risk-taking. A possible drawback
of this simple risk-adjustment methodology is the strategic choice of benchmarks.
Managers may change performance benchmarks in such a way that outperformance
and consequently bonus payments are easier to attain. We therefore also regress
net excess returns on the S&P 500, Size, BTM and Momentum and measure indus-
try performance via the alphas of the common distributions, which we interpret as
pension fund industry alphas (see section 4.3 for more details). Hence if managers
outperform the market by simple small cap, value or momentum strategies we
again pick up these eﬀects.
Table 4.8 displays parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression
of benchmark-adjusted returns on a single constant and on a constant augmented
with the Fama-French factors for deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, as described in
equation (4.2). Table 4.9 shows the same results for deﬁned contribution plans.
The mean benchmark-adjusted returns reported in the ﬁnal columns (’c’),
clearly show that pension funds perform very close to their benchmarks. We split
up the universe in large and small cap, actively and passively managed and inter-
nally and externally managed mandates and document that benchmark-adjusted
returns do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero except for actively managed mandates
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Table 4.8: Benchmark Adjusted Performance Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
This table reports the parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression of fund
net benchmark adjusted domestic equity returns (’Rit   BMRit’) of deﬁned beneﬁt US pension
plans on excess S&P 500 return (’Rm’), Size (’SMB’), Book-to-Market (’BTM’) and Momentum
(’MOM’), for the sample period 1990-2006. The random coeﬃcients model can be characterized
as
Rit   BMRit = αi + βRm,iRm + βSMB,iSMB + βBTM,iBTM + βMOM,iMOM + ηit,
with normally distributed mean-zero errors. We assume that the parameters αi, βRm,i,



























ble reports the parameter estimates from the hierarchical distribution and their corresponding
p-values for diﬀerent dependent variables. Total net benchmark-adjusted returns of domestic
US equity investments are the dependent variable in the ﬁrst row. Likewise, we regress the net
benchmark-adjusted returns of large cap, small cap, actively managed, passively managed, inter-
nally managed and externally managed mandates on the same factors. The last column displays
the results of a regression of the same dependent variables on a constant, with its corresponding
p-value.
α βRm βSMB βBTM βMOM c
Total 0.0043 -0.0456 0.0367 -0.0237 -0.0110 -0.000
(p-value) (0.103) (0.000) (0.152) (0.298) (0.546) (0.757)
Large cap 0.0018 -0.0422 0.0321 0.0005 -0.0143 -0.001
(p-value) (0.515) (0.000) (0.222) (0.984) (0.487) (0.306)
Small cap 0.0343 -0.1027 0.0374 -0.2486 -0.0917 0.002
(p-value) (0.000) (0.001) (0.274) (0.000) (0.120) (0.616)
Active 0.0045 -0.0605 0.0546 -0.0213 -0.0112 -0.001
(p-value) (0.170) (0.000) (0.057) (0.441) (0.604) (0.435)
Passive 0.0043 -0.0230 -0.0077 -0.0208 -0.0160 0.002
(p-value) (0.037) (0.057) (0.582) (0.296) (0.370) (0.318)
Internal 0.0156 -0.0927 0.0527 -0.0269 -0.0282 0.004
(p-value) (0.190) (0.112) (0.440) (0.722) (0.811) (0.574)
External 0.0045 -0.0484 0.0395 -0.0305 -0.0103 -0.001
(p-value) (0.111) (0.000) (0.136) (0.204) (0.601) (0.511)
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Table 4.9: Benchmark Adjusted Performance Deﬁned Contribution
Plans
This table reports the parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression of net bench-
mark adjusted domestic equity returns (’Rit BMRit’) of deﬁned contribution US pension plans
on excess S&P 500 return (’Rm’), Size (’SMB’), Book-to-Market (’BTM’) and Momentum
(’MOM’), for the sample period 1997-2006. The random coeﬃcients model can be characterized
as
Rit   BMRit = αi + βRm,iRm + βSMB,iSMB + βBTM,iBTM + βMOM,iMOM + ηit,
with normally distributed mean-zero errors. We assume that the parameters αi, βRm,i, βSMB,i,



























ble reports the parameter estimates from the hierarchical distribution and their corresponding
p-values for diﬀerent dependent variables. Total net benchmark-adjusted returns of domestic
US equity investments is the dependent variable in the ﬁrst row. Likewise, we regress the net
benchmark-adjusted returns of large cap, small cap, actively managed and passively managed
mandates on the same factors. The last column displays the results of a regression of the depen-
dent variables on a constant, with its corresponding p-value.
α βRm βSMB βBTM βMOM c
Total -0.0011 -0.0035 0.0050 -0.0061 -0.0104 -0.002
(p-value) (0.946) (0.907) (0.941) (0.930) (0.919) (0.274)
Large cap 0.0019 -0.0269 0.00670 -0.0293 -0.0241 -0.004
(p-value) (0.742) (0.145) (0.829) (0.541) (0.475) (0.056)
Small cap 0.0098 -0.0349 -0.1500 -0.0357 -0.0522 0.002
(p-value) (0.927) (0.827) (0.717) (0.928) (0.936) (0.824)
Active 0.0130 -0.0697 -0.0084 -0.1412 -0.0755 -0.009
(p-value) (0.361) (0.016) (0.815) (0.228) (0.307) (0.023)
Passive -0.0047 0.0019 0.0029 0.0225 0.0126 -0.001
(p-value) (0.789) (0.968) (0.929) (0.866) (0.784) (0.742)
of deﬁned contribution funds, which show a signiﬁcant underperformance of less
than 1% on an annual basis. This may be partially explained by the higher cost
levels for actively managed mandates, as shown in Table 4.6. Additionally, deﬁned
contribution funds are on average smaller than deﬁned beneﬁt funds, i.e. they also
beneﬁt less from scale advantages in costs as explained in section 4.5.
Adding more risk factors, does not change the overall picture of performance
ﬁgures. Benchmark-adjusted returns are very close to zero, before and after adding
risk factors. The largely insigniﬁcant loadings on the Fama-French factors indicate
that the average fund does not try to outperform its benchmark by taking on
traditional risks, i.e. by investing more than the benchmark in small cap, value or
momentum stocks.
Since the fund-speciﬁc benchmarks in this study are self-reported, benchmark-
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Table 4.10: Performance Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
This table reports the parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression
of net excess domestic equity returns (’Rit,e’) of deﬁned beneﬁt US pension plans
on the excess S&P 500 returns (’Rm’), Size (’SMB’), Book-to-Market (’BTM’) and
Momentum (’MOM’), for the sample period 1990-2006. The random coeﬃcients model
can be characterized as
Rit,e = αi + βRm,iRm + βSMB,iSMB + βBTM,iBTM + βMOM,iMOM + ηit,
with normally distributed mean-zero errors. We assume that the parameters αi,



























. This table reports the parameter estimates from the hierarchical
distribution and their corresponding p-values for diﬀerent dependent variables. Total
net excess return of domestic US equity investments is the dependent variable in the
ﬁrst row. Likewise, we regress the net excess returns of large cap, small cap, actively
managed, passively managed, internally managed and externally managed mandates
on the same factors.
α βRm βSMB βBTM βMOM
Total 0.0041 0.9358 0.1259 -0.0098 -0.0274
(p-value) (0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.685) (0.230)
Large cap -0.0007 0.9497 0.0665 0.0303 -0.0001
(p-value) (0.818) (0.000) (0.018) (0.181) (0.997)
Small cap 0.0509 0.7840 0.4756 -0.3910 -0.3571
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Active 0.0064 0.8558 0.2212 -0.0236 0.0630
(p-value) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000) (0.511) (0.049)
Passive 0.0010 0.9253 0.1102 -0.0394 0.0250
(p-value) (0.778) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.357)
Internal 0.0122 0.8819 0.1402 0.0000 0.0123
(p-value) (0.337) (0.000) (0.044) (1.000) (0.922)
External 0.0053 0.8586 0.2025 -0.0260 0.0736
(p-value) (0.150) (0.000) (0.000) (0.418) (0.021)
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adjusted returns may be biased as a result of strategic benchmark choices. We
therefore regress net excess returns on the Fama-French factors for both deﬁned
beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans and their various mandate types. Tables
4.10 and 4.11 report the results and conﬁrm the small but non-negative alphas doc-
umented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. Comparing the net returns results with benchmark-
adjusted performance, we can conclude that results are not aﬀected by strategic
benchmark choices. The performance picture is virtually unaﬀected by replacing
the net benchmark return on the left-hand side net excess returns.
Ultimately, we conclude that pension funds do not consistently out- or under-
perform their benchmarks, but are able to cover their expenses with investment
returns. This ﬁnding is in contrast with the mutual fund industry for which a
large majority of studies ﬁnds negative performance after subtraction of costs (see
e.g. Carhart (1997) and Malkiel (1995)).
Although our study does not suﬀer from biases caused by strategic benchmark
choices of pension fund managers, we should note that this result may only be
induced by the type of data or size of the data set. Most previous studies measure
performance at the manager level using smaller cross-sections of funds. Since asset
management companies may use diﬀerent benchmarks than pension funds, results
of studies on manager-level may not be robust to strategic benchmark choices.
The benchmarking issues may also be more severe in smaller cross-sections be-
cause results are more easily aﬀected by a small number of funds. We therefore
recommend to use diﬀerent market factors as a robustness test for general conclu-
sions on performance ﬁgures in the pension industry.
4.7 Why do Pension Funds Perform Better than
Mutual Funds?
The sharp contrast between pension and mutual fund alphas raises the question
why pension funds perform better than mutual funds. Particularly, since Table
4.3 has shown that pension funds outsource more than 80% of their equity in-
vestments, it seems strange that pension funds have better performance ﬁgures
than mutual funds. We do not argue that external managers employed by pension
funds have more skill than those investing for mutual funds, since most external
asset managers invest for both pension and mutual funds. We argue that scale
advantages in costs for internal management, bargaining power in externally man-
aged portfolios and better monitoring ability does not lead to outperformance of
standard benchmarks, but reduces the scale and probability of underperformance
in the pension sector.
Although it is diﬃcult to test our hypothesis on the performance diﬀerential
between pension and mutual funds, we could have a closer look at the gap and
its constituents. The diﬀerence can to a large extent be explained by lower cost
levels in the pension industry. An average pension fund has a cost level of 50
basis points, whereas mutual funds have average fees of 150 basis points. As
explained in section 4.5, the lower cost level of pension funds can be partially
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Table 4.11: Performance Deﬁned Contribution Plans
This table reports the parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression
of fund net excess domestic equity returns (’Rit,e’) of deﬁned contribution US pension
plans on excess S&P 500 return (’Rm’), Size (’SMB’), Book-to-Market (’BTM’) and
Momentum (’MOM’), for the sample period 1997-2006. The random coeﬃcients model
can be characterized as
Rit,e = αi + βRm,iRm + βSMB,iSMB + βBTM,iBTM + βMOM,iMOM + ηit,
with normally distributed mean-zero errors. We assume that the parameters αi,



























. This table reports the parameter estimates from the hierarchical
distribution and their corresponding p-values for diﬀerent dependent variables. Total
net excess returns on domestic US equity investments are the dependent variable in the
ﬁrst row. Likewise, we regress the net excess returns of large cap, small cap, actively
managed and passively managed mandates on the same factors.
α βRm βSMB βBTM βMOM
Total 0.0114 0.9892 0.0859 -0.1108 -0.0453
(p-value) (0.448) (0.000) (0.175) (0.132) (0.620)
Large cap 0.0034 0.9853 0.0263 -0.0618 -0.0213
(p-value) (0.568) (0.000) (0.464) (0.246) (0.583)
Small cap 0.0355 0.9419 0.2668 -0.1260 -0.1586
(p-value) (0.740) (0.000) (0.525) (0.754) (0.808)
Active 0.0187 0.9614 0.1375 -0.1848 -0.0731
(p-value) (0.237) (0.000) (0.003) (0.172) (0.424)
Passive -0.0072 1.0177 0.0194 0.0655 0.0341
(p-value) (0.688) (0.000) (0.544) (0.632) (0.519)
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attributed to scale advantages in costs of internal equity investments. Pension
plan participants beneﬁt directly from these scale advantages, whereas Swensen
(2005) shows that mutual fund fees are independent of fund size. Section 4.5 also
provides evidence of the bargaining power of pension funds with external parties.
Table 4.7 has shown that larger pension funds have relatively lower costs of external
investment. This shows that larger funds are better able to bargain lower costs at
asset management companies than smaller funds. Plan participants also reap the
proﬁts of the bargaining power.
In addition to costs, we argue that monitoring capacity partially explains the
better performance of pension funds. Although monitoring capacity is typically
hard to measure, we are able to provide evidence of the presence of monitoring
abilities. When we compare the alphas of internally and externally managed port-
folios in Tables 4.8 and 4.10, we ﬁnd that internally managed portfolios generate
higher alphas than their externally managed counterparts. Since pension funds
are generally better able to monitor internal managers than external ones, this is
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that better monitoring leads to better perfor-
mance. Table 4.12 contains more evidence of the monitoring capacity of pension
funds. The table shows parameter estimates of a panel random coeﬃcients re-
gression of net excess returns on log fund size and the Fama-French factors. If
large pension funds are better able to monitor external parties, we expect to ﬁnd
scale advantages in performance, especially in the externally and actively managed
mandates. In Table 4.12 we show that pension funds have positive loadings on log
fund size in almost all types of equity mandates. In line with the expectations,
externally and actively managed mandates show signiﬁcant loadings which indi-
cates that large funds are better able to monitor actively and externally managed
mandates which in turn leads to better performance. Large pension funds often
have separate accounts at external parties. Besides, they have more qualiﬁed staﬀ
to monitor the accounts. This increased monitoring ability of large funds enhances
performance, as shown in Table 4.12.
4.8 Conclusion
Due to a lack of comprehensive data there exists no clear picture on the perfor-
mance of US pension funds. A lack of cost and benchmark data, aggravated by
severe biases in self-reported return data have lead to many diﬀerent conclusions
on performance. The CEM database covers a substantial part of the pension sec-
tor (40% in terms of total asset values) and contains detailed and fund-speciﬁc
information on returns, costs and benchmarks. The CEM data are reported on
pension plan level, contrasting the return data on manager-level in most earlier
work. This fund-level data enables us to measure the performance for every indi-
vidual fund. The data set also allows us to measure diﬀerences in returns and costs
between large and small cap, actively and passively and externally and internally
managed mandates. We rule out possible biases related to the voluntary reporting
and measure pension fund performance net of fund-speciﬁc costs and benchmarks.
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Table 4.12: Size-eﬀect on Performance of Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
This table reports the parameter estimates of a random coeﬃcients panel regression of net
excess domestic equity returns of deﬁned beneﬁt US pension plans (’Rit,e’) on log fund size
(log (Sizeit)), excess S&P 500 returns (’Rm’), Size (’SMB’), Book-to-Market (’BTM’) and Mo-
mentum (’MOM’), for the sample period 1990-2006. The random coeﬃcients model can be
characterized as
Rit,e = α0i + α1ilog (Sizeit) + βRm,iRm + βSMB,iSMB + βBTM,iBTM + βMOM,iMOM + ηit,
with normally distributed mean-zero errors. We assume that the parameters α0i, α1i,
































. This table reports the parameter estimates from the hierarchical distri-
bution and their corresponding p-values for diﬀerent dependent variables. The ﬁrst displays
the total net excess return of domestic US equity investments of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans.
Likewise, we regress the net excess returns of large cap, small cap, actively managed, passively
managed, internally managed and externally managed mandates on the same factors.
α0 α1 βRm βSMB βBTM βMOM
Total -0.1615 0.0230 0.9277 0.1370 -0.0498 -0.0664
(p-value) (0.146) (0.179) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.023)
Large cap -0.0989 0.0136 0.9470 0.0722 -0.0102 -0.0387
(p-value) (0.240) (0.277) (0.000) (0.000) (0.697) (0.248)
Small cap -0.3132 0.0550 0.7506 0.4562 -0.4250 -0.3832
(p-value) (0.309) (0.147) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Active -0.3738 0.0482 0.8505 0.2257 -0.0922 -0.0005
(p-value) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.991)
Passive -0.1927 0.0226 0.9279 0.1195 -0.0567 0.0237
(p-value) (0.086) (0.116) (0.000) (0.004) (0.130) (0.393)
External -0.4113 0.0527 0.8444 0.2286 -0.0999 0.0257
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.498)
Internal 0.0059 -0.0013 0.8764 0.1524 -0.0189 0.0351
(p-value) (0.987) (0.975) (0.000) (0.040) (0.837) (0.774)
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We ﬁnd that pension fund net returns are very close to self-reported bench-
marks. Cost levels are substantially lower than standard mutual fund fees and
are diminishing in fund size. The lower cost levels can be partially explained by a
combination of scale advantages in internally managed portfolios and bargaining
power of large pension funds with external management companies. Plan partici-
pants beneﬁt directly from the lower costs, whereas mutual fund investors do not
harvest these proﬁts as a result of the mutual fund proﬁt objective. We also show
evidence of the monitoring power of large pension funds, which improves perfor-
mance, again to the beneﬁt of pension plan participants. Additionally, we give an
overview of the benchmarks used by pension funds to evaluate their asset man-
agers. We show that pension funds use many diﬀerent benchmarks both across
mandates and over time. By using diﬀerent market factors in our performance
evaluation, we point out that the eﬀects of choosing the wrong benchmark can
be substantial. We consequently contribute to earlier work by showing that our
results are robust to choices of diﬀerent benchmark, whereas previous studies only
benchmark performance against the S&P 500.
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Regret Aversion and
Annuity Risk in Deﬁned
Contribution Pension Plans
The high value of the implicit option to choose a retirement date at which interest
rates are particularly high and life annuities relatively cheap, leads to the possi-
bility to introduce regret aversion in the retirement investment decision of deﬁned
contribution plan participants. As a remedy for regret aversion in retirement in-
vestment decisions, this chapter develops and prices a lookback option on a life
annuity contract. We determine a closed-form option value under the restriction
that the option holder invests risklessly during the time to maturity of the option
and without the guarantee that the exact amount of retirement wealth is converted
into a life annuity at retirement. Thereafter the investment restriction is relaxed
and the guarantee of exact conversion is imposed and the option is priced via
Monte Carlo simulations in an economic environment with a stochastic discount
factor. Option price sensitivities are determined via the pricing of alternative op-
tions. We ﬁnd that the price of a lookback option, with a maturity of three years,
amounts to 8-9% of the wealth at the option issuance date. The option price is
highly sensitive to the exercise price of the option, i.e. pricing alternative options
(e.g. Asian) substantially lowers the price. Time to maturity and interest rate
volatility are other important option price drivers. Asset allocation decisions and
initial interest rates hardly aﬀect the option price.1
5.1 Introduction
In recent years an increasing number of pension funds shifted from deﬁned ben-
eﬁt to deﬁned contribution plans. Particularly in anglo-saxon countries deﬁned
1 This chapter is based on the paper Frehen, Hoevenaars, Palm, and Schotman (2008)
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contribution plans have gained popularity. Boulier, Huang, and Taillard (2001)
attribute this shift to two major advantages of deﬁned contribution plans over
traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plans. Participants can observe their pension claim at
any moment in time and can transfer this claim more easily when changing em-
ployer. Moreover, deﬁned contribution plan sponsors are unburdened from risk
associated with the pension plan. This risk is passed on to participants. As a di-
rect result of the change in risk bearer, large numbers of uninformed participants
face a diﬃcult decision at retirement: Whether and when should they invest their
retirement wealth irreversibly in a life annuity? The high price sensitivity of the
life annuity with respect to the long-term interest rate complicates the retirement
investment decision. In times of increasing interest rates, plan participants may
be forced to postpone their retirement date. Beside the shorter payout period and
longer contribution period, the high price sensitivity of the life annuity can oﬀer
substantial gains in times of increasing interest rates. Vice versa, plan participants
may also decide to retire early in times of high interest rates. Hence, the high price
sensitivity of the life annuity makes the implicit option to time the retirement date
valuable (see Milevsky and Young, 2006).
The large value of the timing option creates fertile ground for regret aversion.
For instance, the pension income of a participant who retired at the end of our data
set (December 2003) was, ceteris paribus, 6.1% higher than a colleague’s income
who retired half a year earlier. The 6.1% diﬀerence is even more remarkable if we
take into account that long-term interest rate diﬀerences at the sample end are
small relative to diﬀerences earlier in the sample (see Figure 5.1).
Numerous experiments document that regret aversion plays a role in human
decision making (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Bell (1982) and Loomes and
Sugden (1982) are the ﬁrst to extend standard utility functions by incorporating
regret aversion components. Since this development, the eﬀect of regret aversion
has been explored in many diﬀerent areas. Braun and Muermann (2004) document
that regret aversion has a mitigating eﬀect on extreme demands for insurance.
Michenaud and Solnik (2008) show that even if the currency risk premium is
zero, regret averse investors hold positive currency positions. Gollier and Salani´ e
(2006) document that the introduction of regret aversion in a complete market
with Arrow-Debreu securities, shifts the optimal asset allocation more to states
with low probabilities. Muermann, Mitchell, and Volkman (2006) analyze the role
of regret aversion in pension investment decisions. They evaluate the eﬀect of
regret aversion on the willingness to pay for a pension guarantee. One of their
main ﬁndings is that the willingness to pay for a pension guarantee, of an investor
with a risky portfolio, increases with the introduction of regret aversion.
This chapter prices an option that protects regret averse participants against
annuity risk at retirement. At retirement, many retirees convert their pension
wealth into a life annuity and regret aversion plays an important role in the tim-
ing of the life annuity purchase. Merton and Bodie (2005) argue that lookback
options are valuable assets for regret averse individuals. We address regret aver-
sion and annuity risk at retirement by developing and pricing a lookback option on
a life annuity. The option holder buys an insurance against regret aversion some
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Figure 5.1: Conversion Rate
This ﬁgure displays the time series evolution of the 10 year zero coupon bond yield from January











Y i e l d   i n   %
103
Thesis_Rik V1.pdf
Thesis_Rik V2.pdfyears before the retirement date. Using a replicating portfolio strategy, we derive
the closed-form price for the lookback life annuity option under some simplifying
assumptions. We also determine the option price sensitivity with respect to the
volatility of the underlying interest rate process. In the closed-form setting, the
option holder is obliged to invest in a riskless product during the time to maturity
of the option. Furthermore, the closed-form solution cannot guarantee that the
exact amount of retirement wealth is converted into a life annuity for the minimum
forward price. As a result, the closed-form solution does not eliminate annuity risk
completely.
To allow risky investment strategies and eliminate all annuity risk, we also
price the lookback life annuity option in an extended economic environment. In
this more elaborate setting, we price the option under the restriction that the com-
plete retirement wealth is converted into a life annuity and allow stock and bond
investments during the time to maturity of the option. Monte Carlo simulations
and a stochastic discount factor are used to price the option. Finally, we determine
the option Greeks by changing diﬀerent parameters in the pricing environment.
We ﬁnd that the closed-form price of the lookback life annuity option amounts
to 7-9% of the wealth at the option issuance date and that interest rate volatility
and time to maturity are important price drivers. A relaxation of some simpli-
fying assumptions and the application of a stochastic discount factor results in a
comparable option price of 8% for men and 9% for women. This relatively high
price indicates that the insurance against regret aversion is expensive. It is there-
fore unlikely that optimization of life cycle functions ignoring regret aversion leads
to life annuity lookback option purchases. Hence accounting for regret aversion
results in fundamentally diﬀerent investment strategies than observed in standard
non-regret averse investor strategies. Furthermore, we document that the look-
back feature is an important driver of the option price. If the participant is oﬀered
the right to buy the life annuity for the average forward life annuity price (Asian
option), the option price decreases to slightly more than 2% of the wealth at the
option issuance date. Extending the time to maturity of the option by one year
increases the option price to 11-12%. We also ﬁnd that the option price is insen-
sitive to the initial interest rate and hardly aﬀected by the asset allocation during
the time to maturity.
The presence of regret aversion in retirement investment decisions contrasts this
chapter sharply with most earlier literature on the topic. The lookback life annuity
option, which oﬀers protection against regret aversion, is not available in ﬁnancial
markets yet. Earlier literature addresses the problem of annuity risk at retire-
ment eﬀectively using standard utility functions and asset allocation approaches.
Assuming power utility for participants, Campbell and Viceira (2002) derive the
optimal pre-retirement asset allocation. Furthermore, Yaari (1965) points out that
it is optimal for participants without bequest motives to convert retirement wealth
into a life annuity. Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2008) determine the optimal al-
location to nominal, real and equity-linked annuities at retirement. Subsequently,
they determine the optimal pre-retirement hedging strategy in stocks, nominal
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ity mix. These optimal investments diﬀer strongly from a portfolio replicating a
lookback life annuity option. Boulier, Huang, and Taillard (2001) optimize the
asset allocation in a deﬁned contribution pension plan. They impose a minimum
guarantee on the beneﬁts in the form of a life annuity. Deelstra, Grasselli, and
Koehl (2003) generalize the problem to allocation optimization in the presence of
a lower bound on the retirement beneﬁts (not necessarily converted into a life an-
nuity). These solutions often impose long-term restrictions on the asset allocation
and therefore imply a serious reduction in the freedom of choice of the deﬁned
contribution plans. A solution that suﬀers less from the loss in freedom of choice
is the possibility to buy an option that protects participants against annuity risk.
Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) develop an option to buy back a deﬁned
beneﬁt claim. However, this option turns out to be extremely expensive and also
fails to recognize possible regret aversion in participant investment decisions. The
lookback life annuity option creates only a minor loss in freedom of choice and
provides a possibility to insure participants against regret aversion.
In section 5.2 we develop the lookback life annuity option and determine a
closed-form price in a simpliﬁed environment. Section 5.3 describes the option
pricing via Monte Carlo techniques in an extended valuation setting. Our empirical
results are discussed in section 5.4.
5.2 Deﬁned Contribution and the Lookback
Option
In this section we develop and price the lookback option on a life annuity contract
in a continuous time framework. The lookback option is oﬀered to plan partici-
pants three years before the retirement age of 65. We assume that participants
who buy the option survive until their retirement date. Moreover, we price the
option under the assumption of exogenous and constant mortality rates and fairly
priced life annuities. As a result, a life annuity is nothing more than a portfolio of
zero-coupon bonds. The pricing of the option can therefore be reduced to pricing a
series of lookback options and each is on a pure discount bond. We therefore start
with the pricing of a lookback option on a zero coupon bond with ﬁxed maturity
date s. We consider a ﬁxed option issuance date ta. This allows us to suppress the
dependence of mortality rates and realized forward bond prices on ta. Bond option
formulas developed by Jamshidian (1989) and Goldman, Sosin, and Gatto (1979)
are used as a guideline to price the lookback option. We assume that the instanta-
neous spot rate follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck interest rate process characterized
as
dr = α(γ − r)dt + σrdW, (5.1)
with r being the instantaneous spot rate, α the mean-reversion parameter, γ the
long-term average interest rate, σr the interest rate volatility and dW a standard
Brownian motion under the risk neutral measure.
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payoﬀ. Since we price the option via a replicating portfolio technique this charac-
terization is suﬃcient to determine a closed-form option price. The lookback bond
option provides the right at the ﬁxed retirement date T to buy a discount bond
with maturity date s for the minimum forward price. The lookback bond option
payoﬀ UT can consequently be characterized as
UT = P (r,T,s) − Q( ¯ fT,T,s), (5.2)
with P (r,T,s) the time T price of a bond maturing at s and Q( ¯ fT,T,s) the
minimum forward bond price in the time span [ta,T], where the dependence of
Q on ta is suppressed. The minimum forward bond price is a function of the
maximum forward rate ¯ fT in the time interval [ta,T], retirement date T, and
bond maturity date s.
An investor who wants to replicate the lookback option on an s-maturity dis-
count bond must buy a straddle on the s-maturity bond with exercise price equal
to the initial (time ta) forward bond price at time T. Once the time T forward
bond price attains a new minimum, the replicating investor sells the old position
and buys a new straddle with the new minimum as exercise price. He repeats
this exercise until the straddle matures. The time t exercise price Q(¯ ft,t,s) = Q
of the straddle is consequently the minimum forward bond price up till time t.
Q thus summarizes the history of the lookback option and therefore contains the
lookback-element. The bond prices and therefore also the bond option prices are
direct contingents of the time t interest rate. Moreover, the option and bond ma-
turity dates T and s are ﬁxed. The hedging portfolio value can consequently be
characterized as a function of the time t interest rate r, exercise price Q, and time
t, and follows
H (r,Q,t) = CallB + PutB, (5.3)
with CallB and PutB respectively the time t prices of bond call and put options
maturing at time T on pure discount bonds with maturity s. A simple application
of the put-call-parity leads to
H (r,Q,t) = 2CallB + P (r,t,T)Q − P (r,t,s). (5.4)
Substitution of bond option formulas by Jamshidian (1989) shows that the bond
straddle that replicates the lookback option is composed of investments in discount
bonds with maturities T and s. This is a result of the fact that standard put and
call bond options can be replicated with investments in bonds maturing at times
T and s. The hedging portfolio for the lookback option on an s-maturity bond
can therefore be simpliﬁed to two bond investments and can be expressed as
H(r,t,Q) = ϕ
(s)
t P (r,t,s) + ϕ
(T)




t = [1 − 2N (h − σp)]Q, (5.6)
ϕ
(s)
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where N represents the normal cumulative distribution function and Jamshidian























In the appendix we prove that the hedging portfolio is indeed a replicating
strategy for the lookback bond option. Hence, the price of the hedging portfolio
must equal the price of the lookback bond option. The time ta price of the lookback
option on a zero coupon bond maturing at time s can therefore be characterized
as
CB
L (P (r,ta,s),Q,T − ta,s) = ϕ
(s)
ta P (r,ta,s) + ϕ
(T)
ta P (r,ta,T). (5.11)
Under certain conditions Jamshidian (1989) proves that the value of a portfolio of
bond options equals the value of an option on a bond portfolio. Consequently, the










L (P (r,ta,s),Q,T − ta,s)ζsds, (5.12)
with ζs the time t conditional survival density, i.e. if the time t probability that
the participant is still alive at time s is modeled as πs, then its derivative with
respect to s is denoted ζs = ∂πs
∂s .
This closed-form option pricing formula enables us to price a lookback option
on a life annuity with a monthly nominal payoﬀ equal to 1. Table 5.1 displays the
percentage of wealth at the option issuance date (ta) that a participant pays for
the right to buy a yearly pension income of 10,000 for the minimum price. The
numbers in Table 5.1 are obtained by discretizing equation (5.12) on a monthly
basis and estimating equation (5.1) with monthly US one-month interest rate
data from January 1952 to December 2003 and substituting the estimates for the
parameters in equation (5.12).
Table 5.1 shows that time to maturity is an important driver of the lookback
life annuity option price. Furthermore the table shows that for a time to maturity
of three years a plan participant pays 7-9% of the wealth at the option issuance
date for the right to convert his retirement wealth against the minimum forward
life annuity price during the time to maturity of the option.
A closed-form solution also enables us to estimate the eﬀect of a change in
standard deviation of the underlying interest rate model on the option price. Fig-
ure 5.2 displays option prices for volatilities of the interest rate process ranging
from 50% to 150% of the estimated volatility.
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This ﬁgure displays the eﬀect of a change interest rate volatility on the option price. Option
prices are expressed in a percentage of wealth at the option issuance date, for both men and
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Table 5.1: Base Closed-Form Option Prices
This table presents prices for the lookback life annuity op-
tion with times to maturity of respectively two, three and
four years and a yearly payoﬀ of 10,000. Prices for both
men and women are expressed in percentages of the wealth
at the issuance date of the option (Wta).
2 3 4
Men 5.93 7.64 8.90
Women 7.59 9.60 11.10
Figure 5.2 shows that the volatility of the instantaneous spot rate is an impor-
tant driver of the option price. Decreasing the volatility by 50% leads to a decrease
in option price of approximately 50%. Vice versa, increases in the volatility of the
spot rate of 50% lead to option price increases of approximately 50%.
Figure 5.3 displays the eﬀects of the changes in hedging portfolio holdings, due
to a rise in interest rate from 2% to 11%. We zoom in on the time t holdings
of a three (ϕ
(T)
t ) and four (ϕ
(s)
t ) year maturity bond, assuming a ﬁxed minimum
interest rate of 2% and ﬁxed time to maturity of three years.
Figure 5.3 shows that, ceteris paribus, a rise in interest rate leads to larger long
positions in the bond with three year maturity and larger short positions in a four
year maturity bond. The ﬁgure also shows an upper- and lowerbound on bond
holdings. These upper- and lowerbounds can easily be explained by equations
(5.6) and (5.7). The cumulative normal distribution implies a range of [−Q,Q] for
ϕT and a range of [−1,1] for ϕs, as clearly depicted in Figure 5.3.
One limitation of the closed form model is that it works with an option payoﬀ
that is per unit of annuity income after retirement. The participant buys a ﬁxed
number of options, and each option provides the payoﬀ (5.2). When the participant
invests his wealth in risky assets, the ﬁnal wealth at age 65 is unknown, and
therefore he does not know a priori how many option he needs to convert his entire
pension wealth at the retirement date. An alternative design of the option is that
it gives the right to convert all wealth in the pension account at the retirement.
5.3 Extended Environment and Price Drivers
In this section we describe the pricing of a lookback life annuity option that guar-
antees conversion of ﬁnal wealth in a pension account. The pricing environment
generalizes the one-factor Ornstein-Uhlenbeck assumption from the previous sec-
tion to a multi-factor setting. We also allow the participant to invest part of his
pension wealth in stocks. Closed-form solutions are no longer available in this
extended setting and we therefore price the option using Monte Carlo methods
and a stochastic discount factor that is consistent with market prices for stocks
and bonds. If the participant can choose his investment portfolio (stocks, bonds
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This ﬁgure displays the eﬀect of a change in three and four year bond holdings due to a rise in
interest rate from 2% to 11%. We consider a ﬁxed time to maturity of three years and ﬁxed
minimum interest rate of 2% Option prices are expressed in a percentage of wealth at the option
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of diﬀerent maturities), he also controls the expected value and volatility of his
ﬁnal pension wealth. This in turn implies that the price of the option depends on
the investment strategy chosen by the participant. As we work with simulations,
we also switch from continuous to discrete time.
5.3.1 Pricing Environment
This subsection describes the economic environment and pricing techniques applied
to determine the lookback life annuity price. We price the option using Monte
Carlo methods, again assuming that mortality rates are exogenous and constant,
fair pricing of life annuities and neglecting mortality risk and contributions during
the time to maturity of the option (as in the previous section). The probability
that a participant dies during the time to maturity of the option is approximately
3%. Including mortality risk during the time to maturity of the option, would
therefore decrease the option price by approximately 3%. We neglect the eﬀect of
the lookback option purchase on the pre-retirement wealth. Despite its implausible
character, this assumption is necessary. Otherwise, the retirement wealth and thus
the option price would be a function of the option price. This self-dependency is
typically hard to model. In the simulation setting the retirement wealth WT
is a function of the investment weights, speciﬁed by the option holder and the




(ws (1 + Rs,t) + w2b (1 + R2b,t) + w10b (1 + R10b,t)), (5.13)
with ws, w2b and w10b respectively the investment weights for the stock port-
folio, two-year and ten-year bond and Rs,t, R2b,t and R10b,t the corresponding
time t returns. Ata represents the participant’s initial wealth. In the base simu-
lation setting, we set Ata equal to 100,000 and specify equal investment weights
(ws = w2b = w10b), whereas the returns are simulated using a VAR-model. We
ﬁrst determine the option payoﬀ and specify the processes for the stock and bond
returns in the investment universe with the corresponding stochastic discount fac-
tor. Subsequently, 100,000 scenarios with discounted option payoﬀs are generated
on a monthly frequency. The option price is then approximated by the average
discounted option payoﬀ.
To ultimately determine the option price, the option payoﬀ, investment uni-
verse and discount factor need to be speciﬁed. In this setting option holders have
the right to buy a life annuity for the minimum forward price attained during the
time to maturity of the option. Furthermore, we require that both the option
holder and non-option holder convert the exact amount of retirement wealth WT
into a life annuity. As a result, the right to buy the life annuity for minimum
price is equivalent to the right to convert retirement wealth against the maximum
interest rate during time to maturity of the option. We specify the guarantee of
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where πs is the time T probability that the participant is still alive at time s
and LN the after retirement income of the non-option holder (i.e. the nominal
monthly life annuity payoﬀ for the non-option holder). The option holder has the
right to convert against the maximum rate. The guarantee for the option holder







where LH is the after retirement income of the option holder (i.e. the nominal
monthly life annuity payoﬀ of the option holder) and rmax the maximum interest
rate during the time to maturity of the option. The option payoﬀ is the diﬀerence














s−T − WT. (5.16)
Equations (5.15) and (5.16) show that the option payoﬀ is a function of the re-
tirement conversion rate rT, maximum conversion rate rmax, terminal wealth WT
and mortality rates πs.
In a deﬁned contribution pension plan, participants have more freedom with
regard to the asset allocation than in a deﬁned beneﬁt plan. Deﬁned contribution
plan participants have to specify weights (ws, w2b and w10b) for each product
(portfolio of stocks, two-year bond and ten-year bond) in the investment universe.
The investment universe with stocks and diﬀerent bonds implies that investment
risk during the time to maturity of the option is contained in the option price, in
contrast to the closed-form analysis. Analogous to Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) we model the log returns of the diﬀerent investment
alternatives as a VAR(1)
Xt+1 = µ + ϕXt + ηt+1 ηt+1 ∼ N(0,Σ), (5.17)
where Xt+1 contains log stock, 2 year and 10 year bond returns at time t + 1.
As Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), we approximate n-maturity log bond
returns by
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Table 5.2: Return Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of the annualized
stock, two and ten-year bond returns. For each return series,
diﬀerent rows display the mean, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis. The statistics are computed on a data period
ranging from January 1952 until January 2004.
rs r2b r10b
Mean 0.108 0.059 0.065
St. Dev 0.149 0.100 0.093
Skewness -0.708 0.840 0.713
Kurtosis 2.79 0.762 0.188
with Dn,t and yn,t respectively the time t duration and yield of an n-maturity
bond. We approximate yn−1,t+1 by yn,t+1 and consider zero coupon bonds, for
which maturity equals duration.
The VAR(1) model is estimated using monthly U.S. data on bond yields and
stock returns for the period ranging from January 1952 to December 2003. Value
weighted stock returns are obtained from the CRSP database. Bond yields are
provided by Bliss (1997). Summary statistics and parameter estimates are reported
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
In order to price the option, we specify a stochastic discount factor. The
stochastic nature of the discount factor allows it to discount payoﬀs in relatively
“good” scenarios stronger than payoﬀs in relatively “bad” scenarios. In line with













λt = λ0 + λ1Xt, (5.20)
where Mt+1 denotes the time t + 1 discount factor and λt > 0. By deﬁnition, the
expected deﬂator value should equal the price of a zero coupon bond maturing in
the same period. Considering a one period horizon, this yields
p
(1)
t = log(Et [Mt+1]), (5.21)
with p
(1)
t the log time t price of a zero coupon bond with maturity date t + 1.
Substitution of equations (5.19) and (5.20) in equation (5.21) leads to
−δ0 − δ′
1Xt = −y1mt, (5.22)
with y1mt the log yield of a one month maturity bond at time t. To determine
values for λ0 and λ1, we note that the expected value of the discounted return of
any asset in the economic environment should be equal to 1, represented as
ι = Et [Mt+1Rt+1], (5.23)
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This table presents parameter estimates and the corresponding t-
statistics of the VAR(1)-model for stock and bond returns and for
δ0 and δ1 as speciﬁed in section 5.3. Log monthly stock, two-year
and ten-year bond returns are respectively denoted by rs,t, r2b,t and
r10b,t and c represents a constant. The one month log bond yield is
represented by y
(1)
1mt. We approximate the one month maturity bond
yield by the monthly yield on a three month maturity bond, for data
reasons. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The estimations are
performed on a data period ranging from January 1952 until January
2004.
c rs,t−1 r2b,t−1 r10b,t−1
rs,t 0.0055 0.0490 0.5806 0.0705
(2.5604) (1.2202) (1.6162) (0.4917)
r2b,t 0.0040 -0.0330 0.2101 0.0116
(10.7840) (-4.7172) (3.3589) (0.4628)
r10b,t 0.0037 -0.0653 0.4208 -0.0485
(3.8897) (-3.6423) (2.6217) (-0.7573)
y
(1)
1mt 0.0036 -0.0044 0.1912 -0.0455
(35.0430) (-2.2660) (11.0330) (-6.5832)
with ι a 3x1 unit vector and Rt+1 a 3x1 vector containing the returns of the
diﬀerent products in the investment universe. Rewriting and taking logs allows us
to rewrite equation (5.23) as







diag(Σ) + σmr, (5.24)
with σ2
m the variance of the log discount factor, diag(Σ) a 3×1 vector containing
the diagonal elements of Σ and σmr a 3×1 vector containing the covariances be-
tween the log discount factor and the log returns of respectively the stock, 2 year
bond and 10 year bond. Substitution and some more rewriting then gives
λt = Σ−1
(







λ0 and λ1 can consequently be deﬁned as
λ0 =Σ−1
(






λ1 =Σ−1 (ϕ − ιδ′
1), (5.27)
where values for δ0 and δ1 have been obtained by simply regressing the log short-
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We have speciﬁed the option payoﬀ in equation (5.16) and discount factor in
equation (5.19) in VAR parameters, mortality rates and terminal wealth. VAR
parameters have been obtained from standard regressions and mortality rates are
readily available. However terminal wealth depends on the investment weights
and corresponding returns in each investment category for the investor. Hence, by
specifying weights (ws, w2b and w10b) for each investment category and repetitively,
randomly drawing values for η from a normal distribution, scenarios-speciﬁc values
for the terminal wealth and thus for the option payoﬀ and discount factor can be
determined. The option price can subsequently be approximated by averaging the
discounted option payoﬀs across all scenarios.
Any n-maturity bond can be priced consistently with the VAR speciﬁed before.
This allows us to determine the exact life annuity price and easily extend the
investment universe. The exact price is obtained by discounting each pension
payoﬀ with the corresponding maturity bond rate. The investment universe as
speciﬁed contains two bonds, a two-year and ten-year maturity zero coupon bond.
This may seem a restrictive universe. However, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)
document that a complete term structure of bonds can be deﬁned recursively. As
a result, it is straightforward to extend the universe with bonds of any maturity.
However, we have to note that the term structure in our investment universe is
based on only two maturities. As a result, the empirical term structure could diﬀer
(even in shape) from ours. If we assume that the n-maturity bond yield is a linear
function of the VAR-variables
y
(n)
t = an + b′
nXt, (5.28)
and use the fact that A0=0 and B0=0, An and Bn can be deﬁned recursively using












In line with Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) an and b′






















5.3.2 Measuring Price Drivers with Alternative Options
This subsection describes the diﬀerent alternative options priced to quantify the
Greeks of the lookback life annuity option. We start with a base option and ﬁrst
modify the exercise price (i.e. the option version) to determine the eﬀect of the
lookback characteristic. Subsequently the parameters time to maturity, initial
interest rate and investment weights are changed to resolve the price sensitivities




The base option is a lookback life annuity option with a time to maturity of
three years. This option provides plan participants the right to buy a life annuity
at retirement for the minimum forward price during the last three years before
retirement. In addition to the time horizon, the option price is a function of the
retirement wealth WT. WT is determined by the investment weights (ws, w2b and
w10b) and their corresponding returns. We assume that contributions do not take
place in the last years before retirement and assume that participants that buy the
option survive until retirement. For the base option we assume that investment
weights are equal (ws=w2b=w10b) and that the portfolio is monthly rebalanced.
As a ﬁnal characterization, we set the initial value of the conversion rate equal to
its last value in the dataset (4.42%).
Option Greeks
As a ﬁrst sensitivity test, we change the exercise price to determine the impact
of the lookback feature on the price. We price an Asian option with the same
characteristics as the lookback option. The Asian option provides the right to
buy the life annuity for the average forward price during the time to maturity.
This option only has a positive payoﬀ if the time T life annuity price exceeds the
average forward life annuity price. The second alternative option we price has
a predetermined and ﬁxed exercise price. This option oﬀers holders the right to
convert their retirement wealth against a predetermined rate (e.g. 6%). The option
holder exercises the option if the retirement rate does not exceed the guaranteed
rate. For both alternatives the probability of having a payoﬀ of zero is substantial,
whereas the lookback option has a negligible chance of ending at-the-money (and
generating a zero payoﬀ). Since the option price is the expected value of the
discounted payoﬀ, the eﬀect of changing the option version is large.
Furthermore, we measure the eﬀect of a change in time to maturity. We price
the lookback life annuity option on a horizon of two, four and ﬁve years. By
providing the right to buy for the minimum price, the time to maturity is an
important driver of the option price. An extension in time horizon with one year,
gives the life annuity price 12 additional possibilities of attaining a new minimum.
Hence, the longer (shorter) the time to maturity, the larger (smaller) the expected
option payoﬀ and thus the option price.
As a further possible price driver we select the interest rate at the time the
option is issued. Particularly if the interest rate three years before retirement
is high, a large demand for the lookback option is likely to arise. Participants
then want to protect themselves against a fall in interest rate shortly before the
retirement date. We quantify the impact of a change in initial rate. However, we
point out in the closed-form valuation (see appendix) that changes in the lookback
option price are not aﬀected by changes in minimum price of the life annuity.
On the issuance date ta, the life annuity price is at a minimum by construction.
Hence, the option price is unlikely to be aﬀected by changes in the initial rate.
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alter this result.
Finally, we measure the impact of the investment weights on the option price.
In addition to the equally weighted portfolio of the base option, we construct three
pure asset portfolios. Investments are restricted to one of the three assets (stock
portfolio, two-year and ten-year bond) in the pure portfolios. The portfolios are
re-balanced on a monthly basis. Since we consider the ten-year bond yield as the
conversion rate of the life annuity, especially the pure ten-year bond portfolio is
an interesting investment strategy. This portfolio is particularly risky. When the
interest rate increases during the time to maturity of the option, the diﬀerence in
interest rates (rT − rmax) is likely to be small and the option payoﬀ consequently
low. Additionally, interest rate increases lead to a relatively low retirement wealth
WT, via low bond returns. On the other hand, interest rate decreases lead to large
diﬀerences between rT and rmax and thus high option payoﬀs. The high payoﬀ is
ampliﬁed by a relatively large retirement wealth. The large retirement wealth is a
result of high bond returns. The higher risk of the pure ten-year bond investment
strategy is partially oﬀset by the stochastic discount factor. Nevertheless, investing
in the pure ten-year bond portfolio is a risky strategy.
5.4 Empirical Results
This section reports the prices of the previously speciﬁed options. We start with
pricing a base option and then provide prices for diﬀerent alternatives, to determine
the option Greeks.
5.4.1 Option Prices
The base option as described in the previous section is a lookback life annuity
option with a time to maturity of three years. Since men and women have diﬀerent
mortality rates, we determine option prices for men and women separately.
Table 5.4 reveals that the price of the base option is 8% for male participants
and slightly higher than 9% for female participants, due to better life expectancies
for women. Furthermore, the simulation results show that the standard deviation
across all scenarios of the discounted option payoﬀ is high, approximately 55% for
men and 63% for women. This is an indication that the annuity risk that partici-
pants encounter at the conversion date is considerable. Compared to the results in
section 5.2, we document a price increase of 2-3% points. The increase can be at-
tributed to the risky investment strategy and the guarantee that the exact amount
of retirement wealth is converted at retirement. Table 5.4 also shows convergence
in option prices at 100,000 simulations. Furthermore, 100,000 simulations ensure
signiﬁcance up to the second decimal. We therefore hereafter generate prices based
on 100,000 simulations. Finally, the table with base option prices displays the av-
erage across all scenarios of the deﬂated cumulative stock returns. As expressed by
equation (5.23) the expected value of discounted cumulative stock returns should
be equal to one. We approximate the expected value by the average across all
scenarios and the results show that the theoretical condition is satisﬁed.
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Thesis_Rik V2.pdfTable 5.4: Base Monte Carlo Option Prices
This table presents prices for the lookback life annuity option
with a time to maturity of three years. Prices for both men
and women are expressed in percentages of the wealth at the
issuance date of the option (Wta). We present option prices
based on 90,000, 100,000 and 110,00 scenarios. Prices are sig-
niﬁcant up to less than 2 basispoints. The last row reports the
average across all scenarios of the deﬂated cumulative stock
returns.
90,000 100,000 110,000
Men 8.02 7.98 7.97
Women 9.22 9.17 9.17
E[MRs,T] 0.997 0.999 0.995
5.4.2 Alternative Option Prices
We ﬁrst determine the sensitivity of the option price with respect to the exercise
price. An Asian option with the same time to maturity is priced. The Asian
option holder has the right to convert his retirement wealth into a life annuity for
the average interest rate during time to maturity.
Figure 5.4 shows that transforming the option into an Asian one, considerably
lowers the price. For both men and women the price diﬀerence between the Asian
and lookback option is approximately 6 percentage points. The Asian option
has fewer scenarios with extremely high payoﬀs and many scenarios with a zero
payoﬀ. Only if the terminal rate rT is substantially lower than the average rate,
high payoﬀs are realized.
As a second exercise price sensitivity test, we price an option that guarantees
participants a certain conversion rate. Option prices are determined for guaranteed
rates of 5% and 6%. Figure 5.4 again shows that the impact of changing the option
version is large. Price diﬀerences between the guaranteed rate option and the base
option range from 2.5 to 6 percentage points.
Beside the exercise price, we consider the sensitivity of the option price with
respect to the time to maturity. The base option has a time to maturity of three
years. We determine the eﬀect of a change in time to maturity by pricing lookback
life annuity option with times to maturity of 2, 4 and 5 years.
Figure 5.5 aﬃrms the relatively large sensitivity with respect to the time to
maturity documented in section 5.2. Decreasing the lookback period by one year
leads to a price decrease of 2 percentage points, whereas an increase of one year
causes a price increase of 2 percentage points. A lookback life annuity with a
time to maturity of ﬁve years would cost a participant approximately 12% of the
wealth at the option issuance date. Compared to the base option this implies a
price increase of 4 percentage points.




5 Regret Aversion in Defined Contribution Pension Plans5.4 Empirical Results
Figure 5.4: Variation in Option Design
This ﬁgure displays the eﬀect of a change in option design. Option prices are expressed in a
percentage of wealth at the option issuance date, for both men and women. Prices are provided
for the base option (3 year lookback life annuity) and an Asian option and guaranteed rate option
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Thesis_Rik V2.pdfFigure 5.5: Variation in Time to Maturity
This ﬁgure displays the eﬀect of a change in time to maturity. Option prices are expressed in a
percentage of wealth at the option issuance date, for both men and women. Prices are provided
for the lookback life annuity option with times to maturity of respectively 2 year, 3 year (Base),
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5 Regret Aversion in Defined Contribution Pension Plans5.4 Empirical Results
Figure 5.6: Variation in Initial Rate
This ﬁgure displays the eﬀect of a change in initial conversion rate. Option prices are expressed
in a percentage of wealth at the option issuance date, for both men and women. Prices are
provided for the base option (3 year lookback life annuity with initial rate of 4.42%) and for a
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Figure 5.6 shows that the initial rate does not aﬀect the option price. These
ﬁndings support the proof in the appendix that the option payoﬀ is not aﬀected
by changes in the minimum price.
As a ﬁnal sensitivity test, we price the lookback life annuity option with diﬀer-
ent asset allocations. We restrict the investments during the lifetime of the option
to one of the three available products: stock portfolio, two-year bond and ten-year
bond.
A pure stock investment lowers the price compared to the base option by
1 percentage point. Restricting the investments to the two-year bond reduces
the price by 4 percentage points. Since stocks have a higher risk premium than
two-year bonds, the “stock-only” strategy is more expensive than the two-year
bond strategy. However, when investments are restricted to the ten-year bond, we
observe an increase in price. The price increase is a result of the risky character
of the ten-year bond. Since we consider the ten-year bond rate as the conversion
rate, restricting the investments to this category creates a multiplier eﬀect. In
relatively good scenarios this strategy leads to very high option payoﬀs via the
diﬀerence in terminal and maximum interest rate and via high bond returns. In
relatively bad scenarios this strategy leads to extremely poor payoﬀs vice versa.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the asset mix drives the price of the option, but
only to a minor extent.
5.5 Conclusion
Large numbers of uninformed plan participants face diﬃcult decisions at retire-
ment. Should they make an irreversible and risky investment in a life annuity
or risk the possibility of outliving their money? If they buy a life annuity, when
should they do so? These decisions aﬀect their income for the rest of their lives.
Especially the high value of timing (i.e. early retiring if the long-term interest
rate is decreasing and postponing retirement in increasing interest rate states) the
investment decision provokes regret aversion.
As a remedy for the regret aversion in that decision making process, we de-
velop and price a lookback option on a life annuity. Participants buy this option
in the last years before retirement. It provides them the right to lookback at re-
tirement and buy a life annuity for the minimum forward price in the lookback
period. First, we determine a closed-form lookback life annuity option price with-
out the guarantee that the exact amount of retirement wealth is converted into
a life annuity and under the assumption that the option holder invests risklessly
during the time to maturity of the option. The closed-form option price is 7-9%
of the plan participant’s wealth at the option issuance date. Then we price the
option in an extended pension environment conditional on the guarantee that par-
ticipants convert the exact amount of retirement wealth into a life annuity, with
the possibility to invest in stocks and bonds during the time to maturity of the
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Figure 5.7: Variation in Asset allocation
This ﬁgure displays the eﬀect of a change in asset allocation. Option prices are expressed in a
percentage of wealth at the option issuance date, for both men and women. Prices are provided
for the base option (3 year lookback life annuity with equal allocation in the three investment
categories (stocks, two-year bond and 10 year bond)) and for a lookback life annuity option with
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investment freedom, is 8-9% of the wealth three years before retirement. Hence,
closed-form and simulated prices are comparable.
In the closed-form setting we document that interest rate volatility and time to
maturity are important option price drivers. In the simulation setting, we deter-
mine the option Greeks by pricing alternative options. Another important driver
of the option price is the lookback feature (i.e. the exercise price). If participants
are oﬀered the right to buy the life annuity for the average forward price (Asian
option) or for a predetermined price, the option price decreases substantially. We
ﬁnd that the option price is neither sensitive to the initial interest rate, nor to the
asset allocation during the time to maturity.
Future research could extend our analysis in multiple ways. Participants could
be oﬀered real instead of nominal pension income. Furthermore, mortality risk
and life annuity risk premia could be added in the option pricing environment.
5.A Appendix
This appendix proves that the hedging strategy as speciﬁed in section 5.2 is a
replicating and self-ﬁnancing strategy for a lookback option on a discount bond. To
formally prove that the hedging portfolio is indeed replicating and self-ﬁnancing,
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T P (r,T,s) = UT.
It is straightforward to check that the payoﬀ of the hedging portfolio replicates
the option payoﬀ UT. When the maturity date of the option is approaching,
equations (5.5) to (5.10) show that the portfolio has limit value
lim
t→T




which is identical to the option payoﬀ as speciﬁed in equation (5.2).
To prove that the hedging portfolio is self-ﬁnancing, we have to prove that
dH = ϕ
(T)
t dP(r,t,T) + ϕ
(s)
t dP(r,t,s). (5.34)
An application of Itˆ o’s lemma to expression (5.5) shows that changes in hedging
portfolio value can be characterized as
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Since the hedging portfolio is a function of the time to maturity T − t, the de-
pendence of the hedging portfolio on t is negative, as indicated by the minus in
equation (5.35).
We start with proving that HQdQ = 0. To prove this we can restrict our-




FB(r,t,T,s) → Q(¯ ft,t,s).
If the forward bond price is not at a minimum dQ = 0 and hence HQdQ = 0. We
therefore have to prove that HQ = 0 if the forward bond price attains a minimum.
The methodology to prove this is introduced by Goldman, Sosin, and Gatto (1979).
We prove that the moments of Q
( ¯ fT,ta,T,s
)
, conditional on P(r,t,s), t and
Q(¯ ft,t,s) are independent of Q(¯ ft,t,s) for any ta < t < T. Since the hedging
portfolio payoﬀ and therefore also its value is a function of Q( ¯ fT,T,s), it suﬃces
to show that the distribution of Q( ¯ fT,T,s) is unaﬀected by changes in Q(¯ ft,t,s).
To see the dependence of the option price on Q( ¯ fT,T,s) we note that
CB





F B(r,t,T,s) if Q(¯ ft,t,s) < QT( ¯ fT,ta,T,s)
QT(  ft,T,t,T,s)
F B(r,t,T,s) ≡ Z otherwise,
(5.37)
and let QT( ¯ ft,T,t,T,s) and ft,T respectively be the minimum bond price and maxi-
mum forward rate in the period [t,T]. By construction Q( ¯ fT,T,s) = FB(r,t,T,s)ψ.













with ΦQ the conditional CDF of Q( ¯ fT,T,s) given FB(r,t,T,s). Substitution





Decomposing ψ as in the deﬁnition and noting that we condition on the information































with ΦZ the distribution function of Z. Z is like a return and FB(r,t,T,s) follows
a random walk (see Jamshidian, 1989). Therefore the derivative of the second









Since we only consider the case where FB(r,t,T,s) → Q(¯ ft,t,s) and we assumed
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for the underlying interest rate, the probability
measure at the point
Q(  ft,t,s)
F B(r,t,T,s) is zero. Hence, the n-th moment of Q( ¯ fT,T,s)
is independent of Q(¯ ft,t,s) for any n and therefore HQ = 0 if the forward bond
price attains a minimum.
After proving that HQdQ = 0 and substituting equation (5.1) for dr, the change
in hedging portfolio value is characterized as
dH = HrσrdW +
[







Diﬀerentiating the hedging portfolio value twice towards r, and towards t leads
to:




























Ht = − ϕs
tP(r,t,s)
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t dP(r,t,T) + ϕ
(s)
t dP(r,t,s) (5.48)







This thesis addresses ﬁnancial risk management, ﬁrst from a global, macroeco-
nomic perspective and thereafter narrowing it down per chapter to the individ-
ual pension plan participant. As a main overall conclusion, we can state that it
is crucial for risk management purposes to accurately quantify investment risks.
Better risk measurement enhances risk management decisions. We suggest several
diﬀerent approaches to improve risk measurement, ranging from more complete
data sets to improved model speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. All of our
methods contribute to the risk management of institutional investors and private
individuals. Since the diversity of the topics mentioned in this thesis is too broad
to draw more general conclusions, we proceed on a per chapter basis.
In chapter 2 we show that expectations about the Atlantic trade and specula-
tion in insurance companies may have been important factors driving share prices
in the turbulent year 1720. More speciﬁcally, long-term prospects for Atlantic com-
merce, and ﬁnancial innovation in the organizational form of insurance companies
may have induced a bubble in international asset prices. Our cross-sectional anal-
ysis shows that shares of companies trading with the Americas or involved in the
insurance industry had price run-ups exceeding other industries by large amounts.
We also show that Atlantic trading ﬁrms experienced a permanent price increase,
while ﬁrms in other industries had mixed results. Our cross-sectional evidence
suggests that the ”bubble” may have been based upon some fundamental com-
mon factor that justiﬁed a value increase. While investor irrationality may have
carried prices to many multiples of their post-crash value, the bubble speculation
may have anticipated some long-term permanent eﬀect.
In chapter 3 we improve both the speciﬁcation and estimation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
time-varying equity betas. We combine parametric and non-parametric approaches
for modeling changes in betas. The precision of ﬁrm-level beta estimates is in-
creased by setting up a Bayesian panel data model that exploits information con-
tained in the cross-section of stocks and imposes a common structure on parame-
ters while still allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity. Fundamental and realized




therefore a combination of these speciﬁcations captures more aspects than either
of the separate speciﬁcations. The optimal mixture of the two beta components
varies across ﬁrms and over time. We further demonstrate that our panel data
approach yields more precise estimates of ﬁrm-level betas than the traditional
approach of estimating betas by running a time series regression for every ﬁrm.
Moreover, we document strong cross-sectional variation in betas of ﬁrms that are
grouped together in traditional asset pricing portfolios. Consequently, aggregating
stocks into portfolios conceals important information contained in individual stock
betas and reduces the cross-sectional variation in betas. We also demonstrate that
the mixed betas generated by our panel data model lead to a sharp increase in
the pricing ability of the conditional CAPM. Furthermore, we support the ﬁnding
of Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008) that the use of individual stocks as tests assets
instead of portfolios leads to more eﬃcient estimates in cross-sectional tests of
asset pricing models. We extend their work by showing that a better speciﬁca-
tion and more precise estimation of stock-speciﬁc betas increases the explanatory
power of the CAPM. Additionally, we use our beta estimates for forecasting the
covariance matrix out-of-sample in a minimum variance optimization. The out-of-
sample standard deviation of portfolios constructed using our betas is lower than
that of competing methods.
In chapter 4, we document the domestic equity performance of US pension
funds. We employ a data set that encompasses a large part of the US pension
industry, multiple plan types, various mandate types and contains vast informa-
tion on returns, costs and benchmarks. We provide insights in the average net
risk-adjusted fund return, average cost levels and benchmarks used to evaluate
asset managers. We also test for possible biases that result from the voluntary re-
porting of pension funds to our data provider (CEM) and ﬁnd none. We ﬁnd that
pension funds’ net returns are very close to standard benchmarks, cost levels are
substantially lower than standard mutual fund fees and are strongly diminishing
in fund size. Additionally, we give an overview of the benchmarks used by pension
funds to evaluate their asset managers and show that pension funds use many
diﬀerent benchmarks both across mandates and over time. We argue that pension
funds have bargaining power with external parties, scale advantages in internally
managed portfolios and monitoring ability, which does not lead to higher returns,
but reduces the amount and likelihood of underperformance.
In chapter 5 we develop and price a lookback life annuity option, which pro-
tects deﬁned contribution plan participants against annuity risk at retirement and
provides protection against regret in the retirement timing decision. It grants par-
ticipants the right to look three years back at retirement and buy a life annuity for
the minimum forward price in the lookback period. We determine a closed-form
lookback life annuity option price without the guarantee that the exact amount
of retirement wealth is converted into a life annuity and under the assumption
that the option holder invests risklessly during the time to maturity of the option.
Thereafter, we price the option in an extended pension environment conditional
on the guarantee that participants convert the exact amount of retirement wealth
into a life annuity, with the possibility to invest in stocks and bonds during the
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Thesis_Rik V2.pdftime to maturity of the option and using a stochastic discount factor. The closed-
form option price is 7-9% of the plan participant’s wealth at the option issuance
date. The price for a deﬁned contribution plan participant to insure against regret
aversion at retirement, whilst retaining investment freedom, is 8-9% of the wealth
three years before retirement. Hence, diﬀerences between closed-form and simu-
lated prices are negligible. In the closed-form setting we document that interest
rate volatility and time to maturity are important option price drivers. In the
simulation setting, we determine the option Greeks by pricing alternative options.
Another important driver of the option price is the lookback feature (i.e. the ex-
ercise price). If participants are oﬀered the right to buy the life annuity for the
average forward price (Asian option) or for a predetermined price, the option price
decreases substantially. We ﬁnally ﬁnd that the option price is neither sensitive
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Het meten, controleren en beheersen van ﬁnancieel risico is van cruciaal belang
voor het functioneren van onze maatschappij. Vaak wordt gedacht dat ﬁnancieel
risico vooral belangrijk is voor grote ondernemingen en wordt er bij ﬁnancier-
ing vooral gedacht aan de eﬀectenbeurs. Echter, ﬁnanciering en ﬁnancieel risico
bepalen in grote mate ons welvaartsniveau en verklaren in veel gevallen waarom
bepaalde beslissingen (soms achter de schermen) genomen worden. Zoals Robert
Shiller al aangeeft in zijn eerste college aan nieuwe Yale studenten, leer je de
wereld begrijpen aan de hand van ﬁnanciering. Hij zegt dat iemand misschien
wel zal denken: ”Ik ben een dichter, wat heb ik met ﬁnanciering te maken?”.
Maar voordat je het weet zit je aan tafel bij je uitgever en wordt er over ﬁnanci¨ en
gesproken.
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan het meten en beheersen van ﬁnancieel risico.
We dragen op verschillende manieren bij aan dit onderwerp. We starten op een
globaal niveau door internationale zeepbellen in aandelenprijzen te bestuderen en
vernauwen ons gezichtsveld telkens verder.
In hoofdstuk 1, leiden we het onderwerp in en benadrukken we het belang
van risicobeheersing voor zowel institutionele beleggers als individuen. We zetten
ook uiteen waarom het van cruciaal belang is dat we ﬁnancieel risico nauwkeurig
kunnen meten.
In hoofdstuk 2 bekijken we welke factoren ertoe bijgedragen hebben dat veel
investeerders in 1720 besloten aandelen te kopen en vervolgens veel geld verloren.
Vaak worden deze beslissingen toegeschreven aan latente, publieke hebzucht of
wereldwijd irrationeel of ongefundeerd enthousiasme. Wij proberen nieuwe verk-
laringen voor de zeepbellen te vinden door de verschillen in grootte tussen de bellen
van diverse aandelen te bestuderen.
Zo laten we zien dat aandelen van ondernemingen die handelden met het
Westen (Royal African Company, WIC en South Sea Company) veel sterker stegen
dan aandelen van ondernemingen die geen handel dreven met het nieuw-ontdekte
gebied. Wat zou de onderliggende oorzaak kunnen zijn van het vertrouwen in de
ondernemingen die met Amerika handelden? Wij vermoeden dat de afnemende
Spaanse dominantie in het Westen een belangrijke rol gespeeld heeft. Spanje had
het recht om in het Westen slaven te verhandelen (Asiento) verloren en had in
de laatste twee oorlogen (Spaanse Successieoorlog en de Oorlog van de Quadru-




verloor veel gebied aan Groot-Brittani¨ e. Wellicht dat de recente overwinningen
tot optimisme onder de Britse belegger geleid hebben.
Ook tonen we aan dat aandelen van nieuwe verzekeringsmaatschapppijen veel
sterker in prijs stegen dan de overige aandelen. Rond het jaar 1720, vond er een
belangrijke ﬁnanci¨ ele innovatie plaats en waren verzekeringsmaatschappijen voor
het eerst in staat om kapitaal te verzamelen door de uitgifte van aandelen. De
aandeelhouder kon zo slechts zeer beperkt afhankelijk worden van de ﬁnanci¨ ele
situatie van de onderneming. Dit was een enorme vooruitgang ten opzichte van
de grote afhankelijkheid die investeerders voordien hadden. Verzekeringen werden
voor de innovatie namelijk geﬁnancierd door kapitaalkrachtige handelaren die grote
sommen geld verenigden. De kapitaalkrachtigen waren zo met grote sommen geld
afhankelijk van de onderneming. Veel beleggers zagen de toegevoegde waarde van
de nieuwe ondernemingsvorm in en hoopten mee te proﬁteren van de toekomstige
winsten door aandelen aan te schaﬀen.
In hoofdstuk 3 stellen we een nieuwe manier voor om het risico van individuele
aandelen te kwantiﬁceren. We brengen een verbetering aan in de modelspeciﬁ-
catie die gebruikt worden om risico te kwantiﬁceren, en we passen nieuwe, ef-
ﬁci¨ entere schattingsmethoden voor deze modellen voor. De verbeteringen leiden
tot een grotere verklaringskracht in cross-sectionele testen van aandelenprijzen,
ten opzichte van concurrerende methoden.
Een van de meest gebruikte methoden om het risico van een individueel aandeel
weer te geven, is de CAPM-beta. Hoewel verschillende studies aangetoond hebben
dat deze beta tijdsvari¨ erend is, bestaat er grote onenigheid over de manier waarop
deze tijdsvariatie gemodelleerd dient te worden. Aan de ene kant zijn er studies
die de tijdsvariatie modelleren door beta afhankelijk te maken van economische
factoren. Aan de andere kant, is er een andere groep wetenschappers die kiest voor
een data-gedreven beta, bijvoorbeeld door beta’s op korte intervallen te schatten
of beta autoregressief te maken. Wij combineren beide methoden en laten het
gewicht dat aan elk van de methoden gegeven wordt per aandeel en door de tijd
vari¨ eren.
Daarnaast verbeteren we schattingsmethoden door een hi¨ erarchisch Bayesi-
aans panel model toe te passen. Door een gelijke verdeling te veronderstellen
voor fonds-speciﬁeke parameters, is het model ﬂexibel, maar zijn de schattingen
toch erg nauwkeurig. Het model heeft de ﬂexibiliteit om veel gewicht aan fonds-
speciﬁeke schattingen te geven wanneer deze accuraat zijn en minder wanneer ze
minder nauwkeurig zijn. Ook maken we gebruik van hoog-frequente data in de
schatting van de data-gedreven beta, waarbij we een gewichtenfunctie speciﬁceren
die meer gewicht geeft aan meer recente observaties. Deze verbeteringen leiden
tot een grote toename in de nauwkeurigheid van de beta schattingen, gemeten in
betrouwbaarheidsintervallen.
In een toepassing laten we zien dat onze verbeterde beta schattingen ook leiden
tot een grotere verklarende kracht in cross-sectionele aandelenprijzingstoetsen. We
laten zien dat de risicopremie dichter bij het datagemiddelde ligt, dat de R2 van
ons model aanmerkelijk hoger is dan bij alternatieve modellen en dat ons model




toepassing laat zien dat er aanzienlijke verschillen in beta’s bestaan binnen tra-
ditionele portefeuilles die gebruikt worden voor aandelenprijzingstoetsen. Dit is
in strijd met de populaire aanname dat beta’s binnen een dergelijke portefeuille
gelijk zijn. Tot slot tonen we aan dat onze nauwkeurigere beta schattingen voordeel
opleveren bij de constructie van portefeuilles met minimum variantie. In een out-
of-sample analyse verslaan we met behulp van onze beta’s concurrerende modellen
(bijvoorbeeld tijdreeks-geschatte beta’s) in termen van standaarddeviatie.
In hoofdstuk 4 zoomen we verder in door enkel naar de binnenlandse aandelen-
portefuilles van Amerikaanse pensioenfondsen te kijken. We meten de gemiddelde
rendementen na risicocorrectie. Ook meten we de gemiddelde kostenniveaus en
schaalvoordelen in kosten van grote pensioenfondsen. Verder geven we aan welke
indices vaak door pensioenfondsen gebruikt worden als referentiepunt voor beo-
ordeling van de aandelenrendementen (referentie-indices).
Door een gebrek aan data over pensioenfondsen, bestaat er geen consensus over
de prestaties van hun aandelenportefeuilles. Veel gebruikte databases bevatten
slechts een bepaald type fonds, data op portefeuilleniveau en niet op fondsniveau.
Bovendien zijn de data onderhevig aan biases omdat pensioenfondsen nu eenmaal
geen verplichting hebben om hun resultaten periodiek te rapporteren. Gezien de
grote diversiteit tussen de verschillende databases, is het niet vreemd dat verschil-
lende studies tot uiteenlopende bevindingen komen. Verder is data over de kosten
van pensioenfondsen of referentie-indices vrijwel niet-bestaand.
Wij geven inzicht in de prestaties van de binnenlandse aandelenportefeuilles
van Amerikaanse pensioenfondsen, waarbij we gebruik maken van een veelom-
vattende database. Onze data lijdt niet aan eerder genoemde biases, en bevat
uitgebreide informatie over rendementen, kosten en referentie-indices. Ook bevat
onze database vele soorten pensioenfondsen en hebben wij data op fondsniveau.
We laten zien dat Amerikaanse pensioenfondsen, na risicocorrectie, rendementen
hebben die heel dicht bij de referentie-indices liggen. Verder tonen we aan dat de
kostenniveaus van pensioenfondsen een stuk lager zijn dan van beleggingsfondsen
en dat er grote schaalvoordelen in kosten zijn. Daarnaast geven we inzichten in de
indices die pensioenfondsen als referentie gebruiken (referentie-indices). We laten
zien dat er een breed scala aan indices gebruikt wordt voor referentie-doeleinden
en dat de indices per fonds en over de tijd veranderen. We tonen aan dat pensioen-
fondsen beter dan individuele beleggers of beleggingsfondsen in staat zijn kosten
te reduceren. Verder beweren we dat pensioenfondsen door hun grootte beter
in staat zijn om hun portefeuilles te bewaken, een grote onderhandelingskracht
hebben met externe partijen en interne schaalvoordelen hebben. Dit leidt niet tot
hogere rendementen, maar stelt hen wel in staat om de kans op en grootte van
slechte rendementen te beperken.
In hoofdstuk 5 verkleinen we onze focus nog verder en bestuderen we de risico’s
van pensioendeelnemers in een beschikbaar premiesysteem. Vlak voor de pensioen-
datum dient een deelnemer zijn pensioen om te zetten in een lijfrente. Hierbij
wordt hij blootgesteld aan veel renterisico en loopt hij een groot risico om spijt te
krijgen van het moment waarop hij zijn vermogen geconverteerd heeft. Een half




inkomensverschillen van 10%. Wij ontwikkelen en waarderen een optie die hem
beschermt tegen beide risico’s.
Wij ontwikkelen en prijzen een lookback optie op een lijfrente. Het lookback-
karakter van de optie biedt de koper bescherming tegen mogelijke spijt van het
kiezen van de pensioneringsdatum. Verder beschermt de optie de deelnemer ook
tegen het renterisico dat hij loopt bij de conversie van zijn opgebouwde kapitaal
in een lijfrente. We leiden eerst een closed-form optieprijs af, onder restrictieve
aannames met betrekking tot de beleggingsmogelijkheden gedurende de looptijd
van de optie. Daarna laten we enkele restrictieve aannames varen en waarderen
de optie met behulp van simulatietechnieken.
We tonen aan dat de prijs van de optie ongeveer 8% van het opgebouwde
kapitaal bedraagt. Ook laten we zien dat de hoogte van de prijs vooral bepaald
wordt door het lookback-karakter van de optie, i.e. de prijs van bescherming tegen
spijt is relatief hoog. Wanneer we het lookback-kenmerk verwijderen, wordt de
optie aanmerkelijk goedkoper. Ook toont de optieprijs gevoeligheid met betrekking
tot de volatiliteit van het onderliggende renteproces en de looptijd van de optie.
Echter, de beleggingsmix en de rentestand bij aankoop van de optie spelen geen
belangrijke rol in de waardering van de optie.
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